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Conflict Threats
& Peace Assessment
Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Kadugli, Kauda & Abyei
Enhancing People to People Indigenous Capacities Program Pact Sudan
(CA 650-A-00-06-00005-00)
June 2007
Disclaimer:
This report was made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The views expressed in this publication do not however necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. Its contents are the responsibility of Pact Sudan. 2
Table of Contents
Table of Contents.............................................................................................................3
List of Acronyms...............................................................................................................4
List of Tables...................................................................................................................5
Section I: Introduction................................................................................................6
Report Purposes...........................................................................................................6
Report Design..............................................................................................................7
Section II: Methodology, Approach & Analysis...........................................................8
Methodology of the Conflict Threat and Peace Assessments..............................................8
Conflict Assessment Findings.......................................................................................10
EPPIC Analysis based on findings.................................................................................11
Section III: Conflict and Peace Assessment...............................................................14
JUBA – Conflict and Peace Assessment.........................................................................21
MALAKAL - Conflict and Peace Assessment....................................................................31
AWEIL - Conflict and Peace Assessment........................................................................40
TRANSITIONAL AREAS AND THE CPA – AN OVERVIEW..................................................48
KADUGLI AND KAUDA - Conflict and Peace Assessment..................................................53
ABYEI - Conflict and Peace Assessment........................................................................70
Section IV: EPPIC Analysis of Conflict Threats..............................................81
Understanding Structural Causes in Sudan....................................................................82
The historical perspective............................................................................................84
Structural Causes & the CPA........................................................................................85
Urban Issues and the CPA...........................................................................................87
Section V: Conclusion.................................................................................................89
Bibliography..................................................................................................................90
Annex 1 – The EPPIC Program........................................................................................91
Annex 2 – EPPIC INDICATORS ON THREATS TO THE CPA..................................................92
Annex 3 – EPPIC Selection Criteria of Identified Conflict Threats.........................................93
Annex 4 – EPPIC Partner Selection Scoring.......................................................................94
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List of Acronyms
ABC Abyei Boundary Commission
ARD Associates fro Rural Development
BEG Bahr el Ghazal
BYDA Bahr el Ghazal Youth Development Agency
CANS Civil Authority of New Sudan
CBO Community Based Organisation
CES Central Equatoria State
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO Civil Society Organisation
DDR Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation
ECS Episcopalian Church of Sudan
EPPIC Enhancing People to People Indigenous Capacities
GNU Government of National Unity
GOS Government of Sudan
GOSS Government of Southern Sudan
GRPB Grass Roots Peace Building
HEC High Executive Council
IDP Internally Displaced People/Person
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAD Intergovernmental Group for Assistance and Development
JIU Joint Integrated Units
JMC Juba Municipal Council
JMC Joint Military Commission
LRA Lords Resistance Army
NBEG Northern Bahr el Ghazal
NCP National Congress Party
NDI National Democratic Party
NESI New Sudan Indigenous Network
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NIF National Islamic Front
NSCC New Sudan Council of Churches
OAGS Other Armed Groups
PC Peace Committees
PCOS Presbyterian Church of the Sudan
PDF Popular Defense Force
RVI Rift Valley Institute
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SCC Sudan Council of Churches
SCP Sudan Country Program
SDA Seventh Day Adventists
SIC Sudan Inland Church
SNGO Sudan Non-Government Organisation
SPF Sudan Peace Fund
SPLA/SPLM Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/Movement
SPLM PRC SPLM Peace and Reconciliation Commission
SPP Southern Political Parties
SPRP Sudan People’s Revolutionary Party
SRG Southern Regional Government
SSDF South Sudan Defence Force
SSPC Southern Sudan Peace Commission
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List of Tables
Table 1: Summary of Conflict Threats.............................................................................17
Table 2: Juba Conflict Threat Analysis Summary...............................................................25
Table 3: Malakal Conflict Threat Analysis.........................................................................35
Table 4: Summary Aweil Conflict Threats.........................................................................43
Table 5: South Kordofan Conflict Threats........................................................................61
Table 6: Abyei Conflict Threats.......................................................................................75
Kauda
Kadugli
Aweil
Malakal
Juba
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Section I:
Introduction
____________________________________________________
Report Purposes
This assessment report is the result of research and analysis conducted by Pact-Sudan in Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Southern Kordofan and Abyei as a milestone activity for a new five-year USAID-funded program named ‘Enhancing People to People Indigenous Capacities’ (EPPIC) which will run from September 2006 to September 2011. The ‘Local Conflict Threat and Peace Assessments’ presented here is the first essential achievement of a program designed to strategically enhance the capacity of local actors to engage in conflict and peace activities.
EPPIC was specifically designed to ‘target and mitigate threats to the CPA at the local level ‘. More specifically the EPPIC Program is to “target and mitigate conflict in the urban centers and their counties in Southern Sudan, key locations in the Three Areas, as well as other key flashpoint locations as identified, by building viable indigenous conflict resolution capacities”. In response to this EPPIC has four specific project objectives:
• To analyze critical threats to the CPA at the local level during 2006– 2011
• To address threats to the CPA in urban centers and their counties, as well as the former opposition-held territories in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Abyei and other flashpoints as identified
• To enhance the capacity of Traditional Authorities, Peace Committees and other peace actors by building their skills to be effective in resolving conflict
• To build the capacity of the GoSS Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC).
Based on the assessments and analysis presented in this report EPPIC will support training in conflict transformation and peace-building as well as support indigenous capacity to undertake related activities based upon a solid local-knowledge and a grounded understanding of local conflict threats and peace opportunities.
This document is the result of months of on-the-ground research, conducted mostly from December 2006 to April 2007, by EPPIC staff in collaboration with multiple local stakeholders and potential local actors. The findings and subsequent analysis of this report aims to achieve several programmatic objectives:
To better understand the local conflict and peace dynamics in key program locations and how the local conflicts identified might be a threat to the CPA.
To better understand the linkage between the local conflict threats and the deeper root causes of conflict that have been endemic to Southern Sudan for many years.
To identify local actors and stakeholders who could potentially play a role in addressing conflict and peace in those localities;
To guide the development of EPPIC’s strategic plan which will set out the interventions and activities - and partnerships - that will address some of the conflict threats and peace opportunities.
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To provide critical information to the EPPIC’s official peace partner, Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) as part its ongoing commitment to enhance the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan’s official peace institution;
To provide accurate and detailed information to help guide and design interventions of local peace actors and stakeholders with a more coherent, inclusive and pro-active approach;
To specifically motivate and engender peace-interventions by local EPPIC partners, targeting the involvement and capacity-building of traditional leaders, peace committees, women, youth, IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Southern Kordofan and Abyei.
This document is therefore not only aiming to identify local threats to the CPA and/or opportunities for fostering peace but more specifically to use that critical identification to wrestle with the challenges of how to realistically and effectively address those threats and opportunities and engage local peace partners and other actors as part of a longer-term peace-building process.1
It recognizes that these assessments were undertaken at a particular period of time and that the conflict and peace environment is fluid and for ever adapting to new realities and new dynamics. At the same time there are fundamental root causes of conflict that characterize Sudan which continue to dominate the social and political and every other arena – even with the signing of the CPA. Monitoring the waves of change above the sea of troubles will be a key part of the EPPIC program over the course of its existence.
Report Design
The report firstly explains the methodology used to identify the conflict threats in Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Kadugli, Kauda and Abyei and their surrounds. This includes an explanation and rationale of some of the tools developed and used to score the threats identified. Assessment findings are presented with an outline of the general and historical background of each location (Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Southern Kordofan and Abyei), followed by a more structured and succinct identification of emerging or persisting local threats following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2004. Each identified local conflict threat identified is associated to broader structural and proximate causes of conflict, and are explicitly linked to the EPPIC Program, highlighting relevance of identified conflict threat to the specific mandate of the program, as well as possible local entry points.
Finally this report places the findings into an analytical context and framework which seeks to provide a rationale for the way EPPIC will make certain programmatic choices that recognize the unique context of Sudan, its complex history of conflicts within the light of the CPA.
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1 See the annex for a fuller description of the EPPIC Program and its purpose and objectives.
Section II:
Methodology,
Approach
& Analysis
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1. Methodology of the Conflict Threat and Peace Assessments
The analysis and assessments undertaken in the each area were done by Pact EPPIC staff in conjunction with local stakeholders. Meetings with members of state and local government as well as members of civil society and as much as possible people from the grassroots communities helped to triangulate information and to unpack the nuanced nature of the threats/conflicts or potential threats/conflict.
Then using carefully designed scoring and selection tools developed by the EPPIC team these threats/conflicts were scored.2 This enabled the team to give some objectivity to what they had learnt on the ground. It also helped to bring some consistency of approach across locations.
The threat evaluation and selection tools were designed and discussed, further developed and tested and reviewed again at a two-day EPPIC strategic planning meeting in Juba at the end of March. The team finally agreed on the final format of the tools to be used as follows:
Tool 1 - Key Indicators on threats to the CPA
In order to unpack the degree of importance of a threat to the CPA a series of questions or indicators were developed which could be scored from 1 to 4. Selected indicators were carefully scrutinized and weighed to balance out various social, political, economic and security considerations. In all 25 questions/indicators were developed to help give a score out of 100. There was some debate over whether some questions should be weighted more than others but in the end it was decided that this would not be done.
Each of the local conflict threats identified is scored using this tool. The score helps to show the degree to which that conflict may threaten peace and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Southern Sudan. A minimum score will be required for each conflict threat to be deemed relevant to the stated goals and purpose of the EPPIC program.
Tool 2 - Selection Criteria for EPPIC Conflict Threats
Those conflict threats scored relevant for each area can then be examined in the light of ten selection criteria to help the team determine the extent to which it would be appropriate and feasible for the EPPIC team and partners to work on this threat. Selected criteria include some of the following considerations:
a) Whether it fits EPPIC objectives and could be addressed with the help of EPPIC;
2 See the tools in the annex at the end of this report.
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b) Local perceptions on the ground and the expected degree of conflict threat to local stakeholders: and
c) Whether the conflict threat could possibly be mitigated at the local level through local partners.
Tool 3 - Partner Selection Process
Each potential partner identified in the assessment process will be scored using this tool. A minimum score will again be required for partners to be deemed adequate for the EPPIC program. Partners may not only be peace committee, councils and traditional leaders but also other entities which have sufficient local legitimacy and credibility and especially a willingness and commitment to engage in long term local consensus-building activities.
EPPIC’s key government counterpart organization - the Southern Sudan Peace Commission were also formally included in this selection process by being asked to comment on each proposed partner before being submitted to USAID for review. As part of its own mandate, the EPPIC program aims to keep the SSPC informed and involved in the prioritisation and selection of local partners. For easy reference and monitoring the conflict threats can then be put into a table (see Tables 2-6).
The selection and scoring tools were part of the three-step process applied to conflict threats and potential partners in each area to ensure that program focus and partners selected is based on criteria relevant to the EPPIC program. With this information and from the whole Conflict Threats & Peace Assessment reporting process EPPIC is then in a position to determine a) which issues to focus on – both in terms of conflict threats and peace opportunities, b) which activities to undertake, c) which stakeholders/actors to work closely with, d) which trainings to offer and eventually as required e) which grants to allocate.
Following this methodology EPPIC undertook the assessments. On-the-ground assessment meetings in Transitional Areas, Aweil, Malakal and Juba resulted in the identification of a number of local conflict threats which were then scored to highlight a) the degree to which they are a threat to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (tool 1) and b) the degree to which EPPIC and/or local partners might be able to address them at the local level (tool 2). Different EPPIC team member scored both tools separately so as to triangulate the scoring for each conflict threat. The results and major differences were subsequently discussed to reach a more reflective and consensual final result.
As part of the assessment process EPPIC teams also identified a number of local peace partners potentially able and committed to engage in conflict mitigation and longer-term peace-building activities. Potential partners were selected with a priority focus on traditional authorities and vulnerable groups (women, IDPs and youth), as well as their local legitimacy and anticipated ability to engage in local activities. The selection process involved regular meetings with each ‘partner’ to ascertain their capacity and potential commitment to and participation in EPPIC’s long-term peace-building program. The EPPIC program was presented not only as a means to address local conflict threats to the CPA but to also to assist its partners in becoming more skilful and effective peace actors.
The analysis based on these reports also helps the EPPIC Program to identify synergies and linkages between threats and issues and to roll out a coherent strategy for the next year and beyond. It also helps to assess risk. Clearly there are huge issues at stake with regards to the implementation of the CPA and the potential to actually contribute to conflict rather than mitigate it is always a danger without an assessment of potential consequence of any action or intervention taken.
The methodology used is designed to more fully understand the manifestation of conflict in these specific locations in view of the past as well as in the light of events since the CPA. The threats to the CPA in
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each of these locations is set out below and whilst there are specifics to each location there are also many commonalities between locations as would be expected given the similar experience of the communities of Southern Sudan and given the nature of the peace agreement that includes just the two main sets of protagonists.
However as well as understand threats to the CPA at the local level there is also need to understand the potential opportunities to build peace.3 This assessment report does not reflect the elements required to build peace as well as the threats to the CPA and potential causes of conflict. This is because building peace is a much more expansive area of work than mitigating conflict. EPPIC will need to develop tools and mechanisms to judge peace opportunities at the local level that will reflect an understanding of how change happens in such a fragmented post conflict environment. Whilst opportunities do exist they need to be understood within the wider context of the CPA and within the wider stakeholder environment. Just as local conflict is linked to the wider conflict so local peace is linked to the wider peace and because real peace is about the transformation of destructive relationships into a network of cooperative and constructive ones it involves many complex actions and a whole range of actors.
2. Conflict Assessment Findings
The following assessment findings are based on information gathered during the early part of 2007; they are a snapshot of the threats at a specific period of time in the specific locations assessed. However it is clear that there are deep underlying root causes to these threats that are part of Sudan’s historic dynamic as well as certain newer elements that overlay these due to the CPA. Monitoring these dynamics in each location as well as of the overall implementation of the CPA in (Southern) Sudan will be a fundamental activity if the EPPIC Program is to be responsive to threats/opportunities to the CPA locally.
For analytical purposes EPPIC has identified seven main root causes of instability in Sudan that have and continue to foster potential violent conflict. All of these have become characteristic strategies of various Khartoum regimes and been embedded in government policy and practice over many years. They are the fundamental reasons why Sudan has been embroiled in civil war for much of its independent existence. Many of these root causes interact and often coalesce to make conflict in Sudan complex and difficult to address.
1. Institutional weakness of the state 4 – the history of bad and abusive elitist governance in Sudan, the use of or promotion of violence as policy to impose policy, the strong military presence and accompanying abusive security apparatus, the weakness and/or denial of the rule of law, the manipulation of power within government and the use of divide and rule tactics to foment ethnic division, the prevalence of rampant corruption. The lack of institutional strength leaves the door open for interpersonal relationships to be strong drivers of conflict where internal rivalries come to the fore.
2. Identity - the manipulation of ethnic, religious, and cultural differences for political gain or from misguided or pernicious perspectives or malign agendas; the promotion of single or specific
3 It should be noted that in addition to this summary report each location assessed has its own detailed report which provides more of an in depth background on the relevant geo-political, economic and social issues (structural and proximate) with a focus on groups in disputes, local grievances, potential triggers and conflict, opportunities for peace and essential peace actors, as well as insight into the specific position and perceptions of local traditional authorities and peace committees or councils.
4 Just at the time of writing the USG is seeking to strengthen sanctions against Sudan because as President George Bush states "President Bashir's actions over the past few weeks follow a long pattern of promising co-operation while finding new methods of obstruction." Such tactics are also familiar in the way the relationship with Southern Sudan re the CPA is being practiced.
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identities (Arab/Islamic) rather than common multiple identities (Sudanese/African). This is probably the key issue for people in Southern Sudan and the Transitional Areas.
3. Inequitable recovery/development – the rich elite at the expense of the majority poor, the lack of investment in the periphery, the misappropriation of community assets by elites – especially land in the Transitional Areas: the control of trade and markets and means of production, the fostering of corrupt or biased foreign direct investment.
4. Insecurity – the sponsoring of the presence of military, of OAGs, and of predatory criminal groups; an armed citizenry - coupled with the absence of or abusive police and rule of law.
5. Interests – the grabbing of control of power and/or resources - oil and other - for personal or elitist economic or political gain. Individual ambition is a strong element here as again are internal rivalries. Elitist agendas driving public policy and practice.
6. Injustice – the misuse of the law or the promulgation of bad law, the grabbing and misappropriation of land from the poor using law, the taking of resources belonging to others, the denial of proper representation in decision making, the lack of recourse to justice to find redress or restitution. The lack on independence of the judiciary and checks on the Executive.
7. International factors - the support of others powers to protect social, political and economic domination and exploitation. The fault lines of external political agendas strongly influences internal decisions. The weakness of the international system to prevent abuse or to force better practice and accountability.
In the conflict assessments to follow these root causes underpin the more proximate manifestations of conflict. If violent conflict is to be triggered it is most likely to be linked to these deeper causes. The link between local and national conflict and root and trigger causes is a fundamental characteristic of the Sudan context.
3. EPPIC Analysis based on these findings
The EPPIC Program recognizes the distinction between threats at the national level to peace as negotiated in the CPA and threats at the local level. However, while the EPPIC Program focuses on the local level threats to the CPA, it understands that those threats are often linked to wider issues and are often a local manifestation of national problems in Sudan. The analysis that follows the findings outlined below demonstrates Pact’s efforts at developing a more strategic approach towards identifying and addressing conflict threats to the CPA at the local level as well as looking for opportunities to build peace.
Understanding Key Terms and Issues
t
As the main purpose of EPPIC is to ‘target and mitigate threats to the CPA at the local level’ there are key terms and issues that need clarifying and defining to enable the Program to be coherent and focused.
Firstly there is need to decide what a critical local threat to the CPA actually is. A critical threat to the CPA at the local level is defined by EPPIC as a hostile intention to inflict damage and injury on neighbourhoods and communities through the abrogation of some aspec of the CPA. This could be a threat that leads to violent conflict on or between communities, but it need not necessarily do so. It could also be a threat that negates part of the CPA in such a way as to deliberately cause damage to 11
communities socially, economically or politically but which is not overtly violent in the narrow sense of physical harm to person/s or property.
Secondly it needs clarifying whether such a local threat to the CPA is critical to the whole CPA, in that it could lead to its abrogation by either of the two signatories, or if it is just a local manifestation of the failure to implement the CPA fully and comprehensively. In most cases local threats are the latter, but given the nature of threats they always have the potential to escalate. However, most local threats are a cause for the undermining of trust and confidence in the CPA and in one or other of the signatories, causing the perpetuation of polarized positions of whole communities and groups of people that does not foster unity or peaceful co-existence. Therefore, a critical threat can be defined as one that not only breaks the letter of the CPA but the spirit also, and both are needed for the successful implementation of the CPA.
Thirdly it needs clarifying whether to target and mitigate threats to the CPA at the local level means a preoccupation addressing those that are likely to lead to overt violent conflict or whether it includes addressing those threats that undermine the CPA overtly or not. If the former, it means putting more of a focus on the firefighting of potential violent conflict and implies that with the minimizing of local violent conflict the fundamental threats to the CPA have been addressed. On the other hand, there are also covert or structural types of violence which can be far more pernicious and damaging to the full and proper implementation of the CPA, but which may not necessarily lead to overt violent conflict.
Fourth it needs clarifying whether addressing threats means only addressing the negative or whether it includes developing the positive. So while the focus of EPPIC is on enhancing local capacities to address negative threats to the CPA at the local level there is a question as to whether EPPIC should also look for positive opportunities to build peace. This might seem like an obvious corollary to addressing threats but supporting/fostering/building/attaining peace is of a different order to mitigating a threat – assuming that real peace is much more than just the absence of threat and its actuality in damage and/or violent conflict. If so it requires a different and much wider set of skills and demands a different and much wider set of interventions and indicators.
It has been through the process of research and assessment that such issues have come to the fore for EPPIC and such nuances have had to be wrestled with and clarified. These clarifications help with the programmatic choices to be made by EPPIC. What follows is not only the presentation of information on specific program locations but an analysis of that information in the light of the recent history and context of war in Southern Sudan and in the light of the emerging peace as well as within the objectives of the EPPIC Program.
Developing a Conceptual Framework
As alluded to above, the conceptual basis for EPPIC’s analysis of the findings within the Southern Sudan context is that there are structural, proximate and trigger causes to conflict. In Sudan the structural causes identified are still dominant and all proximate ‘accelerators’ or ‘triggers’ of conflict are somehow linked to those. In order to properly mitigate threats and address conflict it is crucial not only to understand these structural causes post the CPA but to address them as priority rather than just fire fight the myriad of conflagrations as they break out. Whilst EPPIC’s entry point is around the proximate manifestations it must seek to address some of the root causes of conflict that impact on the successful implementation of the CPA. Fundamental issues such as identity and its negative manipulation and the root causes of insecurity at the local level must be tackled.
In order to understand the evolving context of potential and actual conflict post the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Southern Sudan it is important to identify the continuities with the past as well as the new elements and manifestations that have appeared since the CPA. These continuities then need to be understood as to their present and future impact on the psyche and dynamics of conflict and peace.
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In general terms it is well understood by conflict analysts that underpinning most intra state conflict are different types of causes that can be identified as being driven by particular characteristics:
Structural: these are the pervasive root factors that become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society over time - often deliberately by the state - and which create the pre-conditions for violent conflict, e.g. bad or illegitimate governance, denial of political participation, lack of equal economic and social opportunities, inequitable access to development, the manipulation of ethno-politics.
Proximate: these are more present factors that exploit the root causes and contribute to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, e.g. the availability and proliferation of small arms, the corruption of natural resource wealth for conflict financing, the ongoing sponsoring of local militias or groups to foment insecurity, the political manipulation of governance structures – especially at lower levels preventing redress and reform.
Triggers: these are single key acts or events, or their anticipation, which set off violent conflict, e.g. a political death or assassination, the price rise of a major essential commodity, unfair and contested elections, the failure to pay soldiers, the misappropriation of others assets.
