Potential confrontations

GOSS 'continues to be driven by the belief that a confrontation with
the north is likely... This stance has shaped its current security
strategy, which focuses on defending the border with the north and
other strategic positions [and] containing potential spoilers,
including possible allies of Khartoum'

'while no proof has been produced of Northern support to those
involved in clashes in the south, it had a "history of using brutal
tactics to sow chaos throughout Sudan's vast periphery [including]
employing proxy militias to incite violence at the local level, from
Darfur to the Nuba Mountains"'

'Southern leaders have started to blame the north over related
inter-communal clashes... "They [tensions and rivalries] emanate from
a diabolical strategy aimed at projecting the people of Southern Sudan
as a people who cannot govern themselves, particularly as we approach
general elections and the referendum," Southern President Salva Kiir
told the Southern parliament in Juba on 15 June'

'the two sides seem to have an almost inexhaustible supply of topics
to disagree upon, such as the composition of the electorate in Abyei
and the delineation and demarcation of the north-south border'

' "There still are legitimate and disturbing questions about
Khartoum's commitment to full implementation of the CPA."'

'both the north and the south are bracing for war in 2011, regardless
of concurrent recommitments to implementation of the faltering [CPA]'



Analysis: Hurdles on the road to Sudan peace

MALAKAL, 5 August 2009 (IRIN) - Five months after Southern Sudanese
forces clashed with fighters allied to the north in Malakal town of
Upper Nile State, the city has remained under divided control.

"Part of the town is controlled by Joint Integrated Units [JIUs]
allied to the Sudan Armed Forces, and the southern areas by the Sudan
People's Liberation Army [SPLA]," said a local resident, who requested
anonymity.

Malakal town is just one of many potential flashpoints for the 2005
north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

The agreement halted a war that began in 1983 over resources, power,
religion and self-determination. Its endgame will require border
demarcation, voter registration, national elections, and an eventual
referendum on southern secession, all by the end of 2011.

The recent arbitration on the region of Abyei deals with only one of
a range of potentially explosive problems.

The casualties, injuries and displacement of the long civil war dwarf
Sudan's other conflicts, including Darfur. Some estimates suggest more
than two million people died, while about four million were uprooted
and some 600,000 people fled the country as refugees.

Now, both sides are accused of re-arming and positioning forces at
likely flashpoint areas, either as a deterrent, in defence or
preparation for conflict - including around the north-south border or
in the three "transitional" areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and
Southern Blue Nile.

"The situation is very complicated," a source at the UN Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS) in Malakal told IRIN. "The SPLA is building up arms and
bringing in tanks. During the 24-25 February [Malakal] clash, the JIU
too had tanks."

According to the NGO Small Arms Survey, the government of Southern
Sudan continues to be driven by the belief that a confrontation with
the north is likely, while internal conflicts have also flared up in
recent months.

"This stance has shaped its current security strategy, which focuses
on defending the border with the north and other strategic positions
[and] containing potential spoilers, including possible allies of
Khartoum," it said in a 14 May briefing paper.

Malakal is one example of where partial implementation of the deal
has left a fragile security situation.

Divided Malakal

"Spoilers" include organised armed groups and political groupings in
the south opposed to the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). The
"Other Armed Groups" were supposed to be mopped up in the CPA.

During the war these were funded and encouraged by the north to
disrupt the SPLA, according to analysts. Since the peace accord,
former commanders of these militia have been absorbed into the SAF or
the SPLA.

Tensions, however, remain between the various units. The February
Malakal clashes, for example, occurred after a former Southern
Sudanese militia leader, who was opposed to the SPLA and is now SAF,
Major General, Gabriel Tang-Ginya, arrived in Malakal.

Malakal, according to the 2005 agreement, is meant to be manned by
the JIUs, so the presence of a SAF officer was a provocation,
observers at UNMIS said. In any case, analysts say the SAF component
of JIUs in the South are comprised mainly of southerners who used to
be in Khartoum-backed militias.

Tensions rose, leading to an exchange of fire in which one civilian
was killed and two SPLA soldiers injured. Asked to leave Malakal,
Tang-Ginya refused, sparking off fighting that escalated to involve
tanks.