The conflict analysis and assessments undertaken by the EPPIC program have used this conceptual framework to identify the deep root causes of conflict as well as their proximate manifestations or ‘accelerators’ and less on the potential triggers. This is based on the understanding that accelerators lead to hostilities precisely because they heighten the structural tensions that already exist. Accelerator events may or may not provoke violence depending on the circumstances, but it is the structural tensions which give rise to a societal propensity to violence in Sudan. By focusing more on the trigger causes of hostilities and relegating structural issues to a lesser status such as ‘background conditions’, it preferences an early warning approach towards crisis reaction rather than crisis prevention. EPPIC seeks more to prevent conflict and to build peace than to just fire fight incidents as they arise. EPPIC seeks to address some of the key structural problems affecting the CPA at the local level.
Conceptually the more severe the structural problems in a given country, the greater the number of potential accelerators, the greater the risk of violence posed by such events, and the more difficult the task of determining which events warrant early warning of a return to war. Hence the focus here is on the historical roots that underpin much of what is being experienced today in Sudan which impacts the implementation of the CPA.
After so many years of war and mistrust a serious disagreement between the two parties to the CPA around a single parochial issue is often hard to resolve – and there have already been numerous such disagreements between the NCP and SPLM. The challenge is immeasurably greater in a country such as Sudan; where the scope of the conflict is national, when the underlying causes are structural and there is a history of violence, where there are many local parties that have apparently irreconcilable values and perspectives on a host of issues, when neighbouring states and foreign powers play a destructive role, and when the roots of the conflict include the colonial legacy of divisive ethnic policies and arbitrary demarcation of borders.
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Section III:
Conflict
& Peace Assessments
of JUBA, MALAKAL, AWEIL, KADUGLI, KAUDA & ABYEI.
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The Format
The following format for the findings part of this assessment begins by firstly setting out the historical background of each location. This history is fundamental to peoples experience of the wider conflict and of their perception of the present and future peace. It is fundamental to how they assess and analyze threat. It is fundamental to what they perceive as critical and of major concern. This history also determines largely their feelings about other groups and individuals and their levels of mis/trust and their expectations of what might happen.
It must be remembered that for most Southern Sudanese and those from the Transitional Areas they have grown up knowing little but violence and war and their consequences. These people have profound experiences of devastation and destruction, of loss and bereavement. They know intuitively the experience of oppression and marginalisation that has so characterized the structural violence of the Sudan. They have deep memories of years of the ‘liberation struggle’ - as they describe it – with all the sacrifice and commitment it required.
The findings then identify the main issues highlighted by the EPPIC team with stakeholders in each location. This is then linked to the underlying structural cause and to other related issues showing that no issue stands alone but is part of a complex web of inter-related factors that make up a conflict. The stakeholders involved in this threat are also identified as well as the potential actors who could address this threat. Finally the assessments highlight the link and relevance to the EPPIC Program – the key to interventions.
Commonalities and specific characteristics of each location
An initial and obvious finding from the assessments is that there are similar issues affecting all locations in similar ways. These similarities include
• An uneasy relationship between the NCP and SPLM. This is common to all parts of Southern Sudan. In spite of the two parties being part of the Government of National Unity it is clear that the relationship between the two parties is conflictual rather than cooperative.
• This spills over into the relationship between the armed forces of each party - the SAF and SPLA - and the impact this has on the JIUs in these locations and the relationship with the OAGs.
• There are similar party politics affecting the establishment of effective State and Local Government and especially the integration of the two systems of civil service that have been inherited from the war period and the issues around retrenchment and recruitment of excess staff and who is surplus to requirements.
• In most locations there are tensions between northerners and southerners. The legacy of war remains ever present and there is still deep mistrust and painful memories.
• In most locations there are also local ethnic tribal tensions - also as a product of the war - the polarisation of communities, the militarisation of society and the proliferation of small arms.
• High expectations of the citizenry pervades all areas as does a degree of frustration that those expectations are so thwarted.
• In most locations there are tensions over the return of IDPs and refugees. This is sometimes cultural given years of being away from areas of origin and sometimes due to the increased pressure on services and local resources. Sometimes also there are tensions over leadership between those who stayed and those who left.
• Borders and their demarcation are an issue – from payam to county to state to north south affect all areas.
• Access or not to natural resources and a fair share of local power and wealth are also critical in all locations.
Table 1 summarizes the threats identified during the Assessment. These threats have not been prioritized, as some of the threats are more relevant in areas than others. For example, land was identified as a key issue in all places with the exception of Aweil. Therefore the order of threats in table one does not indicate level of importance.
Table 1. Summary of all Identified Local Conflict Threats in Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Kauda, Kadugli & Abyei
Structural
Issue
Conflict
Threat
Description
Locations
Institutional weakness, International
ABC not implemented
- lack of agreed administration
Abyei Administration is yet to be appointed by the presidency. Ngok refuse appointing an administration without agreeing first on the northern borders. Misseriya also reject the appointment of administration without agreeing to representation in it.
Abyei
Institutional weakness, Interests. Injustice
Access to Land and Natural Resources
There is increased communities awareness of their customary land rights in the transitional areas. The communities become very sensitive and rigid in allowing others, including government and their neighbors, access to their traditional land whether for development, grazing or farming.
Disputes over access to water and grazing by competing ethnic groups along the River Nile close to Malakal. These are in different areas, hence list of different actors
Conflict ensuing over access to land for grazing and water points between the Bari and the Mundari IDPs north of Juba and on the other hand Bari in unison with Mundari having conflict with the Dinka Bor IDPs over the same resources.
Abyei,
Kauda,
Malakal,
Juba,
Institutional weakness, Inequitable development
Politicisation of jobs, recovery and development
Aweil town, the centre of government, is key to planning & managing recovery process. However, infighting & political divisions between NCP & SPLM in their approach is undermining the recovery & returns process.
SPLM accused of inadequate service delivery (employment, water, electricity, schools) because Aweil inhabited by a majority of NCP sympathizers.
There many idle unemployed youth in Kadugli and Kauda. Close to the signing of the of the cease fire and/or CPA, many youth joined SPLA and did military training. Most were graduates and had high expectation of filling SPLM posts after integration of the civil services.
Aweil,
Kadugli
Kauda,
Insecurity
SPLA/SAF, JIU issues & tensions
SPLA & SAF components in Abyei still in separate barracks, with no common doctrine or shared vision. SPLA police are still in Agok and are not integrated. They are fully armed, unpaid or paid on ad hoc basis, and are tired of doing northing for that long.
Members of the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) coming from different groups in Aweil are perceived as not integrating well within their ranks, loyalties within JIU still lie in old allegiances.
The two components of JIUs are yet to be integrated in Kadugli. They have never had joint training, shared vision or common doctrine. They have little respect for each other and seize every opportunity to undermine each other. SAF officers, on one hand, don't consider SPLA as a professional army while SPLA officers, on the other hand, consider the SAF as mercenaries. Each JIU component is still under separate military command and their allegiance is to their respective political parties rather than to the nation.
There is a large presence of SPLA forces in Kauda, with no engagement. Tension exists between the SPLA forces and SPLA police because SPLA are being paid from GOSS while SPLA police in Nuba Mountains are not paid. SPLA ‘mother forces’ were due to withdraw south of the 1956 borders six months after formation of the JIUs according to the CPA. However, due to lack of integration and agreed areas of deployment, the SPLA is still in its place. There is legitimate fear that the withdrawal of SPLA will make the Nuba people more vulnerable to attacks by Arabs armed groups.
Abyei,
Aweil
Kadugli
Kauda
16
Table 1. Summary of all Identified Local Conflict Threats in Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Kauda, Kadugli & Abyei
Structural
Issue
Conflict
Threat
Description Locations
Institutional weakness
Intra-SPLM Tensions
Interpretations of loyalty to the party and southern cause – there is mistrust and misgivings between those who were SPLM in the north/Khartoum and those who stayed in the south.
Aweil
Institutional weakness, Insecurity
Proliferation of small arms
Guns mainly in the hands of non-aligned groups, former militias, former PDF, not integrating into JIU, SPLA or SAF.
Aweil
Insecurity
Decommissioned SAF still in town.
4000 unofficial soldiers, laid off, but still expecting benefits etc. from Khartoum, still organized under commanders. Not armed, but can access them. Able to be manipulated by any spoilers.
Juba
Insecurity
Former Civilian Defense Forces
Rural ex-militias who during war armed and protected their communities. Still armed, but no mechanism to consider them as other armed groups, therefore cannot integrate into SPLA/SAF. Potential for manipulation by spoilers.
Juba
Insecurity
Presence of armed forces (OAGs/SAF/ SPLA/SSDF) in urban areas
The presence of a variety of armed forces (OAGs/SAF/SPLA/SSDF) living amongst civilians in Juba adds tension. They need to be moved to barracks outside of the town.
Tension also exists between undisciplined JIU, both former SAF/SPLA as well as former OAG in Malakal. This spills over into fighting between SAF and SPLA in the town and its surrounding counties.
Juba, Malakal
Institutional weakness, Identity
Returnees vs. Residents - tensions.
Power-struggle between Returnee Chiefs and Host Chiefs (mostly intra-ethnic group tensions) in Aweil
Lack of trust and criticism from SPLM people who stayed (resisted) in Aweil versus SPLA people who left for Khartoum (and later returned).
During war, most Ngok People were forced to flee their home area – to the north. -Currently, there high level of return leading to increased population growth and very limited to no services
Conflict exists between returnees and established Malakal communities. These will not improve is increasing numbers of returnees continue to arrive and the conflict reasons remain unresolved. In particular, youth returnees with youth residence, youth northern cities returnees.
Abyei,
Aweil,
Kadugli, Kauda, Malakal
Identity, Interests
Tension among the Youth
Youth groups divided over political allegiance - especially SPLM, NCP and SANU (Sudan African National Union). Tension manifested through ongoing negative comments of strong dislike among each other.
Aweil
Institutional weakness, Insecurity, Identity
Dinka, Misseiriya, Rizeigat (DMR) Tensions
Tensions exist between the Dinka, Misseriya and Rizeigat, with Misseriya and Rizeigat crossing the river Kiir, which is considered locally as the north-south border line. They also claim that the border line is 50 kilometers further south, including parts of Aweil west and entire Aweil North Counties.
Slight conflicts linked to the grievances erupted in February and April 2007 leading to the killing of two people in Abyei. At the moment armed Misseriya are patrolling the disputed area, impacting negatively on local grazing and water supply to the local community.
Abyei,
Aweil
Identity, Interests
Ethnic Politics - Polarisation between Arabs/Nuba
There is clear division between the Nuba and the ‘Arabs’ along political lines, with the Nuba mostly supporting SPLM and Arabs mostly NCP supporter. NCP members of the legislative assembly are mainly from Arabs and SPLM representatives are mostly Nuba.
Kadugli
Identity
Ethnic Tensions/ Tribalism
Unresolved conflict between Dinka Ngok and Shilluk over administrative control of Malakal County.
Tribalism/ Ethnic politics/ Dinka perceived dominance in all walks of life in Juba.
Malakal, Juba 17
Table 1. Summary of all Identified Local Conflict Threats in Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Kauda, Kadugli & Abyei
Structural
Issue
Conflict
Threat
Description Locations
Institutional weakness, Insecurity, Identity
Farmer - Nomad Tensions/Conflicts
The historic tensions between the Nuba and the nomadic pastoralists (such as the Baggara and Shanabla) were politicised when the nomadic Arab tribes were armed as part of the government of Sudan counter-insurgency against the SPLM/A. This strategy has been implemented since the before the 1980s.
Kadugli, Kauda
Institutional weakness, Insecurity
SPLA - Nomad Tensions/ Conflicts
SPLA is under pressure to intervene for protection of vulnerable Nuba communities from attacks by heavily armed nomads in areas of Kawaliib, Wernang and Abu Kershola in the Eastern side and the Goz area north west of Dilling.
Kauda
Identity, Interests
Ethnic Politics within SPLM
There is a general feeling that there is nepotism within the SPLM leadership, favoring specific groups. For example, the Atoro Nuba feel very marginalized post-CPA despite the fact that they sacrificed the most during the war. This threat is manifested in the formation of small tribal groups and written memoranda to the SPLA leadership.
Kauda
Institutional weakness
GOSS vs. State Jurisdiction in Juba
Decentralization this related to who does what in Juba. CES claims GoSS interferes with the state’s competencies as stipulated in both the CPA and the interim constitutions
Juba
Institutional weakness
SPLM/NCP tensions over CPA Interpretation/ integration of systems.
Lack of common ground/understanding between the NCP and the SPLM around the implementation of the CPA in South Kordofan, for example the disagreement in 2006 over the State constitution which continued for over a year. With the shift in governorship and positioning for elections in 2009, new challenges will emerge alongside increased potential for political manipulation.
The SPLA liberated areas in South Kordofan, for all intents and purposes, still remain isolated and closed to NCP political influence. SPLA still runs a parallel system with its education, health, courts and prison. However, the staff are unpaid, frustrated with the lack of progress in CPA implementation, and are resentful of SPLM's leadership in Kadugli for not being able to change their quality of lives. They feel that their social services have deteriorated since the signing of the CPA.
Power struggles also exist between the NCP & SPLM in Malakal.
Aweil
Kadugli, Kauda, Malakal
Identity, Interests
Contestation of County/Payam borders
Disputes over the changed boundaries at County and Payam levels in rural areas can cause conflict that could easily spill over into urban life. Communities know very well what land belongs to which group, family, community. However, a succession of authorities from the colonial era, through the autonomous administrations during the period of peace brought about by the Addis Ababa Agreement, to the changes made by northern authorities, has created a confusion over which community holds tenure over which plot of land. This is coupled with returnees needing land and some evidence of land grabbing by both SPLA and SPLM, creating the high risk of tensions spilling over into violence. Access to land brings with it access to resources, such as water, grazing, timber, oil or other commodities. Such access would offers those with rights the chance of power and wealth.
Malakal,
Juba,
Kadugli
Kauda,
18
19
Table 1. Summary of all Identified Local Conflict Threats in Juba, Malakal, Aweil, Kauda, Kadugli & Abyei
Locations
Structural
Issue
Conflict
Threat
Description
Institutional weakness, Interests
Intra-Shilluk in-fighting
The majority of Shilluk backed Lam Akol’s split from the SPLA in 1991 and the 1993 SPLA Nasir faction split; however a small but strong number of Shilluk opposed Lam’s decision and remained with SPLA mainstream. Despite the merger between the two faction/parties, the groups maintained the status quo, meaning they remained indifferent to each other, as people move towards multipartyism there does not seem to be a likely narrowing of the gap between these groups.
Malakal
Institutional weakness, Injustice
Economic Difficulties and Corruption
Corruption and economic difficulties experienced by the citizens e.g. inflation and high prices combined with the lack of employment opportunities for civil servants from CES who have been retrenched (over 7000 – many not having received pensions, and the young graduates from the Diaspora and Khartoum Universities moving back to the town.
Juba
Institutional weakness, Identity
Power Struggle in Old Fangak impacting Malakal
The rivalry for the administrative leadership of Old Fangak has been manipulated by the northern authorities and has not been satisfactorily addressed by the GoSS.
In particular, the disagreement between Commissioner John Maluit and Gen Gabriel Gatwach Chan (Tangienya), an infamous SSDF leader, over who should be the commissioner sparked the high levels of violence in Nov 2006 and threatens to spill over into violence in the future as the dispute has never been satisfactory solved. Both protagonists remain keen to lay claim to the administrative power; the former because he has been appointed, the latter because he believes he was promised it. As long as there remains any presence of Old Fangak government officials, either potential or appointed, within Malakal town, there remains the chance that violence will erupt again.
Unresolved tension between Dinka Paweny and Rut in Khorflus County though in Jongolei, the conflict is likely spill over into Malakal due to its closeness to the town.
Malakal
Institutional weakness
Rivalries btw. Southern Political Parties
Influence/rivalry of political parties operating in Juba to seeking to garner support in terms of numbers in anticipation of the upcoming elections.
Juba
Brief Description of each locations
Juba
___________
The capital of the south on the Nile in Central Equatoria State; the seat of the Government of Southern Sudan as well as Central Equatoria State; hosts a large ethnic mix with tension between Equatorians and Dinka to the fore; a major centre for returnees and for internal migration; home to international assistance community and to UNMIS especially. Undergoing major investment and rehabilitation but largely uncontrolled and unplanned leading to poor service provision and poor sanitation and roads etc. High prices and high poverty increasing tensions amongst citizens.
Malakal
__________________
Another town on the Nile – 900kms up river from Juba in Upper Nile State; a complex history of violent clashes between different southern groups, individuals and ideologies – between Anyanya I and II and the SPLM/A. A key place from which the NCP has played out its divide and rule policy in the Upper Nile Region. Nuer/Shilluk tensions pronounced with contestation over the ownership of the town. Oil is a complicating factor in the State with major exploration in Melut area and others pending.
Aweil
_____________
A well populated predominantly Dinka area in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State. Area of large SPLM/A support that was heavily attacked and displaced during the war GoS using especially the ‘Arab’ neighbours to the north; suffered from major famines in 1988 and 1998; many Dinka forced north to Khartoum or into bonded labour in farms of Darfur; major asset stripping took place. Now a high returns area leading to some tension between hosts and returnees; tensions along the contested border with Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan; complex Dinka politics between Aweil and Khartoum, between NCP and SPLM and other political parties.
Kadugli
__________________
A Nuba area that is now the seat of the Southern Kordofan State Government; much under the control of Khartoum from the NCP side; SPLM/A uncomfortable in Kadugli and did not access Kadugli during the war; SPLM struggling to administer Governorship out of Kadugli. Ethnic issues pronounced between Nuba and Baggara in area. Strong influence of what was Western Kordofan and the Misseriya in that area.
Kauda
_______________
Key SPLM/A base during war as near to military HQ – and still home post CPA; strong Nuba centre; NCP have problems accessing because of threats to NCP leaders in the area.
Abyei
______________
ABC not implemented; issues over Abyei’s temporary as well as longer term administration; oil is linked to the boundaries issue and is a complicating factor; highly insecure re various militaries present in area.
JUBA – Conflict and Peace Assessment
___________________________________
General and Historical Background
Juba town, a port and the southern terminus of traffic along the River Nile has its origins in the 19th century when a trading post and a mission named Gondokoro was located in the vicinity of Juba. Currently the largest town as well as the regional capital of Southern Sudan and its regional capital, it is located in Equatoria Region just north of where the White Nile enters the country from Uganda.
Historically, Equatoria is significant as the location of the first mutiny of southern army soldiers in Torit (50 kilometers east of Juba) in 1955. The fighting that ensued until the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 was largely conducted in the Equatorial region and mainly involved Equatorians. Historically Juba has been seen as the ‘capital’ of the South even since before Independence. In 1947, during British colonial administration, it hosted the Juba Conference which sought to secure southern participation in the Legislative Council being established in Khartoum as the first moves were made towards the establishment of a national parliament. Around the period before and after independence (gained on January 1st 1956) it was a centre which fostered discontent - reacting to the manipulation of the 1954 elections and the ‘Sudanisation’ process which favoured northerners over southerners - and it was a place from which political resistance to northern polices vis a vis the south was galvanized – along with Torit and other places in Equatoria.
After the first civil war ended Juba became home to the Southern Regional Government (SRG) and the High Executive Council (HEC) established as part of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. This semi-autonomous government was largely characterized by corruption, unequal political representation, and unfair development across South Sudan, and by ethnic politics - mainly between the Equatorians and the Dinkas. This political confusion was manipulated by the Khartoum government as part of its ‘divide and rule policy’. The SRG was eventually dissolved by President Nimairi in 1983 in an attempt to split the south into three Regions – something which, along with the imposition of ‘sharia law’ triggered the outbreak of civil war.
From 1983 with the outbreak of civil war between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A Juba became a major garrison town controlled and supplied from Khartoum by air and largely cut off from the surrounding area which was controlled by the SPLM/A and other militias. With the take over coup of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1989 came the imposition of their brand of militant Islam – something which alienated Equatorians, especially those living in Juba, leading to greater support to the SPLM/A – something that Equatorians had been ambiguous about due its perceived Dinka dominance.
In June/July 1992 the SPLA launched a major assault against Juba, assisted by southern soldiers within the government garrison. This briefly succeeded in taking large sections of the town and also in disrupting the government’s strategy to regain the military initiative in many parts of the south following the split in the SPLM/A in 1991. This assault was decisively repulsed, with heavy losses to the SPLA and this was followed by government retaliation against their own southern soldiers and southern civilians resident in the city. Such reaction and oppression became common place for those trapped inside Juba.
Right up until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January, 2005, Juba was the NIF/NCP’s stronghold with heavy Sudan Armed Forces presence and influence. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) controlled not only militarily issues but also the trade in and out of Juba and nothing happened without their permission which was usually to the disadvantage of the southerners. In addition, many tribal militia groups were formed and supported by Khartoum to fight a proxy war against the SPLA in
21
and around Juba. Most military operations taking place in most parts of Southern Sudan were being directed from Juba during this period while the SPLA/M controlled the rural counties of Equatoria with a base in Yei and its headquarters in New Site near the Kenya border.
Situation since the Signing of the CPA
The key impact of the CPA on Juba town has been the moving in of the SPLM/A into Juba after years of being outside the town and the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) within its boundaries as well as the Central Equatoria State (CES) Authorities. Prior and even post the CPA there was much discussion as to whether the capital of the South would be in Juba or not. Many felt (especially Dinka) it should not be and plans were being made to go to a new location near Yirol in Southern BEG. However with the death of Dr John Garang in July 2005 and his funeral being held in Juba in August 2006 all doubt vanished and the SPLM moved into Juba very quickly afterwards. Clearly any misgivings (partly caused by lack of access, partly for historic and political reasons with Juba being in Equatoria and the SPLM leadership being predominantly Dinka not from Equatoria) had disappeared and it was obvious, given that it was the only town with any infrastructure able to accommodate the new government, that Juba would be the new capital. Juba has since been transitioning from being under the heavy handed control of the northern military and Khartoum during the war to Southern control.
Since then it has seen the influx of many thousands of people – with all the challenges that brings - either moving in to take up government positions, to protect those government officials, or to find work and services. Rehabilitation has been underway for some time though services are still basic and the roads still not good. The town is filthy and the demand for bottled water and plastic bags means Juba is filled with rubbish. The lack of sanitation is pronounced and it is even worse in the rainy season with puddles and mud replacing the dust and dirt of the dry season.
Since the CPA, Juba’s close proximity to Uganda has brought both benefits and problems to Juba. On the positive side this has meant access to imported goods resulting in a huge increase in goods for sale in the Juba and surrounding markets since mid 2005. This proliferation of cross-border trade during the last two years has however created opportunities for militias and bandits/robbers to attack trucks moving between the border and Juba, destabilizing the area. More significant to this destabilization has been the ongoing fighting between the Ugandan based Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the Uganda army, which has been ongoing in Equatoria north of the Uganda/Sudan border for many years. This continued fighting between Uganda and LRA not only causes local instability, but also threatens the peace process in Sudan, although currently peace talks being held in Juba to resolve this longstanding conflict.
Current estimates of Juba’s population vary greatly but a reasonable estimate would put it at around 250,000 people. In 2005 the population was estimated at only 165,000, indicating Juba’s rapid growth after the signing of the CPA. The influx of population is due to both returnees to Juba after the war, as well as newcomers seeking employment and other services, particularly as Juba is the seat of the GOSS, and the influx of UNMIS and the wider international community. This has in turn made Juba the most expensive town in Africa with high prices for property and essential goods.
The close proximity of a large ethnic mix of peoples is a potential cause of conflict in Juba. There are twelve main indigenous ethnic groups in CES with the Bari and Mundari composing the majority in the rural areas immediately around Juba. The other ethnic groups include the Makaraka, Pojulu, Kuku, Lulubo, Keliko, Avokaya, Lugbwara, Lokoya, Nyangwara and Kakwa. Because Juba is now the capital of Southern Sudan, there has naturally been an influx of non-traditional ethnic groups into the town. In particular a great number of Dinka and Nuer have arrived, including those from the ranks of the SPLA and the SSDF, as the SPLM and others have moved into Juba and become the GOSS. However, peoples from most tribes in Southern Sudan can be found in Juba – as well as communities from the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile and other parts of Sudan. This large ethnic mix creates the potential 22
for conflicts to arise easily as a result of any slight misunderstanding or incident, especially between the indigenous peoples and the non indigenous peoples to this area.
The influx of soldiers belonging to different armed forces into Juba – SAF, SSDF and SPLA - makes the town environment tense with occasional outbursts of violence triggered by small incidents. The fear of personal attack on senior leaders (not sure from whom) means body guards are everywhere often stationed outside residences in large numbers. This gives the city a militarized feel, with insecurity possible at any time. The failure to pay soldiers or disagreements over the integration of forces has already seen incidents occurring that confines civilians to their compounds. Moving soldiers into barracks outside of Juba town would reduce this cause of insecurity.
Still in its infancy, the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) possesses the potential to be a threat or a builder of peace, depending upon the relationships between the various factions within the JIU and their respective paymasters. There have been some recent disturbances that indicate that their influence upon peace will be negative. One such disturbance erupted in shooting after a large group of disgruntled JIU soldiers marched on the GoSS ministries to complain about repeated low and irregular monthly salaries.
The presence of various militias in the rural areas around Juba is having a significant destabilising effect upon the population. Some of these militias are of a considerable size and are heavily armed and they are having an adverse affect on trade routes due to attacks or fears of attack on the roads to Juba from Uganda and Kenya. These disaffected groups may also be vulnerable to manipulation by Southern political forces or the northern government.
Manipulation by political parties is another proximate threat to peace. With the elections on the horizon rivalry between political parties operating in Juba is intensifying. Each party is struggling to win support from the population with the parties peddling rumours against each other which may eventually spark off violent conflict between constituencies to the benefit of the enemies of the CPA.
Memories of the atrocities carried out in and around Juba during the years of civil war are still fresh in the minds of those aggrieved. The GoS in Juba was very oppressive to the Southern Sudanese while always safeguarding the interest of the government in Khartoum, thereby increasing the North-South tensions. Business and trade was entirely managed by Arab traders and the military that often controlled prices, leaving the majority of Southerners struggling for survival. The gap between the rich and poor is very wide and clearly seen between the Arabs and Southerners. This tension broke out into conflict on the news of the death of Dr John Garang. Rumours that his death was a deliberate assassination led to rioting and violence in the streets of Juba (and Khartoum) as Southerners targeted those northern traders who had been so oppressive during the war. People were killed and properties looted and destroyed and many northerners escaped to Khartoum in fear of their lives.
At the same time there has been a strong Equatorian, and especially Bari, mistrust of the Dinka and there is resentment over their dominance in the SPLM/A and the way they have treated Equatorians in the past. Many feel that the SPLM have themselves been oppressors rather than liberators and the heavy presence of Dinka dominated SPLA in Equatoria has led to bad feelings within the civilian population and even the administration and the SPLA. Cultural alienation and differences are prime triggers, especially in Juba, where so many different groups are arriving to settle in what is seen as Bari land. These tensions lie below the surface, but can erupt in ethnic clashes.
Another cause of tension since the CPA has been over the control of trade and commercial activities. What was under the control of the northern traders during the war now seems to have shifted to the Ugandan and Congolese traders who control a substantial amount of business in Juba markets with only a handful of Southerners able to compete with the well established foreign traders. At times shops have been burnt down and traders attacked in reaction to this control.
23
As stated earlier, the population of Juba is growing rapidly and more than a quarter of the population are either IDPs or returnees who have to strive to survive with little or no assistance from either the different levels of government or the UN/NGOs in Juba. Among the returnees are those with skills and knowledge that could used to earn a living but there are few employment opportunities leading to an increase in crime, which is difficult to combat given the weakness of the police and law enforcement agencies.
Unemployment is affecting both former government civil servants as well as the general population, and the returning IDPs and refugees are only adding to these problems. Both GoSS and CES are struggling with having to retrench and pension off over 7,000 civil servants from CES – without adequate resources and the armed forces are decommissioning of soldiers from both the SPLA and SAF. In addition, a large number of young graduates are retuning to Juba from their studies in the Khartoum universities or abroad. The case of the unemployed, decommissioned soldiers, of mainly the SAF, is causing great concern. These men are southerners who were in the SAF and they refuse to go north as they come from the south and want to return home. However, they will be returning to communities that may resent their role in the war and this may well limit their employment prospects. It is believed that some 4,000 former-SAF soldiers have been demobilised and are facing such challenges. The lack of employment opportunities for those being retrenched and the influx of returnees and people migrating to the town seeking work, combined with salary abnormalities are creating tension, and provide room for manipulation by peace spoilers.
Since the signing of the CPA the communities of CES have become sensitive to their traditional land and territories and to the borders between them. This results from a misunderstanding of the decentralization policy adopted by the GOSS. Most communities misinterpret decentralization as a situation where each person works and resides in his/her own place of origin and that the land there belongs to the people. This has led to an increase in intolerance by the communities to others coming into the area. This is actually a new phenomenon in CES where all the communities formerly regarded themselves as one people and they practiced similar values and beliefs.
There are also long standing conflicts – usually over access to grazing and water points for cattle keepers - which before the civil war were resolved by traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. These conflicts are highly likely to escalate into violence as the protagonists today are armed, sometimes heavily, and the conflicts are often linked to political and ethnic groups – e/g. between Mundari and Bor Dinka. The traditional dispute resolution mechanisms have however been dismantled or destroyed during the decades of fighting, making it more difficult to address local conflict.
Mangalla, a small town located about 40 km northeast of Juba along the Juba-Bor road is an example of this tension. During the colonial period Mangalla was one of the colonial administrative base in the South. Before the war, Mangalla had a sugar factory that produced and supplied the wholeof southern Sudan needs. The ownership of the town was not clear as the Mundari and Bari were both living in Mangalla harmoniously. However, during the early nineties Mangalla ownership became contested by the two tribes, and was escalated as the relations between these groups deteriorated. Immediately after the signing of the CPA the issue resurfaced and Mangalla has become the centre of dispute between Juba and Terekeka counties, their commissioners and has the potential for violent conflict at the local level. The governor has established a border committee to address these issues.
The large numbers of returnees in the area and the increased pressure on local resources and land creates new conflict threats, further complicating the situation. Issues over land use and its ownership were raised as a concern by every individual or group interviewed during the assessment phase. There is a perception that land is being grabbed by former SPLA soldiers and by businessmen - mainly foreigners - and by the GoSS. The area of most concern is behind the Jebel hills just off the road to Yei in the West of Juba. The local chiefs and communities in Juba understand very well that the CPA has given the land back to the people instead of it being government owned as it was and is in the north with Khartoum being the sole controller of the land. The people therefore naturally expect the SPLM dominated GoSS to
24
25
enforce and restore control of land to the indigenous people since it was the SPLM who negotiated for this provision in the CPA. Unfortunately this seems not to be the case as it is the GoSS senior officials who are mostly involved in land grabbing activities in Juba and other major towns in the State. As a result there is a growing dissatisfaction with the GoSS that may easily lead to civil strife in Juba.
A key common factor in all these urban issues is over the governance and management of Juba as a municipality. With three levels of government occupying various buildings and parts of the city there have been issues over who controls and decides on the development of the town. Both the GOSS and the CES have claimed authority over various aspects of the town and these remain unresolved. In the midst of that there is the Juba Municipal Council (JMC) which also has responsibility for basic services and law and order in the town. Access to tax revenues is also an issue as these sources of finance will enable the levels of government to operate. Whilst this contestation over authority continues the town continues to suffer as managed urban development is not taking place, people are settling all over as they please, land is being appropriated and developed without due legal process and tensions are increasing all over.
Table 2 - Juba Conflict Threat Analysis Summary
Structural Issue
Proximate Threat
Tool 1
Threat to the CPA*
Tool 2
EPPIC Selection Criteria **
1. Institutional weakness
GOSS vs. State Jurisdiction in Juba
62 83
2. Institutional weakness
Rivalries between Southern Political Parties
77 72
3. Institutional weakness
Inequitable development
Injustice
Limited access to Land & Grazing in Juba and Surrounding area
63 73
4. Identity
Ethnic tensions/tribalism
69 78
5. Identity, Interests
Contestation/Disputes of Payam/County Borders
60 90
6. Insecurity
Former Civilian Defense Forces
83 60
7. Institutional weakness,
Injustice
Corruption linked to Economic Difficulties
71 51
8. Insecurity
Presence of armed forces (OAGs/SAF/SPLA/SSDF)
in Juba town
91 65
* EPPIC Staff rating of threats
**SSPC & EPPIC rating of threat
Juba Conflict Threats
1. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
Proximate Issue: GOSS vs. STATE JURISDICTION IN JUBA
Linked to:
• Contestation over power and resources – a lack of clear policy and law around decentralization of power between GOSS, CES and Juba Municipal Council (JMC).
• Administration and management of Juba around issues of recovery and development, including service delivery to the rapidly expanding Juba urban area and population.
• Ethnic perceptions between indigenous peoples and ‘outsiders’ from other parts of South Sudan, Sudan and externally.
• Possible building of new capital at Gondokoro and the decision-making process around this issue. Local perceptions negative to this possible move.
• Competence of GOSS to manage recovery process including conflicting views within and between governments.
• Many people unwilling to return to their places of origin outside Juba and influx of new people, resulting in conflict between returnees and residents, hosts and hosted.
Stakeholders/Actors
• Government:
o GOSS – Ministries of Environment, Wildlife Conservation and Tourism, Trade, Commerce and Supply, Interior, Gender, Directorate of Religious Affairs, and the Revenue Authorities.
o Central Equatoria State (CES) Government – Revenue Authorities
o Juba Municipal Council (JMC)
o National Congress Party (NCP)
o County and Payam Authorities
• SPLA involvement in civil issues
• IDPs
• Traders: CES Local/Southern/Foreign
• Young Christian Students Association
• Church Peace Actors:
o Presbyterian Church of Sudan (PCS) Peace Desk
o Catholic Church (St. Joseph’s Cathedral) – Youth, Women, Peace and Justice group
o Sudan Pentecostal Church- Peace Desk
• Sudan Council of Churches/SCC Peace and Transformation Committee
o Traditional Leaders and Chiefs Council
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives
• The Director of Religious Affairs has developed a policy document for Peace Building and has prepared strategy and budget. But he needs help as the policy is weak on substance.
• Discussed at Torit Conference (March 2007) and resolutions passed.
EPPIC Relevance:
Citizens and communities feel most the impact of the contested administration and resulting bad urban planning. This is perceived by CES and citizens of Juba as a deliberate violation of the CPA provision regarding devolution of powers to the local level. Such contestation fosters tribal divides and undermines South-South relations within the administration and in the urban area - Equatorians in CES versus non-Equatorians in GOSS, and Dinka/Others versus Bari/Equatorians at the community level.
This institutional weakness also jeopardises the hope of peaceful returnee reintegration and growth of Juba as the southern capital. EPPIC can address this threat within urban communities through dialogue and consultation.
26
Juba Conflict Threats
2. Str
uctural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
Proximate Issue: RIVALRIES BETWEEN SOUTHERN POLITICAL PARTIES
Linked to:
• A poor democratic culture and the inability to cope with difference in non-violent ways - a legacy of war.
• Strongly linked to the process & outcome of 2009 elections.
• Negative canvassing and division engendered by different political affiliations – potentially violently.
• Manipulation of public opinion by elites/politicians/NCP.
• Corruption – buying of allegiance, current GOSS financial support to the SPLM.
• Clientalism – especially around service delivery, access to resources, employment linked to affiliation.
• Ethnicity – potential of party politics along ethnic lines.
• Weak law and order in urban areas, but also management of public debate and freedom of expression and association.
Stakeholders/Actors
• Southern Political Parties
• CES Workers Trade Union
• NCP
• Rural Ex-Militia
• Juba Peace Group
• Young Christians Student Movement/Juba University Students
• Media (Sudan Radio Service)
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives
• Mirror FM (UNDP supported) and Sudan Radio Service (NDI supported) providing civic education regarding election process and good governance.
EPPIC Relevance:
As this threat is linked to identity issues, it is particularly relevant to youth who are easily manipulated into opposing camps, which could undermine South-South unity and feed into ethnic divisions. Political contestation in urban areas is volatile. There is potential for the various media organs to play a key role, as well as working with youth on promoting non-violent ways of resolving conflict and difference. There may also be opportunities to work on violent-free voting campaigns with youth and other key actors.
3. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS & INEQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT
Proximate Issue: ACCESS TO LAND & GRAZING IN JUBA AND SURROUNDS
Linked to:
• Control of and access to land and resources in and around urban area, particularly around who gives permission/denial, issues of appropriating versus negotiating
• Role of TAs vis a vis customary rights and land policy
• IDPs & Returnees reintegration - allocation of land and access
• Individual land appropriation by elites and others
• Management of cattle movements and local agreements
• Farmer-Nomad relations/tensions
• Local Government capacity to manage local issues - including rural law and order and the role of elites in protecting perpetrators
• Payam and county boundaries
• Ethnic issues – Bari vs. Mundari, Dinka vs. Mundari, etc.
Stakeholders/Actors
• Government (GOSS, CES, JMC, NCP, Payam Authorities)
• Traditional leaders: (Juba Chiefs Council, Kator Boma Court)
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives
• Mobile Court (Chiefs) and Joint Monitoring Committee formed at Bor Conference (August 06). But not working yet – lack of support and joint police force.
• Supervisory Committee (Commissioners of Juba, Terrekeka, Bor, Twic East)
• Discussed at Torit Conference (March 2007) and resolutions passed regarding Dinka Bor etc.
EPPIC Relevance:
Lies within the jurisdiction and role of traditional authority, and directly involves grass root communities, EPPIC can support activities at local level to address this threat.
27
Juba Conflict Threats
4. Str 5. Str
uctural Issue: IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: ETHNIC TENSIONS/TRIBALISM
Linked to:
• Perceived Dinka dominance of GoSS and resulting discontent with GoSS amongst other groups.
• Contestation over control of Juba – Equatorians versus other groups, but particularly Dinka.
• Manipulation by either NCP/SPLM/Others to stir up conflict between different ethnic groups that may escalate into conflict.
• Access to resources – actual and perceived favouring of one ethnic group over another.
• Discontent of Bari over land appropriation by non-Bari in Juba.
• Southerners versus Others around trade in Juba, for example the dominance of Ugandans in the markets.
Stakeholders/Actors
• Church Peace Actors (Presbyterian Church of Sudan Peace Desk; Catholic Church - St. Joseph’s Cathedral Youth, Women, Peace and Justice group; Sudan Pentecostal Church Peace Desk)
• Sudan Council of Churches
• Young Christian Students movement
• Juba Youth Peace Group
• Traders (Arab/Southern/Expatriate – Uganda/Kenya)
• Traditional leaders (Juba Chiefs Council, Kator Boma Court)
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives
• Church activities addressing issues of identity through pulpit and other venues. Needs strengthening.
• NSCC involvement in Wunlit process.
EPPIC Relevance:
This is a key issue that was raised in every interview, and involves all major and historically antagonistic ethnic groups. Ethnic identity issues and conflict fall within classic Pact peace building approach and should to be central to our approach and interventions.
uctural Issue: IDENTITY AND INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: CONTESTATION OF PAYAM BORDERS
Linked to:
• Growing group sense of what is theirs in CPA.
• Access to/ownership of local land and its resources is central to this issue i.e. Mangalla town area contestation between Juba and Terkeka county because of potential for sugar production in Mangalla.
• Increase in numbers of Returnees and IDPs who want to resettle.
• Polarization of intra- and inter-tribal tensions – us versus them.
• Authority – lack of clarity or agreement around who is responsible for the demarcation process.
• Affects inter-Payam trade, business and overall relations.
• Capacity of new administration and local government regarding law and order.
Stakeholders/Actors
• Government:
o County/Payam Authorities (Commissioners of Juba and Terekeka County)
o CES Government (CES Governor, Legislative Assembly)
• Traditional leaders (Juba Chiefs Council, Kator Boma Court)
• IDPs
• Women
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives
• Discussion at Torit conference (March 2007) regarding border issues and resolutions passed related these issues.
EPPIC Relevance:
As this issue involves the authority of traditional leaders it is local but also linked to higher-level actors around land policy and law. Local actors are keen to play role in solving this issue, therefore EPPIC could explore options for helping good governance at the local level.
28
Juba Conflict Threats
6. Structural Issue: INSECURITY
Proximate Issue: PRESENCE OF ARMED RURAL CIVILIAN DEFENSE GROUPS
Linked to:
• The proper implementation of the rule of law – questions around authority at the local level.
• Fears of continued community instability brought in by outsiders.
• Dissuades IDP/Refugee returns.
• Manipulation for political gains by either North or South through fostering of such locally armed groups.
Stakeholders/Actors
• Government (GOSS/NCP)
• SAF/SPLA/JIU/OAGs/Militia
• Decommissioned SAF/SPLA (over 4000)
• Juba Chiefs Council
• Police
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives
• SSDF have been fully integrated into the main body of the SPLM by June 2007.
• Discussed at Torit Conference (March 2007) and resolutions passed relating this issue.
EPPIC Relevance:
Local-level insecurity is linked to the authority of the traditional leaders and the local government as the legitimate law and order/security providers. It also has a direct impact on IDPs and other vulnerable groups, and the potential for ethnic tension if civil defense groups are from different tribes/clans. There is potential for EPPIC to support dialogue on these issues as part of the promotion of stability.
7. Structural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
Proximate Issue: ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND CORRUPTION
Linked to:
• Unemployment in Juba is rising, combined with a slow recovery process the skyrocketing prices of basic commodities.
• Influx of IDPs and others looking for work, with little government investment in employment.
• Downsizing of civil service – with the potential retrenchment of thousands.
• Growth of slums and urban poor as town grows without proper urban planning.
• The perception and reality of the widening gap between the rich and the poor.
• Media highlighting the corruption in government is raising citizen awareness, but also can contribute to frustration and disillusionment.
• Disillusionment with governing authorities around service delivery
• Lines of authority and role of local government to manage Juba - vis a vis CES and GOSS
• Trade opportunities dominated by traders from Uganda, Kenya and DRC.
Stakeholders/Actors
• Government: (CES/GOSS, Employee Justice Chamber)
• Traders (Arab/Southern/Expatriate – Uganda/Kenya)
• CES Workers Trade Union
• IDPs
• Women
• Media
• Juba University Students Assoc./ Juba Youth Peace Group
• CES Workers and Trade Union
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives
• Unemployed Youth Association (‘Job Seekers’) being established.
• Employees Grievances Commission has been established.
• World Bank has given grant to GOSS to promote private investment.
EPPIC Relevance:
Poverty affects ordinary citizen and can have a role in breeding conflict, especially when it feeds into ethnic tensions. Corruption impacts all levels of society and can create social unrest against the government.
Anti-corruption activities combined with pro-poor, pro-work media campaigns could have an impact upon urban investment in Juba. Some aspects are outside of the EPPIC Mandate but may be addressed in dialogue at the grassroots.
29
Juba Conflict Threats
30
8. Structural Issue: INSECURITY
Proximate Issue: PRESENCE OF OTHER ARMED GROUPS AND SAF IN JUBA
Linked to:
• Mistrust between previous enemies.
• Ethnic tensions, for example between the Dinka and the Nuer.
• DDR process - 4000 ex-SAF soldiers from South are a threat to security.
• Slow integration of OAGs into the SPLA – partially due to problems over rank and position.
• Late/non payment of salaries to those integrating into the legitimate armed bodies.
• Confusion over the chain of command – unwillingness to come under one command.
• Lack of discipline amongst soldiers.
• Presence of military inside Juba – should move to barracks outside of Juba town
Stakeholders/Actors
• SAF/SPLA/JIU/OAGs/Militia
• Decommissioned SAF/SPLA
Previous/Ongoing Activities
• SSDF have been fully integrated into the main body of the SPLM by June 2007.
• Discussed at Torit Conference (March 2007) and resolutions passed.
EPPIC Relevance:
Military and political context outside of EPPIC mandate
MALAKAL - Conflict and Peace Assessment
____________________________________
General and Historical Background
Malakal sits on the banks of the White Nile in the Upper Nile flood plain - a huge area that hosts the world’s largest natural swamp – the Sudd. The whole area is rich in natural resources that supports and attracts migratory pastoralists to the rich pastures. During the rainy season, flood waters cover much of the Sudd and force many populations onto small patches of higher ground. As the dry season extends large migrations take place as communities bring their cattle to the river in search of water and grazing.
The single largest risk to peace in the Upper Nile State and Malakal in particular is due to the present manifestation of the historic and long standing disagreements between the political and military leaders of the area and their links with the north/NCP or to the south/SPLM/A and the wider conflict.