At least 62 people, including 30 civilians, were killed before
Southern Sudanese Vice-President Riek Machar flew in to restore order.

"We believe that Tang-Ginya is being used by SAF as a catalyst to
start another civil war in Southern Sudan," the Southern Sudanese
information and broadcasting ministry said in a statement after the
clashes.

Malakal's best-known political leader, former foreign minister Lam
Akol, has meanwhile split from the ruling SPLM and announced the
formation of a breakaway party.

The Enough Project, in a 1 July paper, noted that while no proof has
been produced of Northern support to those involved in clashes in the
south, it had a "history of using brutal tactics to sow chaos
throughout Sudan's vast periphery [including] employing proxy militias
to incite violence at the local level, from Darfur to the Nuba
Mountains".

Clashes and massacres

This year, according to Oxfam, has so far been the most violent for
Southern Sudan since the CPA. More than 1,000 people have reportedly
been killed, largely in inter-communal clashes and at least 214,000
have fled their homes - more even than in Darfur this year.

The latest massacre, in which Murle are alleged to have killed Lou
Nuer west of Akobo on 2 August, claimed the lives of up to 180 people,
according to local officials.

Southern leaders have started to blame the north over related
inter-communal clashes in Jonglei State, between the Murle and the Lou
sub-section of the Nuer ethnic group.

"They [tensions and rivalries] emanate from a diabolical strategy
aimed at projecting the people of Southern Sudan as a people who
cannot govern themselves, particularly as we approach general
elections and the referendum," Southern President Salva Kiir told the
Southern parliament in Juba on 15 June.

The government in Khartoum denies these claims.

Aid workers say inter-communal violence and raids have added to the
sense of precarious security and governance.

Southern disarmament

As southern clashes are turning increasingly lethal, it is partly due
to the wide distribution of weapons among civilians.

Residents of Akobo in Jonglei, which hosts about 19,000 displaced
people, say total disarmament would help reduce violence in the
region. "Without a gun, you cannot easily kill," local trader Deng
Gony said. "The solution is total disarmament."

Efforts to disarm fighters have been made, including partial
disarmament by the southern government of mainly Nuer residents of
Jonglei. This, however, left the Lou Nuer community exposed to attacks
from the Murle and other communities. The result was that the disarmed
community re-armed, observers said.

Lately, the UN has started backing a more comprehensive disarmament
process, but analysts say there is a major challenge - the CPA has
provisions for the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, but
provides little guidance on disarming civilians.

Elections and commitments

Most importantly perhaps for Southern Sudan are national elections in
April 2010 and a referendum on self-determination in 2011. A spanner
was thrown into the works recently when the GOSS rejected the results
of the 2008 census.

Announced in May, the results showed that Southerners constitute 21
percent of Sudan's population. The South said its population was
greater than that.

There is also disagreement over the oil-rich Abyei region. While the
results of the Abyei arbitration appear to have settled one issue,
according to media reports, the two sides seem to have an almost
inexhaustible supply of topics to disagree upon, such as the
composition of the electorate in Abyei and the delineation and
demarcation of the north-south border.

In Washington, Ambassador Richard Williamson told a Congressional
hearing on 29 July: "The [CPA] was a monumental achievement toward
beginning to overcome these religious, racial, ethnic and tribal
divides. But the peace it brokered remains fragile, and the peace deal
is neither simple nor neat.

"There still are legitimate and disturbing questions about Khartoum's
commitment to full implementation of the CPA."

"It is increasingly evident that there is a widespread breakdown of
peace in Southern Sudan, and that both the north and the south are
bracing for war in 2011, regardless of concurrent recommitments to
implementation of the faltering [CPA]," the Enough Project warned.

Recently, representatives of the two groups met in Washington and
recommitted themselves to the agreement, but observers remain
sceptical.

"If this agreement fails, there is a risk that all of Sudan will go
to war again," Melanie Teff of Refugees International warned recently.
"Every possible step must be taken to prevent a return to the horrors
of the past."

END