Before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9th 2005, Malakal town was occupied and controlled for strategic military reasons by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and its armed forces in the area around Malakal. This area forms part of the Shilluk Kingdom, which during the civil war was largely controlled by the troops of SPLA/M United – a breakaway faction from the mainstream SPLM/A, and under the Command of Dr Lam Akol, with their headquarters the rural areas in Fashoda County. Beyond that were the SPLM/A and other armed groups of the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) or so called ‘unaligned’ groups claiming to act independently – though that was impossible without GoS support. As a result, the whole area was a patchwork of different military forces with the resulting tensions such contested presence fosters.
In general terms, the whole Upper Nile Region has been marked by an acute crisis in governance, worsened by internal rivalries over the political leadership of the southern struggle which turned violent and destructive. The region has been prey to deliberate ‘divide and rule’ policies, emanating mostly from the northern government, which has given rise to numerous home-grown, semi-autonomous, militias or ‘armed groups’. In total it is estimated that over 20 independent armed entities have been operating in the region from the 1990s. Ultimately, the prolonged absence of a single ‘central authority’, and the growing proliferation of small arms, deepened the tragic cycle of violence and social breakdown. Internal conflicts proliferated, in many cases spawned and co-opted by the civil war, but also driven by historical competition among pastoral communities over local natural resources.
These fractured relationships and the way they have been manipulated have their recent origins in the differences between the Anyanya II5 rebellion and the senior SPLM/A6 that began around
5 Anyanya II was not a unified military organisation but more a generic term applied locally to many guerilla bands operating in the south between 1980 and 1983 which rejected the Addis Ababa Agreement. Not all of these bands had direct contact with Ethiopia from where some were organising themselves. One group which was more closely tied to Ethiopia than many others was the Sudan People’s Revolutionary Party (SPRP), which drew its support mainly from Nuer ex-Anyanya. These groups had been largely contained by Khartoum by the end of 1981 but as evidence grew of Khartoum’s intention to abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement groups gained more support from Southern soldiers and civilians.
6 It is important to note that the former Anyanya included those who later formed the SPLM/A including Dr John Garang. These former Anyanya troops - who accepted the Addis Ababa Agreement - had been incorporated into the Sudan Armed Forces in the South and were in fact the main force fighting the Anyanya II rebels prior to the 1983 rebellion. It is key to
Malakal Conflict and Peace Assessment
the time of the second outbreak of the civil war in 1983. These fundamental differences influenced, and became exacerbated, by the split in the SPLM/A in 1991 with ethnic issues becoming embroiled with issues of leadership style, ideological direction as well as personal interest and ambition.
The breakdown of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 led to a resumption of fighting between government and rebel forces but soon there was a split within the rebels. Part of Anyanya II - the main group located in Ethiopia - refused to merge with the SPLA due to differences over the direction of the rebellion; the Anyanya II leaders wanted southern separation while the SPLM/A leadership wanted revolution within a united Sudan. Added to this ideological difference were the ethnic issues with the SPLM/A being perceived as being predominately Dinka and the Anyanya II becoming predominately Nuer. This split became the source of intense fighting between the two main factions of the southern forces. The Anyanya II splintered into various groups and over time became parts of the SSDF.
This already fractured situation suffered another major upheaval with the 1991 political split in the SPLM/A. Unfortunately Upper Nile was the battle ground for this power struggle and its impact was more destructive than anything inflicted through the north south war – although the north was always willing and very able to exacerbate the tensions. So intense was this experience that many believe it will take a generation at least before healing is restored. The resulting inter-factional fighting was characterized by asset stripping, abductions and economic subjugation, with humanitarian relief centers became objects of attack or manipulation. Tactics were deployed to force displacement or relocate displaced populations, which brought humanitarian efforts further into the dynamics of war. From this period a lack of common vision and purpose in executing the civil war, and the subsequent abuse of ethnic differences by southern armed forces, fuelled major divisions and caused numerous deaths in the region.
During this period Upper Nile was also the main battlefield between the GOS and the SPLA. The fact that it is rich in oil reserves ensured that the region remained a prime target for disruptive violence and political manipulation, especially from the late 1990s onwards, thus exacerbating the situation and further intensifying the targeting of civilians as the prevalent tactic of war. The consequences have seen deplorable levels of suffering and death, large scale displacement of communities, the deliberate targeting and disruption of livelihoods, and a lack of access to and availability of basic services.
Malakal has been important in this political chaos as it has been the command and control centre for the whole Upper Nile Region for the GoS - the place from which arms and other support could be channelled to those groups opposing the SPLM/A - whether formerly aligned with the GoS or not - and from where Khartoum could manage its divide and rule tactics. The main characters involved in this shifting situation have included Paulino Matip, Simon Gatwich, Gabriel Tanginya, Gordon Kong, George Athor, Riak Machar, Lam Akol, and others.
These deep and often personalised fractures have mutated over time and taken on new forms and characteristics. All the way through, they have always been fostered and exploited by the GoS which have led to a complex web of alliances and counter-alliances that epitomizes Sudan’s political economy of mistrust and mismanagement, and which has in the process caught up the communities and populations of these leaders in a pernicious round of internecine conflict. This destructive period of conflict has bequeathed a deeply politicized and militarized environment to live and operate in, and over time has caused the debilitating erosion of social, cultural and customary institutions. Without a central and inclusive administration to oversee fundamental
note that given they had been fighting on opposite sides made it difficult to unite once the Anyanya forces decided also to rebel against Khartoum.
32
Malakal Conflict and Peace Assessment
social order, there was little room left for non-military mechanisms to resolve local division and conflict. These fractures have been carried over into the post-CPA period and pervade communities and constituencies as well as individuals.
Situation since the signing of the CPA
It has only since the signing of the CPA that any process of realignment has begun with Paulino Matip bringing some of the SSDF into the SPLA through the Juba Declaration of January 2006. However, this integration has not been with all parts of the SSDF and notably some SSDF elements have remained ‘independent’ or ‘unaligned’ even though this is a violation of the CPA. It is apparent that the original split has never been fully and satisfactorily addressed and that earlier suspicions and tensions remain. The manipulation of these tensions will continue until both sides can properly reconcile their historic and personal differences.
The presence of so many military forces north and south of Malakal is a cause of concern and unrest among the civilian population. There is a lack of discipline among militia soldiers and discipline is also a problem amongst the regular soldiers with incidents of shooting still prevalent. When army soldiers are not paid they can quickly rise up and cause unrest, as has been witnessed in Juba and which could happen in Malakal. The newly aligned militia soldiers may also not be paid, increasing the risk of looting and stealing, as they are easier to corrupt and encourage into violent action. The militia forces continue to be supported by northern GoS, and the presence of aligned militias (OAGs) within the JIU are a potential source of manipulation when the SAF units are redeployed north, as those that have agreed to be absorbed into the JIU remain vulnerable to Northern attempts to foster intra-ethnic tensions and conflict. They remain poised to shift allegiance once again at an opportune moment – a type of Trojan horse in Southern Sudan.
Such tensions arose between these historic enemies in Malakal in November 2006 when contestation over the Commissionership of Old Fangak was mixed up with SSDF politics when the forces of Gabriel Tanginya tried to force his way into power. The tension built up within the whole area until it broke in Malakal with the clash of not only the forces of Tanginya but also of the SAF with the SPLA. Over 100 people were killed and it had the potential to turn into a major incident. The proliferation of small arms means that such incidents can quickly escalate and drag in civilians and groups beyond the aligned military forces.
These tensions also manifest themselves in the NCP/SPLM contestation over the administrative control of Malakal and are exacerbated through the support each party gets from their military wings; for the SPLM by SPLA and for the NCP by the ex-SSDF units. The NCP’s former military support from the SAF is now changing as under the terms of the CPA they must leave and move north to take up positions in northern Upper Nile and across the border in Blue Nile. This continued tension also affects the manner in which politicians behave towards the civilian population and explains the poor performance of most politicians, even at State level, and the lack of engagement by central GoSS to Malakal issues.
In addition to these deep institutional issues there is a distinct gap between the economic disparity between the southerners and northerners in Malakal, another remnant from the period when Malakal was a garrison city when the SAF controlled the town and favoured northern businessmen. The prevalence of poverty amongst the southerners is set starkly against the wealthier status of northern traders, and highlights each group’s access to, or lack of, wealth sharing. In particular, most returning IDP families are poor, although there is evidence in town of wealthier returnee refugees with apparent access to better employment prospects due to skills gained while in neighbouring countries. However, for both groups of returnees it is difficult to find employment and this is fomenting discontent, especially amongst the youth.
33
Malakal Conflict and Peace Assessment
The economic dependency of the south upon the north is more pronounced in Malakal than other locations in Southern Sudan given its proximity to the north which contributes to the economic gulf between northerners and southerners and could in turn fan the flames of conflict. On the one side there is the opportunity for the northerners to manipulate the system for their own ends, through price controls and favouring certain businesses; on the other hand there is suspicion and discontent at being left out of the opportunities that the increased trade brings, through the production and supply of essentials.
The increasing number of returning IDPs, with no money, work or place to live and returnee refugees arriving with cash, but no work, and having been used to having work, can set up flash points. Linked to this is the failure of the authorities to offer opportunities for southern businesses and the levels of general unemployment remain high - made worse by the high levels of forced redundancies of southern civil servants in line with the requirements for a reduction of the public sector post-CPA. In addition, there is a clash of values between the returnee refugees and those that remained behind; the Malakal community is very conservative and returnees are arriving with different ideas, which can add to tensions.
Although the issues of the boundaries that separates the north from the south is the central issue for neighbouring Abyei and South Kordofan, it also remains a top priority for Upper Nile, which is an oil producing state, and the location of the north-south boundary will affect access to much needed revenue. The boundaries between counties and payams are also contested and adding to tensions at the community level.
As with many rural areas of southern Sudan there are massive numbers of small arms held by many different groups in both rural and urban areas within Malakal and the surrounding rural areas, thus it is not surprisingly there are a number of localised conflicts that contribute to the underlying feeling of insecurity and mistrust that exists between groups.
Another issue of concern is over the perceived manipulation of the CPA itself or the failure to comply with the CPA by the signatory parties. This has manifested itself through a failure to address the north-south boundaries issue and the manipulation of oil revenues by the north, to the obvious disapproval of the GoSS, but also of the State Administration in Upper Nile, as both issues affect the people of Upper Nile. Many have a deep suspicion of the north’s true commitment to the CPA based upon the experience of the failure of the GoS to uphold the Addis Ababa Agreement. There is also suspicion about the international community’s stamina to see out the CPA - again based on past experience. At present, the International Community is distracted by the Darfur crisis and it is perceived locally that it has failed to support adequately the implementation of the CPA. This will only encourage a continuing of the north’s lethargy toward ensuring the CPA is properly adhered to in Upper Nile and in Malakal.
It is felt locally that the north’s ability to destabilise the peace in Malakal and its surrounds cannot be lightly ignored. The continued heavy presence of militias and land mines in the local area makes the chance of a destabilising event more likely. Any event can quickly escalate due to the proliferation of arms in both the rural and urban areas while access to land for cultivation and to markets remains difficult or dangerous because of the presence of land mines.
One result of this prolonged mistrust between leaders and peoples is that everyone is more ethnically aware these days than before. There used to be greater ethnic harmony and interaction, but now divisions have appeared that are manipulated by both sides. Disputes over grazing on the western bank of the Nile, the failure to define rural county boundaries, exploitative business interests exposing ethnic sensitivities and uneven distribution of wealth between north and south all remain as accentuating factors to the structural conflict issues and all are fuelled by the polarised ethnic sensitivities.
34
Malakal Conflict and Peace Assessment
35
The exploitation of the environment by oil business and the employment of only northern senior staff in the oil fields in the State also cause tensions between the two set of workers (southerners vs. northerners). There is also the forced movement of populations by oil companies without proper compensation and deforestation has also take place without proper consultation or respect of either host communities or the environment. Oil producing states are entitled to 2% of oil wealth but this has not been fully received in Upper Nile as yet.
All the above analysis highlights how fragile peace is in Malakal and in Upper Nile generally. Whatever proximate causes exist they are deeply linked into this history. There are potentially numerous triggers as the situation is so fragile and perceptions are so polarized and reactions are almost knee jerk and automatic. Upper Nile is a potential tinder box and it could take very little to see a repetition of the November incident and such an incident triggering a cycle of conflagration and violent conflict within Malakal and within the whole Upper Nile Region.
Table 3 - Malakal Conflict Threat Analysis
Structural Issue
Proximate Threat
Tool 1
Threat to the CPA*
Tool 2
EPPIC Selection Criteria**
1. Institutional weakness
Interests, Identity
Power Struggles between NCP & SPLM in Malakal
65 33
2. Institutional weakness
Identity
Power Struggle in Old Fangak impacting Malakal
60 38
3. Identity
Ethnic Tensions/Tribalism
54 55
4. Identity
Interests
Contestation of County/Payam borders
60 58
5. Institutional weakness
Interests
Intra-Shilluk in-fighting
58 48
6. Institutional weakness Inequitable development
Access to water & grazing
61 78
7. Institutional weakness
Identity
Returnees vs. Residents - Economic Difficulties.
62 71
8. Insecurity
Presence of SAF and OAGs in Malakal and surrounding counties.
74 50
* EPPIC Staff rating of threats
**SSPC & EPPIC rating of threats
Malakal Conflict Threats
1. Str 2. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS – INTERESTS - IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN NCP AND SPLM IN MALAKAL
Linked to:
• Contestation over power and resources in Malakal town and in Upper Nile State - linked to close border position between the north and south.
• Inability of two parties to work together as expected by the CPA – disagreements over proper implementation of CPA.
• NCP Governorship of State – influence of NCP and Khartoum in South.
• Individual ambition for influence and historic personal rivalries.
• Importance of Upper Nile State as oil producing State - oil interests.
• Access to jobs in the public sector in Malakal and State – favouring of one constituency over others.
• Anticipation of Elections in 2009 and who will gain control of the State.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• The governor of the state
• The speaker of legislative assembly
• Chairman and Deputy Chair of NCP for Upper Nile state
• Deputy secretary general of NCP
• Ministers from NCP and SPLM
• MPs from SPLM and NCP
• Students allied to SPLM and those allied to NCP
• Muslim community perceived allied to NCP
• Christians community and other religion perceived allied to SPLM
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Conflict assessment, meeting key people
• Identification of entry point
EPPIC Relevance:
Outside EPPIC mandate except around elections or increasing public pressure on two parties to implement the spirit and letter of CPA.
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS – INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: POWER STRUGGLE IN OLD FANGAK IMPACTING MALAKAL
Linked to:
• Historic poor relations between ex-Anyanya leaders and SPLM/A
• Contestation over power and resources
• Poor implementation of CPA – weak capacity/unwillingness of State to address the threat of use of force by rogue leader
• Tactics of NCP to foster instability through rogue leaders
• Presence of OAGs post CPA - inability to address unaligned elements
• Inability of GOSS to address conflict peacefully
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Commissioner John Malut
• Major general Gabriel Gatwach Chan (Tangiena)
• Thiang Nuer community section
• Thieng of Jonyang Nuer community section
• SPLA/ SAF
• Chief and elders from Fangak community
• Minister of Parliament representing Fangak community
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Stakeholders interviews
EPPIC Relevance:
Although primarily a politicized situation, there are community elements which offer some potential influence on the situation in order to restore stability and put pressure on poor governance.
36
Malakal Conflict Threats
3. Structural Issue: IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: ETHNIC TENSIONS/TRIBALISM
Linked to:
• Relationships interpreted through tribal affiliations – Nuer, Shilluk, Dinka, Others - potential to be manipulated by north and others.
• Political affiliations established during the war period when sections/clans/tribes were on different sides of front line, for example the intra-Dinka clash between Ngok and Dongjol.
• Fears of domination from one ethnic community at the expanse of others.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk political leaders in the State.
• Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk traditional leaders.
• Tribal students and youth.
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• CPA Conflict threat assessment
EPPIC Relevance:
Local issue raised in every interview, involves major and historically antagonistic ethnic groups. This falls within classic Pact peace building approach and can address through traditional leaders.
4. Str
uctural Issue:IDENTITY AND INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: CONTESTATION OF COUNTY AND PAYAM BOUNDARIES
Linked to:
• Ethnic/Group sense of what is theirs including land and territory.
• Desire to safeguard local natural resources for own use.
• Increase in numbers of Returnees & IDPs Resettlement.
• Polarization of intra and inter - tribal tensions – us vs. them.
• Unclear authority around who is in charge of demarcation process.
• Affects inter-Payam/County trade & business and overall relations.
• Formation and capacity of new administration, local government structures and laws to address such issues.
• Manipulation of constituencies to foment territorial conflict.
• Fear of exclusion in the administration of Malakal County.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Shilluk chiefs
• Dinka Ngok chiefs
• Some political leaders from both side
• Manipulated youth from both side
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• CPA threats assessment
• Petition from Shilluk chiefs to GoSS
EPPIC Relevance:
Involves the authority of traditional leaders and also linked to local government role. Local issue but linked to higher level actors regarding policy and law but local actors keen to play role in solving this issue. EPPIC can explore options with local actors and leaders.
37
Malakal Conflict Threats
5. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
& INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: INTRA SHILLUK Conflict
Linked to:
• Historic contestation between Shilluk leaders
• Weakening/undermining of power of the King in Shilluk Kingdom.
• Role of key individuals and the history of SPLM United and its relationship with North and with SPLM and the southern cause.
• Relationship among Shilluk political and military leaders.
• Influence of the north over Shilluk area – its location on border and vulnerability of territory to attack from north during war.
• Shilluk area is a resource rich area – oil and other – access and control of these resources.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Dr. Lam, Dr. Peter Adwok, Mr. Pagan Amum and others
• Students
• Chiefs
• King of Shilluk
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• All Shilluk conference for peace and development
• Shilluk intellectuals and elders reconciliation committees initiatives
• Fashoda special committee on reconciliation
• King of Shilluk efforts to bring harmony among the Shilluk (on-going)
EPPIC Relevance:
High demand to intervene from grassroots and others combined with the potential influence of traditional leaders to resolve issues. Pact has supported the process under other funding.
6. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
& INEQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT
Proximate Issue: ACCESS TO WATER & GRAZING
Linked to:
• Control of access to water and grazing in and around Malakal and rural areas - who gives permission/denial, taking vs. negotiating.
• Role of Traditional Authorities vis a vis customary rights to access, and their role in managing demands of communities for resources and mitigating conflict.
• Cattle movements and local agreements.
• Proliferation of small arms and militarized society.
• Role of youth in pastoral-based conflict.
• Ethnic tensions between tribes.
• Local government capacity to manage local issues including law and order.
• Payam and county boundaries.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Shilluk king and the chiefs
• Dinka chiefs
• Nuer IDPs
• Arabs (Solim) nomadic community
• Manyo, Fashoda, Baliet, Renk, Malut and Panyikang Counties authorities
• The Nuban
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives
• Manyo reconciliation conference between Solim and Shilluk
EPPIC Relevance:
Within the jurisdiction and role of traditional authority and directly involves grassroots communities and especially the youth. Links to disarmament issues of other programs. Falls within classic Pact peace building approach.
38
Malakal Conflict Threats
39
7. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS - IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: RETURNEES VS. RESIDENTS - ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
Linked to:
• People returning with different culture and practices after years away – residents resentful.
• Increase of vulnerability – especially women, children and youth.
• Access to land and livelihoods.
• Employment and resettlement - influx of large numbers of IDPs and others looking for work but no government investment in jobs.
• Growth of slums and urban poor as town grows without planning.
• Gap between the rich & poor widening and seen to be so.
• Disillusionment with governing authorities regarding service delivery and urban management.
• Role of local government to manage Malakal - vis a vis UN State and GOSS.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Government of State
• SRRC
• Returnees & IDPs around Malakal
EPPIC Relevance:
Poverty affects ordinary citizen and breeds conflict, particularly feeding into ethnic tensions. Corruption impacts everyone and creates social unrest against government.
Some aspects of this outside of EPPIC mandate but dialogue can clarify issues that it can address as part of process of stability promotion. Anti-corruption or pro-poor, pro-work media campaigns could have an impact upon urban investment
8. Structural Issue: INSECURITY
Proximate Issue: PRESENCE OF SAF AND OTHER ARMED GROUPS IN MALAKAL AND SURROUNDING COUNTIES
Linked to:
• Mistrust between previous enemies – SSDF vs. SPLA vs. SAF.
• Military affiliations linked to political affiliations can lead to tensions/conflict.
• Tension in JIUs which are not integrated and have dual command makes them largely dysfunctional.
• Ethnic tensions between armed groups and SPLA e.g. Dinka vs. Nuer vs. Shilluk.
• Slow integration of OAGs into SPLA – some unaligned groups refusing to be integrated and rejecting CPA – new SSDF.
• Protection of oil producing areas.
• Presence of military inside Malakal –they should be moved to the barracks outside the town.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLA in Khorflus
• SAF
• Major general Gabriel Tangiena
• Ruling parties SPLM vs. NCP
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Visit of 1st vice president to Malakal 2006
• Reintegration of OAG into SAF and SPLA
EPPIC Relevance:
Military and political context outside of EPPIC mandate.
AWEIL - Conflict and Peace Assessment
___________________________________
General and Historical Background
Aweil is the capital of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, which is made up of five counties - Aweil East, Aweil North, Aweil West, Aweil South and Aweil Centre. Northern Bahr el Ghazal (BEG) is primarily inhabited by the Malual Dinka and is one of most densely populated parts of Southern Sudan.
Aweil town is situated at the heart of the State in Aweil Centre County. A characteristic feature of Aweil town is the Wau-Babanusa railway line which passes through the middle of town. This line runs NNW-SSE south of the Lol River, along the border of the two counties of Aweil East and Aweil South extending southwards until it reaches Wau town. However, it has not been operational for several years – it was land mined by the SPLA and the tracks have been taken up in places to be made into hoes by local blacksmiths.
Northern BEG suffered tremendously during the war period. It endured two major famines as well as massive displacement due to the raiding with impunity of the muraheleen and PDF. NBEG was seen as a major source of support of the SPLA and thus was targeted by the GoS for special treatment. Aweil town throughout this period was a garrison town cut off from the rest of the Aweils and surrounded by landmines. The local population was often persecuted as they were seen as SPLA sympathizers. During the 1998 famine over 90% of Aweil town fled into the rural areas fearing reprisals by the GoS.
War and famine were intricately linked in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and both were extremely costly to the area. In the famine of 1988 (which triggered the formation of OLS) an estimated 250,000 people died as well as many thousands of cattle, was exacerbated by the looting, raiding, displacement, killing, and abduction of Dinka by muraheleen, a militia formed by the Arabized Baggara cattle-owning tribes across the north/south border. Ten years later Bahr el Ghazal faced famine again. This time an estimated 60,000 people died - many again from NBEG.
The 1998 famine in Bahr el Ghazal was mostly the result of the scorched earth tactics of raiding, looting and burning prior to 1998 which caused the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and led to the progressive erosion of livelihoods. What made the accompanying drought intolerable were the constraints put on people’s survival strategies caused by the war and the illegal way the war was waged.
These deliberate tactics led in the 1990s early 2000s to the intensification of shocks upon the livelihoods of the civilian population in NBEG culminating in widespread malnutrition and mortality. This left the people of Northern Bahr el Ghazel extremely vulnerable. The curtailment of trade routes, the breakdown of exchange relationships and the continued military attacks on areas of population concentration resulted in the abandonment of agriculture, the loss of key assets – goats and cattle - and reduced sources of secured storage. The loss of technical expertise and education facilities, of ill health and lack of adequate health services only compounded the problems and increased the decline into vulnerability. This in turn led to the displacement of people and increased abnormal migratory patterns in search of assistance.
A consequence of the arming of the militias and of tribal society in general by the GoS was the spiraling out of control of violence and pauperization - both of which fed into the other. According to Macaskill (1999), over this period,
…insecurity, looting, burning of crops and stealing of livestock have stretched coping strategies to breaking point, the current famine being the result. Regular crop destruction by fighting factions has had a negative effect on the quantity of crops planted, and on population displacement, particularly over the past four years. The militias, in their frequent attacks, destroyed homes, water, education and health
Aweil Conflict and Peace Assessment
facilities including immunization centres. These combined circumstances have had severe repercussions for food security and the people have therefore been living on the absolute margins for years.7
The recurrent famines in Bahr el-Ghazal are however rooted as much in the political economy of the Sudan as in the war and their historical perspective has been traced to root causes going right back to the mid-1820’s. It has also been shown that the recurrent famines and vulnerability that decimated the Dinka of southern Sudan were not isolated events but rather emerged from a long history of exploitative processes that threatened to destroy their way of life and remove their assets.8 Duffield (nd) likewise asserted that;
[T]he process of desocialisation of Southerners in Northern Sudan has been underway since the 1960s. Along the border regions, for example, the abolition of Native Administration marked the beginning of the removal and subordination of ethnic representation. By the mid- 1980s, the political vulnerability of the Dinka was such that their property became fair game for surrounding groups so precipitating the 1988 famine in Bahr el Ghazal. During the 1990s, the processes of desocialisation has continued and expanded to incorporate a social dimension. Through policies of acculturation and Islamisation, GoS is attempting to de-ethnicise Southerners.9
These strategies implemented by the GoS were not therefore merely military tactics used in an attempt to win the war but in many ways they provided a smoke screen to fulfill more hidden objectives. The war acted as a cover for economic and political strategies that would be unlawful in peacetime. It allowed the elites to pursue and maintain power, to economically control Sudan and to extract vast wealth from the ever increasingly poor peoples of the south.
The GoS was clear and consistent in terms of its state policy toward displaced Southerners. Economically the goal was to make displaced Southerners an integral and self-supporting labour component of the agrarian and urban economy of Northern Sudan. Politically, through acculturation, education, urban planning and Islamisation, Southerners were to be re-socialised as new Sudanese citizens. Taken together, this incorporation aimed to define the place of Southerners within the north’s historic project of political Islam.
Bahr el Ghazal Dinka have always typically migrated north to look for work, even in non-famine times, but the impact of these strategies meant Dinka were driven north in vast numbers where many were forced to work on the farms in Southern Darfur and Western Kordofan as bonded labourers or slaves and some were forced into IDP camps.
These policies revealed the structural characteristics of Sudan’s political economy, which were being deliberately created with reference to the Dinka. Northern Sudan’s dependence on a source of cheap, malleable and desocialised labour signaled out a special place for the displaced Dinka of NBEG to occupy – one of a subordinate and weak position in terms of the local systems of power and patronage. In other words the Dinka found themselves at the bottom of the racial hierarchy in Northern Sudan as a consequence of the GoS policies and legislation that legally, politically and economically distinguished displaced Southerners from other groups.
The implementation of deliberate strategies of control do not disappear overnight and though they may adapt it will be worth observing as to how they re-emerge in new forms during the Interim Period.
Situation since the signing of the CPA
It is this destructive history that feeds into many aspects of life and politics in NBEG since the CPA. It explains why Northern Bahr el Ghazal and the adjacent parts of Southern Kordofan and Southern Darfur to the north are among the most politically sensitive regions in Sudan. The Misseriya Arabs from Kordofan and the Rizeigat of Southern Darfur have interacted with the Malual Dinka over a long period of time but the
7 Una Macaskill 1999. Humanitarian assistance in Sudan in 1998. SWP-CPN AEP I/VII
8 David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994)
9 Mark Duffield unpublished report 41
Aweil Conflict and Peace Assessment
conduct of the northern tribes during the war has increased mistrust and broken the close bonds. It was the northern government’s backing of Baggara tribes which gave them the decided advantage over the Dinka and which resulted in the considerable loss of life, widespread abduction and pillaging of Dinka villages. Indeed, the slave trade in women and children northwards through Sudan to Khartoum or further heavily targeted this area and has deeply impacted many families and most people. These violations are at the heart of many of the concerns and suspicions of the local population about their neighbours and about the real progress and success of the peace process and CPA.
At the same time the displacement of the Dinka from the Aweils north, especially to Khartoum, has made the politics of NBEG more complicated than some other areas. Many community leaders and politicians from the area found themselves in the north and having to survive in the difficult political climate of Khartoum. The inability to meet for many years meant that the internal political debate was stunted and mistrust grew with distance and time. Varying political affiliations and allegiances have been created which has fragmented the society as a whole and which will take time to heal and reconcile.
This mistrust also affects such issues such as the border disputes with the Misseriya and Rizeigat. One particular long-standing border dispute concerns the Hofre Nahas area. This was part of Bahr el Ghazal that was transferred to Darfur in the 1960s, but which, by the terms of the CPA, and even by the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement, is supposed to be retransferred back to Bahr el Ghazal. This coupled with the contestation over the 1956 boundary makes relationships tense and prone to violence. The claim by the NCP that the 1956 boundary is up to fifty kilometers south of the Kiir River is clearly provocative, and given the battles over Abyei there is likely to be conflict over whatever decision is made by the Boundaries Commission. With oil and gas reserves at stake this only adds to the levels of complexity and confrontation.
The return of those displaced from northern Sudan – from both Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan as well as from Khartoum and further north – is a major area of concern for the communities in NBEG. They want to see their people return and have been organizing assistance since soon after the formation of the State government. This high demand to return has also been has been attributed to improved security after the signing of the CPA. This process, in tandem with the natural population growth, has contributed to a significant increase in population numbers. Many families have also moved within the counties, especially to the areas previously depopulated during the war in the peripheries of Aweil West and Aweil Centre counties, as well as along the railway running along the eastern border of the two counties.
This influx of IDPs, however, is also causing tension. Whilst there is general acceptance that those who fled during the war should return, and that this should be planned for and financed partly by the State itself, there are few preparations for the receiving of such large numbers of IDPs. Thus the pressure on basic services has increased and there are tensions between hosts and returnees. The integration of the new cultures and values of those returning after many years away is also a challenge. This tension is also compounded to contested traditional leadership. Those who went north established new traditional leaders in the camps and other places where they were displaced in order to manage their affairs whilst in exile. Upon returning home some returnees still look to these leaders whom they know rather than to those who reside in the areas to which they have returned.
In this environment of contested political interests, greed for power between the political parties is leading some leaders to take advantage of the disgruntled civil population to push their political agendas by politicizing the government efforts to push forward recovery and good governance. The inadequate services for both hosts and returnees have become highly politicized and are jeopardizing the return, resettlement and re-integration process. The politicization of local issues is directly linked to the struggle for power and wealth between the NCP and SPLM. The dissatisfaction of the population may be used as a tool, especially by the NCP who would wish to discredit the SPLM’s capacity to deliver on promises. This runs the risk of irritating the SPLM supporters, leading to the possibility of violent conflicts among supporters.
The changing of senior government officials has not assisted in effective administration of the State. Since the CPA the first Governor appointed for NBEG has been replaced along with many of the original 42
Aweil Conflict and Peace Assessment
43
administration due to accusations of corruption. Fighting for position and access to resources has not helped in the management of the State, and there are tensions between the State and the counties over what should be being done and what resources should be being passed on to the local government levels.
Additionally, self-employment opportunities are very minimal and there are high levels of poverty among the communities, where there is an acute lack of credit facilities and entrepreneurial skills. Unemployment is widespread as there are no industries to offer jobs. As a result it was reported that more than half of the communities depend upon food aid for their survival. Despite the CPA and the State constitution stating that there are to be two languages in Southern Sudan, there is a preference for employing English speakers by incoming foreign businesses, NGOs and UN agencies and, in the higher positions, the government. Most middle and junior public servants are educated up to secondary level and can only speak Arabic and few are computer illiterate. The local government ministry is trying to contain the situation, but dealing with politically charged situations inevitably will take time to resolve thus fuelling discontent and frustration.
The original inhabitants of Aweil town consisted predominantly of the Dinka and Jurchol tribes of Southern Sudan. Beside them other southern and northern tribes live in Aweil town; including members of the Fellata tribe of Nigerian origins, the Misseriya, Fur, Zande from the south, Ndogo, Chres and Fertit. While the most of southern tribes in Aweil town are there as a result of duty, displacement and public service, most of those from the northern tribes work as traders or are serving in the military and government units, making these ethnic differences and tensions potential fodder for manipulation and exploitation.
As stated above there are also divisions within the Dinka community itself – mostly due to the separation caused by the war – inhibiting the effective resolution of tensions and conflicts. Those who have been in Khartoum often have a different perspectives and allegiances than those in the SPLM who remained in the area, resulting in mistrust between these groups and the potential for manipulation by the NCP, whose large resources can often buy loyalty from those disgruntled or excluded.
Overall, while the general situation in Aweil and its surrounds is one of calm and peace on the surface, potential clashes exist between a number of groups who are increasingly disconcerted; between pastoralist and farmers over access to land and water, between political parties over control of the capital and the counties, and between clans and religions. The greatest risk to peace in Aweil is the continued tension between the main political parties, which is increasingly being manifested through the polarizing of ethnic groups creating to an environment of unease and potential conflict. The apparent political tensions do not present a positive sign for peaceful coexistence among the people in Aweil as the population is viewing their relationships through political lenses. Coupled with this is the mistrust, criticism and counter accusation of each party, often personalized, which does not support a culture of democracy. There is a need for an increase in democratic awareness to try and allow the polarized population to understand that political differences are allowed, and that violence has no place in the society.
Table 4: Summary Aweil Conflict Threats
Structural Issue
Proximate Threat
Tool 1
Threat to the CPA
Tool 2
EPPIC Selection Criteria
1. Institutional weakness, Insecurity, Identity
Dinka, Misseiriya, Rizeigat (DMR) Tensions
74 65
2. Institutional weakness, Insecurity
Proliferation of small arms.
68
45
3. Institutional weakness
Intra-SPLM Tensions
58
25
4. Identity, Interests
Tension among the Youth
61
70
5. Institutional weakness, Interests
NCP vs. SPLM vs. SPP Tensions
88 25
6. Institutional weakness, Inequitable development
Politicisation of inadequate service provision.
60 30
7. Institutional weakness, Identity
Returnees vs. Residents – tensions.
62 71
8. Insecurity
JIU Issues
73 21
Aweil Conflict Assessment
1. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS – INSECURITY - IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: DINKA, MISSEIRIYA, RIZEIGAT (DMR) BORDER TENSIONS
Linked to:
• Historic relationships between pastoral tribes along north/south border.
• Ethnic tensions/differences – ‘Arab’ Misseriya and Rizeigat vs. African Dinka.
• Legacy of war between pro-SPLA Dinka in south against the Misseriya and Rizeigat in north who were used by the northern government as proxy militias to raid NBEG.
• NBEG devastated and depopulated during war through these groups and PDF – memory of suffering by Dinka who fled.
• Contestation over demarcation of border – Misseriya and Rizeigat claim it is further south than Dinka do - NCP influence supporting claim of Misseriya and Rizeigat.
• Oil reserves along the border areas – contributing and driving the border contestation and interests of various groups, particularly the NCP.
• Access to local resources – especially land, water and grazing – which are necessary for community livelihoods.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Abyei Peace Committees,
• Popular Defence Forces (PDF)
• Militia known as Peace brigades.
• NGO and Donors including (USAID) and the UNDP
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Dinka, Missiriya Peace conferences and dialogues.
• Trainings conducted with the Dinka, Missiriya and Rizeigat on peace building and conflict resolution.
• Further conferences anticipated.
EPPIC Relevance:
A serious issue of concern among both the politicians and local community. Potential for traditional leadership to develop a central role in maintaining stability. Youth play a central role in the conflicts and
tensions, but also have the potential to play a vital role in peace building. Links to similar issues in Abyei, and potential to build upon Pact’s previous work in the DMR process. Some military and political elements out of EPPIC’s scope that need addressing in order to support local efforts.
2. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS –INSECURITY
Proximate Issue:PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS
Linked to:
• Legacy of war and the historic use of arms to provide protection in an area that was often raided from the north during the war.
• Arms held by rogue elements – non-aligned groups, former PDF etc.
• Limited capacity of government to provide effective law and order – weak policing and arms control – no DDR process yet.
• Border insecurity – the population lacks a sense of security and so deploy arms along the border areas for protection.
• Ethnic tensions – again along the borders between the Dinka and other tribes.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Former Militia, Popular Defence forces (PDF), Arab traders, an Arab Militia known as Salam (Peace) brigade at the border, and former SPLA fighters.
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Setting up the DDR office in northern Bahr el Ghazal.
• Planned disarmament once the DDR is functional.
• Police maintaining law and order.
EPPIC Relevance:
Disarmament issues can be discussed with the community alongside other efforts to improve security. The DMR issue and follow-up on local agreements regarding arms control can be addressed by EPPIC. There is potential for strengthening role of traditional authorities and local government around issues related to law and order.
44
Aweil Conflict Assessment
3. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
Proximate Issue: INTRA-SPLM TENSIONS
Linked to:
• Interpretation of loyalty to party and southern cause - mistrust between those who were SPLM in the north/Khartoum and those who stayed in the south during the war.
• Legacy of displacement from NBEG over many years and split in community and leadership.
• Contestation over power and influence in SPLM.
• Personal interest and ambition – influence of key politicians and commanders from the area.
• Capacity of SPLM to manage the transition in governance, the expectations for change, and the tensions between the groups effectively.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Communities in the ‘liberated area’, and those in the garrison towns.
• Government leaders, Party leaders and Secretaries.
• State government and County authorities.
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Political sensitization of party members in May 2007 to build internal cohesion within the SPLM.
• SPLM party mobilisation meetings for common understanding.
EPPIC Relevance:
Mostly outside of EPPIC mandate but there may be opportunities at the grassroots to heal wounds and overcome negative perceptions.
4. Structural Issue: IDENTITY AND INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: TENSION AMONG THE YOUTH
Linked to:
• Legacy of war - divisions between those who grew up elsewhere (Khartoum, etc.) and have returned and those that stayed during the war. The cultural and psychological consequences of displacement and growing up away from home and culture.
• Returnees and reintegration issues – how to manage them effectively.
• Capacity of communities to heal and restore social cohesion.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Youth leaders from NCP and SPLM in Aweil.
• NCP & SPLM affiliated youth members
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Youth mobilisation meetings.
• Youth consensus building was suggested by the different youth groups aimed at increasing consensus.
EPPIC Relevance:
Involves traditional leaders and community in order to achieve healing and reconciliation. Linked to local government role through promotion of economic development in order to provide jobs and opportunity for youth as well as oversee integration of returnees. Local youth actors are keen to play role in solving tensions and divisions in their communities.
45
Aweil Conflict Assessment
5. Str 6. Str
uctural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
& INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: NCP vs. SPLM vs. SPP TENSIONS
Linked to:
• Historic contestation between Dinka leaders regarding affiliation to NCP, SPLM or other Southern Political Parties (SPP).
• Influence of those in power in Khartoum during war (NCP) over Aweil area.
• Control of power and resources in Aweil politicised in anticipation of NBEG State Elections 2009.
• JIUs not integrating well – allegiance remains along former SPLM/SAF commands.
• Inheritance of civil service problems – integration and retrenchment problems; NCP increased the number and scales of its civil servants just before the CPA, leaving the SPLM to pick up pieces, combined with the high number of staff within the SPLM Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS).
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLM party leaders, NCP and its affiliates
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• No action being taken as this is considered purely political with each side seeking to gain ground.
EPPIC Relevance:
Mostly outside of EPPIC mandate but can be addressed at community level through dialogue on related issues.
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS & INEQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT
Proximate Issue: POLITICISATION OF INADEQUATE SERVICE PROVISION
Linked to:
• Capacity of State and Local Government to provide/manage services.
• Returns and reintegration – NBEG a high returns area due to high displacement during war and high demand to return people home.
• Aweil town, the centre of government, is key to planning and managing the recovery process, but infighting prevents good implementation.
• Political divisions between the NCP and the SPLM around recovery and returns process, resulting in a politicisation of efforts and criticism and accusations against the SPLM in order to undermine its standing with citizens.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• NCP Aweil, SPLM, State government, Returnees and IDPS
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• The state governor has been touring the counties conducting rallies to educate people on need to appreciate the government’s current efforts and initiatives.
• NGOs and government support towards resettlement of the returnees complemented with delivery of services.
EPPIC Relevance:
Impact of this is directly upon local communities, therefore potential to support the role of traditional leaders and to provide tools to the local communities in order to hold leaders accountable to the CPA and good governance. IDPs, youth, women and children are the most vulnerable groups affected.
46
Aweil Conflict Assessment
47
7. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS – IDENTITY
Proximate Issue:RETURNEES vs. RESIDENTS – TENSIONS
Linked to:
• People returning to communities after years away – some residents are resentful of the new cultures, values and practices of returnees.
• Increase in vulnerability of groups, especially women, children and youth.
• Access to resources such as land and its impact upon livelihoods.
• Traditional Authorities - alternative chiefs established by IDPs in Khartoum and other northern areas during the war now coming back and unwilling to secede power to chiefs who remained.
• Employment and resettlement - influx of large numbers of IDPs and others looking for work, lack of government investment in jobs.
• Growth of slums and urban poor as Aweil town expands without proper planning.
• Actual and perceived gap between the rich and poor widening.
• Disillusionment with governing authorities around service delivery and urban planning.
• Management – often politicized between NCP and SPLM.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Youth and their leaders, elders and local chiefs.
• NCP and SPLM
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• State local government have taken steps to re-organize the chiefs.
• Youth meetings are being done aimed at reducing tensions.
EPPIC Relevance:
Poverty affects ordinary citizen and breeds conflict, particularly along ethnic lines. Corruption impacts everyone and creates social unrest against governing authorities. Anti-corruption or pro-poor, pro-work
media campaigns could have an impact upon urban investment in Aweil. Some aspects of this outside of EPPIC Mandate.
8. Structural Issue: INSECURITY
Proximate Issue: JIU ISSUES
Linked to:
• Implementation of security arrangements of CPA.
• Mistrust between previous enemies – SPLA v SAF/PDF/OAGs.
• Military affiliations following political affiliations means potential conflict.
• Tension in JIUs – not integrated, dual command = largely dysfunctional.
• Slow integration of OAGs into SPLA – some unaligned groups refusing to be integrated and rejecting CPA.
• Presence of SAF in JIUs could be issue if border issues not resolved.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• PDF, SPLA, SAF, GOSS and GONU
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• The Integration process is ongoing.
EPPIC Relevance:
Military and political context outside of EPPIC mandate but local politicians and local community see JIUs as a threat.
TRANSITIONAL AREAS AND THE CPA
– AN OVERVIEW10
Introduction
The Transitional Areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei can lead in the success of the CPA but can also contribute to its failure. Straddling the north-south divide and representing a new national vision for Sudan, they are critical for peace and recovery.
The success of the CPA in securing a just and lasting resolution to the conflict in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei depends on four aspects of its implementation: (1) how well it addresses the core grievances that gave rise to the conflict; (2) how well it manages the impact of the war – especially a greatly militarized and impoverished society; (3) how well it manages the rapid social and economic transformation that is coming with the end of the conflict and the opening up of the areas; and (4) how well it manages the wider political influence and interferences because of its strategic national importance.
Overview of CPA
The CPA is a national agreement negotiated by the two main parties to the war, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). In the Machakos Protocol - the first of the six protocols that make up the CPA, the parties agreed (1) to use the 1956 boundaries to determine the territory encompassed by the south and (2) to confer on the south the opportunity to vote through a referendum on the choice between independence or continued unity with the rest of Sudan under the special arrangement of one-country-two-systems.
Of the five SPLM’s administered regions the Machakos agreement left two – the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile – and one area – Abyei – within the geographic “north” and therefore outside of the southern two-system solution. These three areas were also initially left out of the main IGAD peace process in Kenya with separate talks being held to discuss their status whereupon the parties agreed to negotiate on each area separately, though later they were brought into the larger talks. At the end of the talks – and under a lot of internal and international pressure – the SPLM from Nuba and Southern Blue Nile accepted compromises on their key demands, including a call for referendum like the south and the removal of Khartoum-imposed sharia law, and agreed on a separate protocol for the two States. The
10 Drawn from J. Matus (2006), and Matus (2007) unpublished paper
Transitional Areas and the CPA
result for Abyei was a separate and largely internationally - mostly U.S.A. - drafted protocol to break the deadlock that had arisen.
The protocol for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile gives final judgment on it to the people via a “popular consultation” to determine what constitutes a just and lasting solution to the conflict. The challenge lies with implementation. The protocol does little to directly address the root causes of the conflict but instead defers resolution to a series of complex political processes, mainly the drafting and ratification of national and state constitutions and enabling legislation, the setting-up of commissions such as for land, and the Fiscal Financial Monitoring Commission, the elections, and ultimately the popular consultation.
The National Importance of the Three Areas
There are four reasons why the Transitional Areas are important for national peace and recovery: (1) they are stated to be model areas for CPA implementation, (2) as an economic resource and north-south bridge, (3) as a military frontline between north and south, and (4) as tests to the parties’ willingness to implement the overall CPA.
Models
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile are supposed to be models of decentralization within a federal system. The CPA is often described as having created “one country, two systems,” referring to the high degree of autonomy in the south, including the right of the south not to be governed under sharia. Effective decentralization at the state level is all the more important because of the complexities envisioned in Sudan’s various peace accords. The agreements for Darfur and the East and the multiple geographic arrangements under the CPA have led to one country and not just two, but seven, systems; (1) GoSS, (2) Abyei, (3) Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, (4) Darfur, (5) the East, (6) Khartoum State as a capital, and (7) other northern states. These multiple agreements have created a complex and possibly an unmanageable diversity of systems with different rights based on geography in which arrangements in one place can easily undermine success in another. The common denominator is the central government in Khartoum with the only examples of highly decentralized states being Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan which should therefore lead in the formation of strong states for both south and north.
According to the CPA, the two states are also to be “(m)odels for solving problems throughout the country.” Many of the core grievances that gave rise to the conflict in these two states are nationally relevant and the CPA is to make efforts to redress under- and imbalanced development, promote land reform, allow for religious and cultural freedom, decentralize the central government, and democratize the political process in ways that promote greater and more proportional representation of people in local and national government.
Abyei in particular, with its oil and parallel referendum, is a model demonstrating to the south their treatment in a unified Sudan. It is also model for peaceful co-existence between the Baggara (cattle rearing Arab nomads) and Southerners with its unique provision that the grazing rights of the Misseriya are protected in the protocol. Successful implementation of the protocols in the all Three Areas would therefore greatly promote national unity.
Important Economic Resource and Bridge
The Three Areas are also a north-south economic bridge linking the productive south with the less productive north. It also encompasses the main dry-season grazing areas and bridge further south for nomadic and semi-nomadic communities within the Transitional Areas and from areas farther to the north, such as South Darfur, Northern Kordofan, and Sinnar States in particular.
Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei are resource rich. Within these areas are oil, ideal agricultural land for irrigated and rain fed mechanized agricultural, gum Arabic, charcoal and other wood and forest 49
Transitional Areas and the CPA
products, minerals like gold and iron, and the Blue Nile River. How these resources have been exploited largely by and to the benefit of outsiders, through large-scale development, was a grievance raised in the peace talks as a root cause of the war and remains a likely trigger for renewed conflict.
Military Frontline
The Transitional Areas will constitute the dividing line between the bulk of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). There is the threat of direct military engagement and of local incidents drawing the two armies into conflict, if such incidents remain unmanaged.
According to the security arrangements of the CPA, the SAF in the south will eventually redeploy north of the 1-1-56 line to a location determined by the presidency, and the SPLA is to withdraw from the Transitional Areas to the south of the same line. In their place Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) made up of troops from both armies will remain in the Areas. Besides the SAF and the SPLA, the areas are highly militarized with many armed communities and organized groups. According to the security arrangements they should either join one of the two armies or be disarmed. This has not been happening and in fact it is suspected that some of these groups are still being armed in order to foster instability.
Litmus Tests for the CPA
Because of the above reasons - the Transitional Areas are models for CPA implementation, are an important economic bridge and are a military frontline; implementation of the protocols in this region should be seen as a test of the parties’ willingness to implement the CPA as a national agreement.
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile challenge two common misunderstandings about the long civil war. One is that the SPLM/A only struggled and fought for the south, and second, that it was categorically a Christian-Muslim war. The Transitional Areas constitute significant opposition areas in the north and the majority of Nuba and Funj (of Blue Nile) are Muslim. The Transitional Areas agreements are a test of a highly-centralized government’s willingness to decentralize, democratize and develop all of Sudan.
Abyei – with its oil and a parallel referendum – is also a test, for the South as well as the north. It is a place where southerners should see the benefits of unity including sharing oil revenue and the likelihood they will have a free and fair referendum at the end of the interim period – that will include non Ngok Dinka. The test for the north is whether it is really willing to address valid claims of minority groups and to address sensitive issues like oil and the borders with fairness.
This test is currently failing as the President has rejected the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission as stipulated in the protocol. Because of this there no Abyei area government has been appointed, residency cannot be determined as the basis for voting, and yet people are returning from the north largely to participate in the census and elections.
Emerging trends since the CPA
Two years into the agreement there are some emerging trends that need to be monitored and managed.
Rapid Economic Recovery
Household economic recovery, for those who can manage (the less war affected hosts and some people returning) is taking place quickly. Nomadic and Agro-pastoral communities are returning to pre-war strategies of increasing livestock herds and farms size. Nomadic communities are re-entering areas previously blocked during the war. 50
Transitional Areas and the CPA
Large-scale private investment in oil, agriculture, livestock and forest products is increasing. Oil extraction and related infrastructure (i.e. roads) has gone up significantly and has led to restricted access of people and agencies into the areas around oil fields as well as the blocking of water courses, the pollution of water sources, and an increased military presence in and around the oil areas. Semi-mechanized agriculture and large livestock holders are returning into the areas. Charcoal and cutting of trees to support brick making and building is also increasing. The negative environmental impact is apparent and particularly severe around the water sheds in the Nuba side of Southern Kordofan.
Rural-urban disparities are increasing, especially between the more and less war affected areas and urban centers are rapidly expanding. The towns have significantly better services and economic opportunities then the rural (off road) areas and poorer areas. Many of the people who returned cannot be absorbed in their home areas and are shifting to these better-off urban centers. This creates additional problems over land and water born and communicable diseases. Surrounding rural communities are also concerned at the loss of their traditional land to the towns.
Rights and access to land (including natural resources) was a previous source of conflict. The current expanding economic activity is taking place ahead of a land reform process which would provide a legal framework and the commissions needed to administer such issues and is ahead of the formation and integration of governments in all three areas. This is matched against high expectation that customary rights to land will be legally recognized and that the government will return or compensate people for land already taken. This recovery is taking place in a vacuum of authority and security and can likely lead to increase in resource based conflict.
Administration, Integration and Security
The Transitional Areas are at various stages of setting up new integrated administrations but all are far behind. While Abyei has no agreed administration, Southern Kordofan integration has only happened at the top of the state level with around 40 SPLM sitting in a government of over 12,000 employees. Sub-state administration remains polarized between former SPLM and GoS controlled areas as they have not revised their administrative boundaries, integrated the government and the salaries of the SPLM civil administration are not being paid. In Blue Nile there has been integration to the level of Locality but again full integration has not happened. There are several constraints: (1) disagreement on integration of the civil service and the level of executive and legislative integration; (2) lack of state control over finances; (3) political sensitivity for the SPLM to fire thousands of government employees to replace them with their candidates before the elections; (4) lack of enabling laws and policies to support establishing and administering a new system of government (5) SPLM capacity is weak to non-existent in many technical fields and thus lack the numbers of staff required.
Security sector reform has barely begun and in many cases the situation is becoming worse. The police are not integrated and there is mistrust of the other party’s forces and constituencies. The JIU is either not fully deployed or at best co-located. The degree of joint command varies. Both the SAF and SPLA are increasing in numbers with shifting alliances of armed groups and deployment in and around the oil fields. New armed groups are emerging. Communities remain heavily armed while Misseriya discontent with the NCP is growing. This is potentially exposing Southern Kordofan to greater influence from Darfur. The overall slow implementation of the agreement has increased the national importance of the Transitional Areas as a potential military frontline.
Up-coming Issues to Watch
Some key events must be watched as they will significantly impact on stability in the Transitional Areas:
• Presidential discussion on the Abyei protocol and particularly the boundary issue and the appointment of the Area Administration. Local expectations are high and opinions on any outcome remain divided and radicalized.
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Transitional Areas and the CPA
• The demarcation of the North-South Boundary is scheduled to take place in 2007. Across the Transitional Areas and in Abyei in particular this has several implications. First is around the actual location of the oil fields. Upper Nile/Unity State feels strongly that Heglig in particular is in their area though the ABC places it in Abyei. The north-south boundary will add clarity and could heighten tension with them and Ruweng Dinka.
• Following the boundary demarcation is the separation of forces, SPLA south, and SAF to be determined by the presidency. With the administrative and security vacuum local incidents (mainly between nomadic and sedentary communities) appear to be rising. The withdrawal of SPLA south of the Transitional Areas will add to their sense of insecurity. It will place local SPLA largely from these areas outside of their areas of origin and it allows the SAF to forcibly disarm the remaining armed communities. Insecurity in the Transitional Areas could see the drawing back of members of the SPLA in order to protect their communities. The Misseriya who recently joined the SPLA will also have to move or be disarmed if they do not. This could increase their sense of neglect and disappointment in the NCP already present from the CPA and the lack of support following its implementation. They could potentially look to Darfur for support.
• The change over of Governorship in the two areas is due to take place in mid 2007 with the NCP taking the Governorship of Southern Kordofan from the SPLM and the SPLM taking over from the NCP in Blue Nile. The difference in support from the central government to the one side and not the other may well be a cause of increasing tension.
• Coming on to the horizon are the elections and the popular consultation on the CPA in the two States in 2009. Elections are always potentially conflictual but more so in these already deeply contested areas given that the elected body will vote on behalf of their constituencies in the popular consultation to determine the status of the CPA. What the popular consultation process is and what it can and cannot achieve needs to be clearly explained and managing sensitively.
Conclusion
Two defining questions need answering to disentangle the complexity and lack of progress in implementing the CPA: (1) What problems are truly local and what are part of the wider national politics playing themselves out in these Areas? (2) What are the problems with the implementation of the agreement and what is simply a problem of the agreement itself with reference to these areas? 52
KADUGLI & KAUDA - Conflict & Peace Assessment
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General and Historical Background
Both Kadugli and Kauda towns are in the Nuba Mountains and are key places from which the Nuba peoples have struggled over their identity and their destiny. The Nuba are a group of peoples who share a common geography in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Province, known as Jebel al-Nuba or Nuba Mountains. There is some controversy regarding the origins of most Nuba peoples, but there is no doubt that they are Africans who arrived in the area from various directions and over the course of thousands of years. Today there are over fifty Nuba tribes, who speak as many different languages. Their combined number is estimated at around two million people.
Until the Egyptian occupation of Sudan during the nineteenth century, most Nuba tribes lived relatively isolated from the rest of Sudan and even form each other. Contiguous events that shaped their history are the short but extremely violent rule of the Mahdi and his successor, and colonial rule by the British. Since independence in 1956 and since the 1960s the Nuba have been at odds with their successive National Governments.
Traditionally the Nuba are farmers, but they are now employed in all segments of society. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, labour migrants have formed large Nuba communities in the large cities of North Sudan, like El Obeid, Khartoum and Port Sudan. In the 1980s and 1990s, the migrants were joined by hundreds of thousands of people who fled from violence. Since fighting in the Nuba Mountains officially ended in January 2002, many refugees are returning home.
During the civil war Kadugli was a government-controlled town and was inaccessible to the SPLM/A during the war. It is now the capital of Southern Kordofan with an estimated population of around 100,000. In contrast, Kauda is a small place in the Nuba Mountains that became renowned during the war when it became a key entry point for the SPLM/A and its supporters. It was the lifeline for outside assistance at times of extreme pressure from the GoS on the whole Nuba Mountains. Located close to the SPLM/A headquarters further up into the hills at Luwere, Kauda has become a key centre of SPLM administration post the CPA.
Many refer to the Nuba as ‘a people’ more out of an act of political faith than as an historical, cultural, social and political reality. In reality, the hilly region of the Nuba Mountains has become a refuge to many disparate and desperate peoples fleeing the power of other predatory states. However this rain-fed agricultural belt with its broad plains of its fertile lowland areas, has also attracted both farmers and pastoralists from neighbouring areas.
Under British colonial administration for a brief time the Nuba Mountains formed a separate province and there were plans to attach it to southern Sudan. However the presence and objections of Baggara pastoralists coupled with the demands of the merchants of the central Nile valley prevented that, and the Nuba Mountains were reabsorbed into Kordofan.
There was little connection between the Nuba and the south during the first civil war and little political consciousness or internal cohesion among the Nuba initially. Being remote, the area suffered from the same lack of services as other remote areas in Sudan. It was not until the 1970s, with the abolition of the Native Administration and the passing of the new land legislation, that the peoples in the Nuba Mountains faced the pressure of dispossession. Through the 1970s and 80s increasing amounts of land were taken for heavy capitalized farming and Misseriya politicians with strong links to Khartoum began to misappropriate Nuba smallholdings. Nuba villages became surrounded by large commercial farms which also blocked Baggara grazing routes who, in order to avoid trespass were forced to re-route through
South Kordofan (Kadugli & Kauda) Conflict Assessment
Nuba farmland, increasing tensions between the two groups. In place of the old Native Administration which previously arbitrated disputes, the government courts that replaced them sided with the Baggara against the Nuba. This had elements of ethnic bias and by 1983 there were large numbers of disaffected Nuba whose grievances made them potentially sympathetic to the SPLM/A.
However, the Nuba did not become involved in the civil war until the war came to them in 1985 when the GoS armed local militia to attack the SPLA, and in retaliation the SPLA attacked a Baggara camp at Qurdud on the border between Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile. In response the GoS increased its support to the Baggara militias and together with the GoS army they began to crackdown on Nuba villages. After that the systematic recruitment of Nuba into the SPLA began and clashes with the GoS increased. In 1988 the government began a policy of systematic elimination of educated Nuba and village leaders, which only increased recruits for the SPLA. In 1989 Yusif Kuwa, a Nuba politician and a Muslim, returned with a large force of the SPLA New Kush Division and established a permanent SPLA presence. It was from this time that Kauda grew in importance to the SPLM/A as a key airstrip and place for organizing.
So the war that was fought in the Nuba Mountains combined conflict over land with older forms of racial oppression. According to Johnson (2006, p. 131),
It is the starkest example of the new land war which has become so much a feature of the civil wars in the north. Whereas in the South, land ownership and the threat of the appropriation of land was not a major factor in the outbreak of war, in the Nuba Mountains it has become one of the main causes. Areas of the Nuba Mountains have been subjected to Islamicization programmes since independence, with acts of cultural suppression in the use of Arabic names and prohibitions against local languages or religious observances. Yet it only relatively recently that the Nuba have been subjected to the same sort of active targeting of local leaders and forced dislocation of populations which has been typical of the conduct of war in the South. Ironically, it is because of the relatively large Muslim population among the Nuba that there has been an explicit extension of jihad against other Muslims. 11
This jihad began in 1992 and from then there was an intensification of government offensives against the Nuba. From the end of 1993 large areas of land were cleared of the original population and sold off to the regimes supporters. The dispossessed population were relocated to resettlement camps near agricultural schemes and forced to work as low-paid or unpaid labourers. In 1996 and 1997 the SPLA launched preemptive dry season offensives, but even so the SPLA presence was still confined mainly to the southeast, south and west of the region – including Kauda and its surrounds.
The Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) signed in Switzerland on 19 January 2002 provided an opportunity for grass roots peace building initiatives through community dialogue. However, the political conflict between SPLM and NCP remained intense, as the root causes of the conflict were not addressed by the CFA agreement. By the time the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005, the Nuba – Nuba community conflicts were largely resolved and a degree of unity and solidarity among the Nuba communities has been achieved and community stability had been largely restored. In the period May to July 2003, it was reported12 that 29 Nuba villages in Dilling County, with a population of about 120,000, had declared that they wanted to be administered as part of the SPLM civil administration. Of these 29 villages, 22 (twenty two) were said to be of Nymang (90,000) and 7 (seven) villages of Ghulfan (32,000) ethnic groups. In the south Eastern Nuba Mountains, the people of Kau, Nayaro, Wernang (Werni) and Logan also declared their support for SPLM and expressed their intention to be administered as part of the SPLM administered areas. They refused to pay taxes to the officials of the government of the state and in fact SPLM started to operate a school (using New Sudan Curriculum) and a tax collection office inside this [former] GOS controlled area. This sparked violent reactions from the GOS police and
11 Douglas Johnson, pp.131
12 NAFIR, Vol. No 8, Nov 2003, pp 6-7
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South Kordofan (Kadugli & Kauda) Conflict Assessment
NCP supporters in early 2006 leading to burning of school, destruction of water points and loss of many lives and properties. The conflict took a racial line with Arab nomads against African (Nuba) farmers; the former supporters of the NCP and the latter supporting SPLM.
However, During the CFA (Cease Fire Agreement) the new conflicts that start to emerge especially related to the opening up of the region after years of isolation, return of those displaced out of the region, and natural resource exploitation. After years of the area being closed for access, nomads resumed their previous patterns of travel into the Nuba Mountains, and conflicts between the nomads and the agriculturalists that ha been dormant during the war years were re-ignited. The Shanabla of northern Kordofan were the most visible nomad groups and have been involved in many conflicts in Kawaliib areas. In contrast, the Felata Umbororo (or Weila) have also re-entered Nuba Mountains with their cattle, but they seem to interact more peacefully with the local inhabitants.
Conflict over resources has included the cutting of trees for timber and firewood as well as coal for commercial use in northern towns. In addition, access to land has re-emerged as an issue due to the expansion of agricultural activities, particularly in Habila (Kawaliib) and Tegali/Tagoi areas.
These localized conflicts all have their roots in deeper, structural causes that have plagued Sudan, and particularly the Nuba Mountains, for decades; linked to the marginalization, exploitation and manipulation of this region and the peoples who live in it.
Structural causes of the conflict
The population in the transition areas is made up of a multitude of different ethnic groups, often associated with different economic activities, and integrated in different ways in wider systems of exchange. The indigenous groups, the various Nuba tribes, are mainly agriculturalists, whereas others like the Baggara (Misseriya, Hawazma and Kenana), Fulani Umbororo, are primarily cattle herders, while yet others groups are camel herders, such as the Kababish and Shanabla in northern Kordofan. Today, however, such strict categorization is far from accurate because while among the pastoralist groups the majority is involved in animal rearing, some combine it with cultivation, and yet others have taken up urban-based occupations without necessarily severing their links with their traditional ways of livelihood. Likewise, the same case applies to the agricultural groups.
Therefore, the root causes of the conflict in the transitional areas, as in other parts of Southern Sudan, are complex and many, although chiefly related to the history of prolonged discrimination, oppression and exploitation resulting in multiple marginalizations by successive ruling regimes. The key underlying causes of the conflict in the transition areas include; a lack of political representation, economic marginalization, the grabbing of community land by absentee landlords, and religious and cultural discrimination.
During the war, the conflict in the Nuba was almost exclusively a manifestation of the wider civil war in Sudan: an armed resistance by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to the military Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and political policies of the central government of Sudan. As contested “marginalized areas” the three areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, the conflict has become focused on the issue of administrative borders during independence in 1956. For instance, a large proportion of the Nuba people would see their alignment to the SPLM/A as the only means to achieve self-determination and, therefore, as one of the prerequisites for a sustainable peace settlement.
At another level, the historic tensions between the Nuba and the nomadic pastoralists (such as the Baggara and Shanabla13) have been politicised when the nomadic Arab tribes were armed as part of the government of Sudan counter-insurgency against the SPLM/A. This strategy has been implemented since the early 80s (possibly earlier). Another element of the government war strategy that has been developed in the mid 90s was the use of Nuba to fight Nuba through formation of tribal armed groups
13 Shanabla are camel herders from northern Kordofan
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South Kordofan (Kadugli & Kauda) Conflict Assessment
under the banner of the Popular Defense Force (PDF) leading to schism and division within the Nuba communities.
Increased commercialization and expanded trade and market forces in the transition area over the past 50 years or so (since independence) has resulted in reallocation of community land and emergence of large scale mechanized farming which eventually disturbed the local socio-economic dynamics. As a result land has become one of the key causes of the conflict South Kordofan – largely due to deficient and inequitable land legislation. Since the 1970’s, successive northern governments withdrew the protection of customary users by abolishing the authority of traditional leaders over access to resources. The Sudan state asserted direct control over land and resource use, expelling existing users without compensation.
This general situation has produced several natural resource based conflicts among pastoralists and between pastoral groups and farmers. The expansion of mechanized farming on the clay plains has affected small farmers and the cattle migration routes of the pastoralist groups alike. The expansion of cultivation on the qoz, together with an accumulation of animals in the same area, has produced over cultivation, overgrazing and deforestation. However, the situation is also been exacerbated by other natural factors. The various periods of drought have affected the areas of the north badly, pushing people towards towns, and also southwards into the qoz and gardud belts already under pressure. The long civil war has created pressure from the south, blocking the dry season migrations of the Baggara in Bahr el Arab and the Nuba Mountains areas, and making them stay longer on the qoz and gardud areas.
In addition, the lack of basic services, acute underdevelopment, disproportionate economic marginalization and increased poverty of local population are also important factors that led to intensification of the conflict. The discovery of Oil and Natural Gas (and other minerals) in parts of Southern Kordofan (as well as Abyei and Blue Nile) has become an added factor in conflict by raising the economic importance of the area and increasing the interest of central control of elites on one hand and also by its negative environmental impact locally on the other, leading to blocking of more seasonal migration routes, loss of many cattle as a result of increased poisonous gases and chemicals and displacement of many settled farming communities.
The past history of slavery and slave trade in Sudan has its vivid effects in the contemporary politics of the transition areas. The processes of Arabisation and Islamisation implemented by successive central governments are regarded as discriminatory, racially and religiously. Therefore, racial, cultural and religious discrimination are key social factors of the conflict in the area. The education system and language is perceived as promoting one cultural identity (Arab and/or Islamic identity) at the expense of the other (African and/or non-Islamic identity).
In political terms, the Sudanese state has always been a centralized state, despite paying lip service since the seventies to decentralization and regionalism. Therefore, devolution of political and economic power and the need for community participation in local and national governance are also major parts of the root causes of the conflict in South Kordofan and other areas of Sudan. The central authority, in its efforts to maintain its cling to power and maintain political marginalization of the areas, is using differences in cultural identities, religious affiliation and modes of livelihood through 'divide and rule' tactics to accentuate local conflicts.
Given these deep root causes of conflict the negotiations over the transitional areas were some of the most difficult and protracted and it was only at the very end of the peace talks in Naivasha - in fact in the final hours of negotiations - that Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile secured their own protocol. However under extreme pressure internally from the SPLM and from the international community, the SPLM/A representatives in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile were persuaded to back down on many of their key demands, including participation in the southern referendum. These compromises secured gains in other parts of the CPA, mostly for Abyei. The Nuba Mountains became part of a new state of Southern Kordofan based on the previous boundaries of Kordofan's two states prior to 1974. These compromises were made in the heat of the moment and were maybe too much for the majority of Nuba (and Funj).
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South Kordofan (Kadugli & Kauda) Conflict Assessment
However it is important to understand that the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (signed in May 2004 and part of the CPA) is not a final agreement. It is not final until it is tested against the popular will through a popular consultation after the national and local elections. In the meantime the agreement provides some degree of power and wealth sharing and some security reform. There is a rotating governorship between the NCP and the SPLM with the SPLM comprising 45 per cent and the NCP 55 per cent of the new government. There are guarantees that funds from the central government will be made available to the State for reconstruction and that there will be elections. Though the protocol recognizes the transitional areas as a "model for solving the problems throughout the country", it does little to address directly the core grievances that gave rise to the conflict, instead deferring resolution to a complex political process and a series of commissions.
The mechanisms meant to deal with core grievances on land reform, sources of legislation and education reform are: the constitution; legislation through the national and state assembly; the state land commission; the census; the Presidential Monitoring Commissions, the States' Parliamentary Assessment and Evaluation Committee; the elections; and finally the process of popular consultation. The popular consultation is designed to be an indirect consultation through the elected representatives to the state assembly, with advice from national-level and state-level CPA monitoring commissions. If the state assembly endorses the status quo, it becomes the final settlement. If they choose to amend the current provisions, they will open negotiations with the Government of National Unity.
Situation since the signing of the CPA
While there have also been some gains in the relations between the different tribes of Southern Kordofan, with some consensus being built between Nuba and the Baggara tribes, this is still fragile and subject to manipulation from Khartoum, and in general there has been little progression since the signing of the CPA. There have been delays and prevarications, poor leadership and infighting all of which have meant that little has been achieved in the first two years since the CPA. There have been issues over the drafting of the State constitution, over the establishment of the branches of government and over the integration of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). There are parts of the [former] SPLM areas that the NCP dare not go and there is still much mistrust between the NCP and SPLM.
Complicating this, as IDPs return home and lay claim to land and water use rights, disputes between returnees and those who currently reside in the area threaten community stability. Such potential threats are particularly evident in the [former] garrison towns such as Kadugli, Kauda, Eri, Heiban, Abu Gibeha, Delami, Dilling, etc. These former garrison towns attracted many internally displaced people (IDPs) during the war, and many other local people were forced to migrate and flee their homeland to northern towns such as Khartoum, Gedarif, Port Sudan, El-Obeid, etc looking for safety and paid labour.
The most serious threat to the CPA in Southern Kordofan seems to emanate from lack of progress in the implementation of the security arrangement; particularly the presence of other armed groups (OAGs) such as the PDF, lack of integration of the JIUs, and lack of credible law enforcement agencies such as the police and prison services. This is a matter of national concern, but particularly touches upon the most important and sensitive part of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States Protocol; the Security Arrangement.
During the war, the police, prison officers and the army were treated equally. After the signing of the CPA, SPLM leadership decided to exclude the police from the general parade of the SPLA in anticipation that the police will be integrated quickly with the police into Southern Kordofan State police force/service, as was done with the JIUs of the SPLA and SAF armies. That did not happen as anticipated. This seems to be due to a wide gap in the understanding and interpretation of the text and spirit of the CPA by the two parties (SPLM/NCP). The NCP is sticking to the text of the agreement, which is silent about the integration of the police forces while the SPLM/A is pushing for treatment of the police similar to what the protocol says about the JIUs of the two armies (50:50). The two parties at the local level seem to have reached a deadlock and a complete impasse. 57
South Kordofan (Kadugli & Kauda) Conflict Assessment
The CPA stipulates that the southern forces should withdraw south of the 1956 borders. SPLA's strategy seems to be delaying its withdrawal as long as possible, linking the withdrawal with satisfactory integration of JIUs and police as well as definition and demarcation of the north-south border in 1956. In addition, within the SPLA there exists tension along ethnic lines, which leads some senior officers to feel dissatisfied and excluded from the centre of authority/power and decision making, unlike during the war. In addition, discrepancy in the salary scale of the SPLA ‘remaining forces’14 (GOSS) and the JIUs (GONU - Government of National Unity) creates tensions between the SPLA remaining forces and the JIU component, as the SPLA ‘remaining forces’ are better paid than the JIUs.
In addition, the integration of other armed groups, such as the PDF into the SAF continues to provide tension. The PDF demands absorption into the SAF as well as payment of compensation for the years they have been fighting alongside the Sudan armed forces. There are indications and popular perception of a 'new' supply of modern arms in the hands of the Arab nomads around Kawliib, Mandal and Tagoi/Turjok areas, allegedly by NCP elements. This perception might put pressure on SPLA and tempt it to consider 'clandestinely' arming Nuba groups to protect themselves against armed nomads, especially that SPLA remaining forces will finally withdraw from the Nuba Mountains to the south of the 1956 border.
In Kadugli, emerging conflicts include the tense relations between SPLA and SAF components of the JIUs, as well as conflicts between the PDF and both the SPLA and the SAF. It is worth noting that the relationship between PDF and SAF has also deteriorated due to requirement that the PDF be absorbed into the regular army and their expectations of compensation for the many years of sacrifice. In February 2007, the PDF staged a demonstration in full combat gear, brandishing ‘new’ guns and occupied the freedom square chanting anti-SPLM slogans such as ‘we will not be ruled by SPLM’15. There is also a political conflict between SPLM and NCP over governance and integration issues. Disputes over boundaries and borders continue to plague this area, particularly between various localities, for example conflict between Kadugli and Dilling localities (straddling Dabri vs. Kega ethnic groups), and community lands boundaries, for example between the Sabouri, Lagouri and Tessee ethnic groups. The students’ riots in Kadugli late February 2007 revealed the level of dissatisfaction and frustration of the youth. Frustrated youth can have a negative impact on this fragile peace accord.
Politically, there has been little development of a broader base of political representation and little participation of non-SPLM/NCP parties in governance and political process. In addition, there is little confidence among the Nuba communities in the law and order institutions. Moreover, violent incidents that occur in the rural areas could easily spill into Kadugli town (and vice versa) as leaders of the ethnic groups and PDF militia leaders are mainly residing in the Kadugli, for example Amir Kafi Tayar. The constituencies of these leaders are mainly in the rural areas where they still command a significant following and a potent network of clients and patronage.
In Kauda, sources of tension exist around SPLM police in Kauda not being integrated into the state police forces, and the presence of the SPLA 'mother' forces, as described above. At the community level in Kauda, there are also simmering tensions between Atoro and Tira ethnic groups over community land boundaries. These have been partly diffused in the past when the two communities were brought together in 2006. However, little progress has been realized since then in regards to implementation of the agreed resolutions. There is also a potential intra-Moro ethnic conflict, which started as a result of competition over leadership in the Episcopalian Church of Sudan (ECS) which has the potential to be politicized and manipulated by either NCP or SPLM elements.
14 ‘SPLA remaining forces’ are also sometimes called ‘SPLA proper’ or ‘SPLA mother’ force. SPLA proper is paid by the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) while the JIUs component of SPLA is paid by the GONU
15 UNMIS Media Monitoring Report, 18 February 2007
58
South Kordofan (Kadugli & Kauda) Conflict Assessment
In both Kauda and Kadugli there is a high level of unemployment amongst youth, leading to dissatisfaction and frustration. This frustration manifests itself in a growing crime rate in and around the urban towns and the emergence of armed robberies (in rural areas) of lorries and buses carrying passengers and goods coming (or leaving) Kauda town. There are credible reports of increased incidents of armed robberies along the roads network connecting the semi-urban commercial centers like Abu Kershola, Umbrembeta, Dalami, Alfed, Al-Gardud, Heiban, Alazrag and Kauda.
Outside of the two urban centres of Kadugli and Kauda, there are potential flash points of conflict, particularly areas with rich natural resources (e.g. gum Arabic, minerals and oil) and/or where there is a mixed racial population of Arabs and Africans, particularly where the African communities have openly declared their support for SPLM or withdrawn their support from NCP since the signing of the CPA. To-date, these areas have suffered an unusually disproportionate level of ethnic violence which was perceived to be politically manipulated and interest motivated. Furthermore, such violence is expected to escalate and security further deteriorates during the forthcoming elections. Some of these potential flash points include the following:
a) The Goz corridor (i.e. the sandy corridor)
This is the area west of Dilling town and county/locality inhabited by the Nuba communities such as Mandel, Sobei, Shifir, Hujuria and Ghulfan and other African tribes such as Felata. These African communities coexist with Hawazma Arabs and neighboring the Misseriya Zurug of Lagawa, and the areas is a regular migration route for nomads who are seasonally moving to and from northern Kordofan such Ma’alia and Shanabla camel herders. For a long time these communities have lived together in relative peace and harmony, even during the height of the war between SPLM and Government of the Sudan.
However, as this area is near the oil fields in Lagawa county/locality, there is a perception (whether real or imagined remains to be seen) that the area is rich in oil and other minerals. During the war era, all these groups were GOS-administered; even they have PDF forces allied with the SAF against SPLA. However, after the signing of the CPA, most of the Nuba of Ghulfan, Sobei, Mandal and Nymany declared their political support to SPLM/A, and the Nuba PDF joined SPLA with their arms and munitions. This has created ethnic tension and polarization of these communities and further divided them into ‘Arabs’ and Africans to the point of violent confrontation between Mandal/Sobei and Ma’alia, Shifir and Ma’alia and between Ghulfan and Misseriya. As recent as in May 2007, there was a military stand off between the Misseriya and the Ajang16 group, when each community mobilized its armed groups and were ready to engage over an attempt by the Ajang groups to hold a conference in an area contested by both Misseriya and the Ajang.
b) The area of Abukershola, Umbrembeta and Al-Fedh
This area, inhabited by both African and ‘Arab’ groups, is rich in gum Arabic and other agricultural produce. The African groups include the Tegali sub groups of Tagoi, Tukum and Turjuk as Kawaliib, Burgo and Burno. The main Arab ethnic groups are the Asira section of Hawazma Halafa who settled in Abukershola and Umbrembeta. These areas have witnessed unprecedented insecurity over the last 12 months. This insecurity includes violence inside the towns and also armed robberies of lorries, raping of women and confiscation of personal properties in rural corridors. Some have described what is currently happening in this area, as similar to the Janjawid’s violent activities in Darfur.
16 Ajang = a coalition of Nuba ethnic groups which include, among others Ghulfan, Sobei, Kujuria, Wali, etc
59
South Kordofan (Kadugli & Kauda) Conflict Assessment
c) The South East area of the Nuba Mountains
The area, adjacent to Upper Nile, South Sudan, is also fertile and rich in agricultural products and gum arabic. Its inhabitants include the Nuba groups of Wenang (Werni), Kau, Nyaru, Fungor, Gadir and Logan and the Arab groups of Dar Ali section of the Hawazma and Kawahla.
During the war, this area was controlled by the GOS, and the Nuba communities were under the administrative emirates of the Kawahla paramount chief. After the signing of the CPA, significant numbers of the Nuba communities joined the SPLM and demanded separate local administration from the Kawahla, firstly the Logan followed by the Wernang (Werni). Initially the conflict seemed to be over control of natural resources, especially the harvesting of the gum Arabic. However, it became evident that there is also competition over power, authority and leadership. The conflict took a racial undertone with Arab fighting Africans and a political dimension with NCP supporters fighting against SPLM activists. Therefore, the conflict has become open to racial and political manipulation by the elites and violence can be triggered easily and at will by minor misunderstandings.
d) The former western Kordofan area
Western Kordofan is mainly inhabited by Misseriya Arabs; Lagwa and al-Fula are home to the Misseriya Zurug while areas like Babanusa and the Misseriya Humur inhabit Muglad. Western Kordofan State has been dissolved into Southern Kordofan with part of it being amalgamated into northern Kordofan, leaving the Misseriya resentful of the dissolution of their state. They are also aggrieved by the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) report and felt that they have been victims of the CPA. There is a heavy presence of small arms in the area, as the Misseriya youths were mobilized en masse and recruited as PDF to fight alongside the SAF during the civil war against the SPLA. However, after the signing of the CPA they have not been absorbed into the SAF nor were they being compensated for their years of fighting.
There are many protest movements starts to emerge in the area such as Shahama Movement, Misseriya peoples Youth Forum, Kordofan Alliance for Development. The leaders of these movements are mainly from the former members of the Misseriya PDF who are skilled fighters. The various Misseriya centred movements share the following three goals i) to enhance development of the area, ii) to work for re-instatement of western Kordofan state and iii) to reject the ABC report.
Meiram, for example, is an interesting border town, which possesses all the characteristics of a typical flash point. Inside and around the town there are a number of armed groups such as the SAF, SPLA (mainly from former Misseriya PDF), NCP PDF militia (remnants of the so-called peace brigade of General Abdel-Bagi Ayee) and other many disgruntled Misseriya PDF or Mujahideen. In November 2006, a violent fighting erupted within the town centre between the militia groups themselves and allegedly supported by SAF. As a result many hundreds of the Southerners who lived in the town for many years were forced to flee the town for fear of being massacred.
The area is bordering Darfur region and there are historical linkages and arguably also blood relations between Misseriya and Rizeigat in Darfur. Therefore, the area is a fertile ground for recruitment into the National Redemption Movement (NRM) of Darfur. The conflict in Darfur can easily spilled into Southern Kordofan through this front.
60
South Kordofan (Kadugli & Kauda) Conflict Assessment
61
Table 5 - South Kordofan Conflict Threats
Structural Issue
Proximate Threat
Location
Tool 1 Threat to the CPA
Tool 2
EPPIC Selection Criteria
Identity, Interests
Ethnic Politics - Polarisation between Arabs/Nuba
Kadugli 76
78
Institutional weakness, Insecurity, Identity
Farmer - Nomad Tensions/Conflicts
Kadugli 77
88
Insecurity
JIU Issues and Tensions
Kadugli,
Kauda
75
77
43
Institutional weakness, Inequitable development
Politicisation of jobs, recovery and development.
Kadugli 66
28
Institutional weakness, identity
Returnees vs. Residents - tensions.
Kadugli, Kauda
50
54
70
71
Institutional weakness
SPLM/NCP tensions over CPA Interpretation.
Kadugli
Kauda
78
78
51
Institutional weakness & Interests
Access to Land and Natural Resources.
Kauda 81
73
Institutional weakness, Interests, Identity
Conflict over borders and boundaries
Kauda 66
88
Identity, Interests
Ethnic Politics within SPLM
Kauda 65
48
Institutional weakness, Inequitable development
Politicisation of jobs, recovery and development.
Kauda 68
33
Institutional weakness, Insecurity
SPLA - Nomad Tensions/Conflicts
Kauda 80
83
Kadugli Conflict Threats
62
1. Str 2. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
Proximate Issue: SPLM NCP TENSIONS OVER CPA INTERPRETATION
Linked to:
• History of wider conflict in Southern Kordofan and experience of oppression and marginalisation of Nuba from self-governance.
• Implementation of CPA in spirit and in letter - both being abrogated through delays, obstruction and stalling tactics.
• Inherent weakness of SPLM in Southern Kordofan to use CPA to best advantage and to strategically push things forward - failure of SPLM Governor to make key decisions.
• Incapacity of SPLM in Southern Kordofan to organize itself as functioning part of government
• Influence of Khartoum on NCP in Southern Kordofan - much stronger ability to control events and processes frustrating SPLM at every turn.
• Ethnic tensions and polarisation between Nuba and other ‘Arab’ tribes - consensus building often thwarted or undermined.
• Politicisation of traditional administration.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Leaders of all political parties, especially leaders of NCP and SPLM
• Traditional leaders in southern Kordofan
• Citizens of the state
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Formation of an ad hoc committee in late 2005 to discuss the state constitution was a positive step that needs to be replicated on state-wide issues.
• Bi-lateral committees between NCP and SPLM
• Traditional leaders’ conferences in July 2005, July 2006 and March 2007
EPPIC Relevance:
Goes to the heart of the conflict and affects all and citizens observing the roll out of CPA in the State and tensions will increase if not implemented as they think it should be. Need to engage citizens with leaders to raise issues around CPA which implies CPA dissemination and dialogue.
uctural Issue: INST. WEAKNESS – INSECURITY - IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: FARMER - NOMAD TENSIONS/CONFLICTS
Linked to:
• Historic relationship/tension between different farming practices.
• Ethnic tensions - different practices often followed by different ethnic groups - which is another entry point to foster tension
• Politicisation and militarization of traditional conflicts/tensions – deliberate fostering of division by Khartoum - arming and fomenting, divide and rule.
• Undermining of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and previous access agreements
• Influence of elites in Kadugli and Khartoum to drive conflict
• Misappropriation of large areas of pasture land by elites - forces nomads into traditional farming areas and increases tensions
• Inability of local administrations to manage conflict, law & order
• Installation of corrupt leaders who exacerbate situation not mitigate it.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Farmers union
• Nomads union
• State law enforcement agencies
• Traditional leaders of various farming and herding communities, led by the Traditional Leaders Forum Steering Committee
• State Ministry of agriculture
• Youth and women groups
• UNMIS, UNDP, IFAD
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• SK Traditional Leaders Conferences (2005, 2006, 2007)
• All Tribes Conference (April 2005)
• All Nuba Conferences (December 2002 and April 2005)
• All Nuba Women Conference (June 2003)
• IFAD’s17 initiative for demarcation of cattle migration routes
EPPIC Relevance:
Potential role for traditional leaders and communities to resolve issues and manage conflict.
17 IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development
Kadugli Conflict Threats
63
3. Str
uctural Issue: INST. WEAKNESS – INTERESTS – IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: CONFLICT OVER BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES
Linked to:
• New counties/localities formed but boundaries are unclear and contested in many cases
• Resistance to new counties from some communities, ethnic groups
• Keilak County administration in Southern Kordofan is disputing the county border with Unity State in Southern Sudan
• NCP v SPLM differences over north-south border major issue linked to oil
• Dichotomy between majority domination and minorities rights for autonomous cultural identification
• Oil issues - borders determine oil reserves and thus revenues
• Access to resources – land and water and grazing etc
• Abyei Boundaries issue affects Southern Kordofan as Abyei’s northern boundary is with Southern Kordofan state
• Ethnic tensions – Keilak, e.g., is mostly inhabited Misseriya while Abyei is mostly inhabited by Ngok Dinka. Communities identify with traditional boundaries which are now changing
• Corporate Community responsibility
Stakeholders/Actors:
• National, State and county/locality authorities
• Community Traditional Leaders
• Community Land Committees/Councils
• Oil companies and other extractive industries and interest groups such as owner of large mechanized farming schemes
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Customary Land Securitisation Pilot Project in SPLM areas of the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile regions
• Ongoing USAID-supported and ARD18 implemented, Customary Land Tenure Project in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States
EPPIC Relevance:
Mostly outside of EPPIC mandate but there may be opportunities through grassroots to feed into demarcation process and mitigation of negative ethnic perceptions. Communities can address new boundary issues through dialogue in order to establish common interests and identify
18 ARD = Associates fro Rural Development (an American Contractor) mutual benefits. The Southern Kordofan Traditional Leaders Forum could play an important role in facilitating dialogues to foster community agreements on tribal land boundaries and borders.
4. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS & INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: ACCESS TO LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Linked to:
• Fundamental reason for Nuba going to war
• Misappropriation of large areas of land by northern elites from Nuba and others for mechanized farming and other use
• Community awareness of their customary rights to land and willingness to fight for those rights
• Environmental degradation of traditional land - trees cut down, soil depletion etc
• Tensions between nomads and farmers exacerbated by land grabbing
• Use of State resources for State benefit - rather than extraction and exploitation by others
• Influence of large business interests - including foreign investors liked to Khartoum (centre) and political elites
• Misunderstanding & misuse of land ownership rights vs. land use rights
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Ministry of Agriculture
• Local government
• Traditional administration
• Small scale traditional farmers
• Cattle Owners’ Union
• Land committees/councils
• Traditional leaders
• Local authorities
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• IFAD’s work on mechanised agricultural schemes and cattle migration routes
• Traditional leaders conference discussion of the customary land in July 2006 is an initiative to be promoted and build on
EPPIC Relevance:
Involves traditional leaders and community re advocacy for customary rights to land and resources and secondary rights to land use and access to resources.
Kadugli Conflict Threats
64
5. Str 6. Str
uctural Issue: IDENTITY & INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: ETHNIC POLITICS - POLARISATION BETWEEN ARABS & NUBA
Linked to:
• Northern (centre) domination of the periphery (margins)
• History of Arabisation and Islamisation
• SPLM perceived as only championing the Nuba or Africans’ interests
• NCP perceived as advancing Arab interests only
• NCP perceived as representing the agenda of the centre
• SPLM perceived as representing local (Southern Kordofan state) agenda
• Nuba mainly support SPLM while Arabs are mainly NCP supporters
• Exclusion of Other Political Parties from participating in state governance structures – e.g. Umma, DUP, SNP, etc
• Ethnic polarisation and competition within parties (NCP & SPLM as an example)
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLM and NCP
• Traditional leaders (administration) in Southern Kordofan
• Civil Society and community based organisations
•
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Southern Kordofan State constitution drafting committee in 2006
• Formation of Southern Kordofan Traditional Leaders Forum in March 2007
EPPIC Relevance:
Largely outside of EPPIC mandate but can be addressed at community level in some ways through dialogue on these issues for mutual interests and creation of common identities.
uctural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS & INEQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT
Proximate Issue: POLITICISATION OF JOBS AND RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT
Linked to:
• Historic inequitable development between GoS and SPLM areas during war still not addressed now that CPA has be signed
• Limited capacity of State and Local Government to provide/manage services – especially in SPLM areas
• Legacy of pre CPA decisions – many youth joined SPLM just before CPA expecting jobs but disappointed while NCP recruited many loyalists into civil service – the two systems of civil administration are not integrated
• Returns and reintegration – Southern Kordofan a high returns area due to high displacement during war and high demand to return people home.
• Kadugli the centre of government is key to planning and managing recovery process but division and delay prevents good implementation.
• Political divisions – NCP v SPLM re approach to recovery process – politicisation of efforts – criticism and accusations proliferate
• Poor implementation of and commitment to CPA at local level - some SPLM areas still isolated and NCP leaders unable to go to some SPLM areas for fear of attack.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• NCP and SPLM leaders
• Traditional leaders (administration)
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• During the second traditional leaders’ conference, the leaders appealed to the two parties to put aside their political differences and put the interest of southern Kordofan state first.
EPPIC Relevance:
As the impact of this threat is on the local community, the traditional leaders and local communities have the potential to hold leaders accountable to CPA and to good local governance. IDPs, youth, women and children are most vulnerable.
Kadugli Conflict Threats
7. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS - IDENTITY
8. Structural Issue: INSECURITY
Proximate Issue: JIUs ISSUES AND PDF TENSIONS
Proximate Issue:RETURNEES vs. RESIDENTS – TENSIONS
Linked to:
Linked to:
• Implementation of security arrangements of CPA – SPLA supposed to withdraw south but reluctant to do so unless satisfied with JIUs and police integration process
• Employment and resettlement - influx of large numbers of IDPs and others looking for work but no government investment in jobs
• Increase in vulnerable groups – especially women, children, youth
• Mistrust between previous enemies – SPLA vs. SAF – due to the legacy of the war period
• Access to land and livelihoods difficult for some
• Disillusionment with governing authorities re service delivery and urban management – often politicized between NCP and SPLM
• There is no shared vision, joint training or common doctrine between SPLA and SAF
• SAF not accepting SPLA as professional army
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLA perceive SAF as mercenaries
• SRRC/HAC
• Military affiliations following political affiliations means a recipe for potential conflict
• Return and Reintegration Commission
• UNMIS RRR section
• Tension in JIUs – not integrated, dual command = largely dysfunctional
• Traditional leaders
• IOM
• Slow/non integration of PDF into SAF – still able to act as proxy militia
• Ministries of Rural Development and Social Welfare
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLM and NCP – at the national and state levels
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• SPLA and SAF – at the national and state levels
• NMPACT/IOM monitoring pilot in 2005/06
• PDF
• UN/OCHA assisted return program
• UNMIS
• Community leaders
EPPIC Relevance:
Poverty affects ordinary citizen and can have a role in breeding conflict, especially when it feeds into ethnic tensions. Corruption impacts all in society and can create social unrest against government. Anti-corruption combined with pro-poor, pro-work media campaigns could have an impact upon urban investment in Kadugli. Some aspects are outside of the EPPIC Mandate but may be addressed in dialogue at the grassroots.
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Previous JMC19 experience during the Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement (2002-05)
• Existence of joint (NCP & SPLM) security committee
• Formation of an assessment and Evaluation committee at the state level to oversee implementation of the CPA – Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states protocol
EPPIC Relevance:
The military and political aspects are outside of the EPPIC mandate but local politicians and local community recognize non-integration of JIUs as a serious threat to community peace and stability.
19 JMC = Joint Military Commission
65
Kauda Conflict Threats
1. Str
2. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
Proximate Issue:SPLM - NCP TENSIONS OVER INTEGRATION OF SYSTEMS
Linked to:
• History of wider conflict between SPLM Nuba and others in SK and experience of oppression and marginalisation of Nuba from self-governance.
• Kauda was SPLM/A HQ and unwillingness to hand over due to mistrust of NCP and of the future of the CPA
• Poor implementation of CPA in spirit and in letter - SPLM running a parallel system of administration and services
• SPLM CANS (Civil Authority of the New Sudan) still operating as volunteers - unpaid and frustrated
• Inherent weakness of SPLM to use CPA to best advantage and to strategically push things forward in their stronghold areas due to incapacity of SPLM to organize itself as a functioning part of government
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Leaders of all political parties, esp. leaders of NCP/SPLM
• Traditional leaders in Southern Kordofan
• Communities and citizens of the state at large
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Formation of technical bilateral committee to address integration of civil administration
• Formation of an ad hoc committee in late 2005 to discuss the state constitution was a positive step that needs to be replicated on state-wide issues.
• Bi-lateral committees between NCP and SPLM
• Traditional leaders conferences in July 2005 & 2006, March 2007
EPPIC Relevance:
Although outside EPPIC mandate due to political nature, central to conflicts and affects all citizens observing the roll out of CPA in the State. Tensions will increase if not implemented as expected. There is an opportunity and need to engage citizens with leaders to raise issues around CPA, CPA dissemination and dialogue.
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS – INSECURITY
Proximate Issue:SPLA – NOMADS TENSIONS/ CONFLICTS
Linked to:
• Historic relationship/tension between different farming practices – with SPLA being pressurized to support local farmers versus nomads.
• Politicisation and militarization of traditional conflicts/tensions means SPLA reluctant to redeploy south for fear of violence against Nuba vulnerable communities
• Influence of the intellectual elites in Kadugli and Khartoum to drive conflict in rural areas – e.g. arming of PDF and OAGs in SPLA areas
• Misappropriation of large areas of pasture land by elites - forces nomads into traditional farming areas and increases tensions that need monitoring by armed forces - SPLA could have been best placed to do that if perceived neutral.
• Inability of local (traditional) administrations to manage conflict and law and order increases pressure on SPLA
• Weakness and perceived bias of the law and order institutions
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Nomads communities/ Farming communities
• Law & order enforcement agencies (police, Prison, judiciary)
• Traditional leaders forum
• State security committee
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Efforts to hold nomads-farmers annual conference
• Existence of indigenous mechanisms for mitigation and resolution of such conflicts
EPPIC Relevance:
Strong potential role for traditional leaders and communities to resolve issues and manage conflict.
66
Kauda Conflict Threats
e:
3. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS – INTERESTS – IDENTITY
Proximate IssuCONFLICT OVER BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES
Linked to:
• New counties/localities formed but boundaries unclear in some cases and highly contested in other instances
• Resistance to new boundaries from some communities,
• Communities resist being divided into different administration boundaries for fear of being marginalised and dominated
• Ethnic groups as communities usually identify with traditional boundaries which are now changing
• Affects access to resources – oil, land, water, grazing etc.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• National, State and county/locality administration
• Community Traditional Leaders
• Community Land Committees/Councils
• Oil companies and other extractive industries and interest groups (i.e. owner of large mechanized farming schemes)
• Associates fro Rural Development (ARD)
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Customary Land Securitisation Pilot Project in SPLM areas of the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile regions
• Ongoing, USAID-supported and ARD implemented, Customary Land Tenure Project in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States
EPPIC Relevance:
Mostly outside of EPPIC mandate but there are potential entry points through grassroots to feed into demarcation process and mitigation of negative ethnic perceptions. Communities can address new boundary issues through dialogue in order to establish common interests and identify mutual benefits. The Southern Kordofan Traditional Leaders Forum could play an important role in facilitating dialogues to foster community agreements on tribal land boundaries and borders.
4. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS & INTERESTS
Proximate Issue:ACCESS TO LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Linked to:
• Fundamental reason for Nuba in SPLM areas going to war
• Misappropriation of large areas of land by Khartoum elites from Nuba and others for mechanized farming and other use not addressed - demands for restoration/compensation.
• Customary awareness of customary rights to land is growing as is willingness to fight for those rights
• Environmental degradation of traditional land - trees cut down for charcoal and or just to clear land, soil depletion.
• Tensions between nomads and farmers exacerbated by land grabbing as nomads forced to pass through farmers land.
• Prevention of extraction and exploitation by outsiders
• Returnees back into Kauda and surrounding area - how to allocate and manage demand and potential conflict re reclamation and pressure on services and land etc
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Ministry of Agriculture at southern Kordofan state level
• Local government authorities
• Traditional administration
• Small scale traditional farmers
• Cattle owners’ (nomads’) Union
• Land committees/councils
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Previous work on mechanised agricultural schemes and demarcation of cattle migration routes
• The Traditional leaders’ conference discussion on customary land ownership in July 2006 is an initiative to be promoted and build upon.
EPPIC Relevance:
Involves traditional leaders and community around advocacy for customary rights to land and resources and secondary rights to land use and access to resources.
67
Kauda Conflict Threats
5. Str
6. Str
uctural Issue:IDENTITY, INTERESTS & INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
Proximate Issue: ETHNIC POLITICS WITHIN THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES (NCP & SPLM)
Linked to:
• Accusations of corruption and nepotism at the highest level of SPLM and NCP with some groups perceived as being favoured by the top leadership over others
• Exclusion and marginalisation of communities
• Promotion of tribalism
• Tribal political organisations and weak political institutions – increasing tension and undermining Southern Kordofan solidarity
• Lack of democracy and accountability
Stakeholders/Actors:
• All political parties
• Civil society
• Traditional leaders
• INGOs
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• N/A
EPPIC Relevance:
Largely outside of EPPIC mandate but can be addressed at community level in some ways through civic education and dialogue on these issues, e.g. tribalism, corruption, identity (cultural, political, etc), democracy and accountability
uctural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS & INEQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT
Proximate Issue: POLITICISATION OF JOBS AND RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT
Linked to:
• Historic inequitable development between GoS and SPLM areas during war still not addressed now that CPA is in place – Kauda less developed and under pressure to serve citizens
• Limited capacity of Local Government to provide/manage services in SPLM areas
• Legacy of pre CPA decisions – many youth joined SPLM just before CPA expecting jobs but disappointed
• Returns and reintegration – Kauda a high returns area due to high displacement during war and high demand to return people home.
• Poor implementation of and commitment to CPA at local level - SPLM running parallel system out of Kauda and not integrated with NCP. Some SPLM areas still isolated and NCP leaders unable to go to some SPLM areas for fear of attack.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLM and NCP – at national and state levels
• Southern Kordofan State Ministry of Local Government
• Ministry of Water and Rural Development
• Traditional leaders
• UNDP/UNMIS/World Bank
• Youth, women, IDPs/Returnees
• HAC/SRRC
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• JAM (Joint Assessment Mission) documents
EPPIC Relevance:
As the impact of this threat is on the local community, the traditional leaders and local communities have the potential to hold leaders accountable to CPA and to good local governance. IDPs and youth, women and children most vulnerable.
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Kauda Conflict Threats
69
7. Str
Proxima
uctural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS - IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: RETURNEES vs. RESIDENTS – TENSIONS
Linked to:
• Return of those from Khartoum to Kauda area – not always politically in agreement with majority in host area.
• Increase in vulnerable groups – especially women, children, youth
• Gaining access to land and livelihoods may be difficult for some
• Employment and resettlement - influx of large numbers of IDPs and others looking for work but no government investment in jobs
• Disillusionment with governing authorities re service delivery and support for reintegration
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SRRC/HAC
• Return and Reintegration Commission
• Local Government
• UNMIS RRR section/IOM/WFP
• Traditional leaders
• Ministries of Rural Development and Social Welfare
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• NMPACT/IOM monitoring pilot in 2005/06
• UN/OCHA assisted return program
EPPIC Relevance:
Some aspects outside of EPPIC mandate but may be addressed in dialogue at the grassroots. However, poverty affects ordinary citizen and can have a role in breeding conflict, especially when it feeds into ethnic tensions. Corruption impacts all in society and can create social unrest against government. Anti-corruption combined with pro-poor, pro-work media campaigns could have an impact upon urban investment in Kauda.
8. Structural Issue: INSECURITY
te Issue: SPLA REDEPLOYMENT - JIUs ISSUES AND PDF TENSIONS
Linked to:
• Implementation of security arrangements of CPA – SPLA to withdraw south of 1956 border, including Kauda, but reluctant to do so prematurely unless satisfied that the JIUs and police integration process is complete and protection of vulnerable communities is guaranteed.
• SPLA ‘mother forces’ and police in and around Kauda – SPLA forces paid on ad hoc basis by the GOSS while SPLA police are supposed to be integrated and paid by the GoNU. Has created tension even among ‘comrades’.
• JIUs – not integrated, dual command = largely dysfunctional
• Presence of PDF/OAGs - may act as proxy militia in vicinity of Kauda and other former SPLM controlled areas (i.e. Julud).
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLM and NCP – at the national and state levels
• SPLA and SAF – at the national and state levels
• PDF
• NSDDRC and SSDDRC
• UNMIS
• Community leaders
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Previous JMC experience during the Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement (2002-05)
• Joint NCP/SPLM security committee at SK State level
• Formation of an assessment and Evaluation committee at the state level to oversee implementation of the CPA – Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states protocol
EPPIC Relevance:
Military and political aspects of this threat are outside of the EPPIC mandate. Local communities consider premature redeployment of SPLA south of the 1956 borders as serious threat to community security and stability. Community awareness of DDR principles approaches could be an appropriate entry point.
ABYEI - Conflict and Peace Assessment
___________________________________
General and Historical Background
The border areas between what is generally known to be the northern and southern parts of Sudan are generally complex, politically sensitive and often contested parts of the country. During the periods of civil war, many of these areas have been characterized by intense violence and human rights abuses. Abyei, home to the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms in central Sudan, is one of the contested border areas between north and south Sudan. The geographical area is not clearly delineated and a contentious issue. For more than two centuries, this area which straddles the River Kiir (or Bahr El Arab), has been used for cattle grazing by the Ngok Dinka. For various reasons Abyei agreed to be transferred from Bahr el Ghazal Province in south Sudan to Kordofan Province in the north during the period of colonial rule in 1905.
There are both local and national reasons why Abyei is so contentious; it is an absolutely essential part of a grazing pattern for a number of pastoralists – not only the Ngok Dinka but also various groups of Baggara Arabs of whom the Misseriya are the most important. The area was also a major flashpoint in the first and second north-south civil war, when the dispute was further exacerbated by the discovery of oil.
Abyei area involves interaction of diverse ethnic groups: the Dinka of northern Bhar el Ghazal Region (including Abyei area), their neighbours the Misseriya of the former West (post CPA now Southern) Kordofan State; and the Rizeigat of South Darfur State (DMR). The Dinka are comprised of four large Dinka sections; the Malual, Ngok, Twic and Rek of Gogrial, and also include small numbers from the Luo ethnic group. Misseriya sub sections interfacing with the Dinka are categorized under the Ajaira – Awlad Kamil, Awlad Omran, Mazaghna, Fiareen and Fadliya. The sections of the Rizeigat closer to the Kiir River include a number of sub-tribes, including Mahamied, Maheria and Nawaiba.
Historically, relations between the Dinka in the south and the bordering pastoralists to the north have been relatively peaceful, though blemished sporadically by disputes over access to grazing, water points and fishing along the river Kiir (Bahr el Arab) and beyond. For generations, these disputes were managed using traditional conflict resolution practices led by local chiefs and other community leaders. However, since the beginning of the second civil war (1983), the area faced widespread insecurity and consequently, inter-ethnic relationships became politicized and destructive. Conflict operates at different levels: at the local level, disputes arise as a result of a diminishing resource base for Misseriya and Rizeigat cattle owners, forcing increasing numbers to migrate southwards into Dinka territory. The traditional checks to regulate these movements have been undermined by war, and elements from among the Misseriya and Rizeigat often used force and the threat of violence to impose access. At another level, these tensions and fears were manipulated by and absorbed into the wider national conflict and the political economy of war. As well as the competition over scarce water and pasture, the extraction of petroleum in the area added another dimension to the conflict. Local militias were regularly armed as part of this war strategy and have in turn killed many civilians, abducted women and children (as captives to the north), and dispossessed the population of cattle which is their main source of livelihood20. Repeated raids by Sudan government backed militias, such as the Murahaleen and PDF,
20 The railway line passes through this area traveling between Wau town (in the south) and Babanousa northwards. When these trains transported soldiers and military supplies, they were escorted by militias who caused havoc in the areas the trains traversed.
Abyei Conflict Assessment
had devastating effects. One of the major consequences of the armed warfare in Abyei has been the huge impact this has had on displacing local settled, predominantly Dinka, communities. It is estimated that up to 95% of Ngok Dinka communities were displaced north- and southward from their traditional lands, creating a deep sense of fear, anger and mistrust between communities.
The Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a peace protocol on the 5th of June 2004, in which they agreed to share the administration of Abyei (called Abyei Province by the GoS and Abyei County by the SPLM/A). The GoS administered Abyei Province as one of five provinces that made up West Kordofan State. Located in the southern part of the former West Kordofan State, it borders Northern Bahr el Ghazal state to the south and west, and Unity State to the east and is approximately 4,455 km. The total population in 1998/9 was estimated to be 156,000 with an annual growth rate of 1.7%.
The SPLM/A describes Abyei County as part of Northern Bahr el Ghazal bordering Upper Nile Region to the east, Twic County to the south and Aweil East County to the west. It is made up of five payams: Alal, Ameth Agok, Mijak, Run-Ameer and Biem Nhom. The Kiir River (Bahr el Arab) forms the dividing line between GoS and SPLM/A controlled areas, flowing across Ngok Dinka territory in a west-east direction. All nine chiefdoms that form the Ngok Dinka ethnic group have seasonal villages along this main river.
Abyei lies between the Dar Misseriya to the north and Dinka land to the south. According to the Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation in Abyei (PACTA, a UNDP initiative), Abyei region can be described in three different ways:
• The traditional lands of the Misseriya Ajaira, Dinka Ngok, Twic and Awan.
• The geographic area defined by Muglad to the north, Turalei and Mayen to the south, Meiram to the west and Beihnom to the east.
• The area made up of the GoS defined Abyei Province and the SPLM/A defined Abyei County.
The main grievance of those from Abyei is that there has never been a fair referendum as to whether to join the south or remain in the north. This was not done either after independence in 1956 or after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. This is the crux of the Abyei protocol in the CPA. The two most important Commissions for ensuring a fair referendum are the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to determine the boundaries of Abyei and the Abyei Referendum Commission to finalize the criteria for residency.
The inclusion of Abyei into the CPA demonstrates the importance of the region’s political and economic value to both the north and south and the sensitivity of the Abyei area issue became clear during the peace negotiations at Naivasha, when the two parties alone were unable to find agreement, resulting in an internationally-drafted agreement which was accepted by both parties. The Protocol on the Resolutionof the Conflict in Abyei Area, signed in May 2004 and included in the CPA of January 2005, is very strong in its protection of the rights of the people of Abyei and its provision of financial support for recovery. It also provides guaranteed grazing in Abyei to the Misseriya, the only northern group mentioned by name in the CPA, as having an explicit right to use the resources of that area and to cross the boundary. The relatively small population of Abyei (estimated to be around 250-300,000) is the direct responsibility of the Presidency and is granted citizenship and representation in the State legislatures on both sides of the border (that is Southern Kordofan and Warub). The agreement also makes provision for shares in the oil revenues along ethnic and administrative lines with the Ngok and the Misseriya people each receive two per cent of oil revenues, as well as Southern Kordofan State, former Western Kordofan and Bahr el-Ghazal Region (of which half is for Warub State).
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Abyei Conflict Assessment
The CPA crucially stipulates that when Southern Sudan votes on whether it will stay united or secede, the residents of Abyei will vote on whether they wish to become part of the south or remain in the north. If the south votes for independence and Abyei votes to join Bahr el-Ghazal then it will become part of a new country and be part of the autonomous southern government. However, beyond providing Abyei a guarantee of a referendum and allocating it some resources, the CPA does little to address other core grievances directly, and the people of Abyei hope instead that these grievances will be addressed by an appointed, and later elected, government for the area.
Situation since the signing of the CPA
Under the protocol, the mandate of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) - composed of five representatives each from the Sudanese government and the southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), as well as five international experts - was to determine the exact border, based on historical records and community testimonies. However, the two sides could not agree, and the final decision fell to the experts.
The report was submitted to the presidency on 14 July 2005 and immediately there were two different interpretations of it. On the one hand, the leader of the government delegation said the ABC had presented recommendations, which would be studied. On the other hand, the leader of the SPLM delegation said it had in fact given a final and binding decision, which would have to be implemented.
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Abyei Conflict Assessment
After the report was presented the SPLM went to the Ngok Dinka and explained the report while the government went to the Misseriya and explained their version of the report. What should have happened was that the two delegations and the experts should have met with the communities collectively and explained the report so that there was no doubt about what the report actually contained.
However leaving it to the two sides to explain the contents has led to misunderstandings and polarisation of positions. According to the Arabic press reports the government delegation in Khartoum said the experts had exceeded their mandate and that therefore what the report concluded was incorrect. They also claimed that the ABC were allocating to the Ngok Dinka territory that it had not stating that the ABC gave them territory as far north as Lake Kailak, on the border of the Nuba Mountains, which again was not true. Understandably the Misseriya objected to this and refused to accept the report.
Part of the problem was that the Misseriya were not fully represented in the government delegation. It included Misseriya Humr, but did not include anyone from the central lineage of the Misseriya Humr - of the family of the paramount, of the emir. The reason for this was that during the negotiations in Kenya over Abyei, the government delegation included the emir of the Misseriya, Muktar Babel Nimr. However, he had a private meeting with the Ngok Dinka and the SPLM delegation and made it clear to them that he was not disputing the Ngok Dinka claim to the territory they lived in, nor was he trying to claim this territory for himself. He did not dispute that this was Ngok land. What he did not want, and what he disputed, was the Ngok taking the area back to Bahr el Ghazal. When the government heard what Muktar Babel Nimr had said to the SPLM, they sent him away and said he either towed the government line or he would be dismissed. He said he would say nothing in that case. So there was a matter of a certain amount of dissent within the Misseriya, which the government was very active in trying to prevent.
Since the CPA, the SPLM has been undertaking a programme of explaining the Abyei Protocol and the boundary report and are showing the map that comes with the boundary report in public meetings. They have done this in Juba, Khartoum, Abyei and other places, with members of the SPLM delegation to the boundary commission attending and explaining the report in Arabic or in English.
Meanwhile, because the NCP rejects the report, it is not being implemented. In particular, an Abyei executive committee has not been set up to administer the area, creating a vacuum and power struggles over control of the area. In addition, armed groups in the area are not being integrated into the SPLA/SAF, creating additional tensions and security threats. The longer this situation persists the more likely it will be that the divisions will become even more polarized and politicised.
Despite these major setbacks, since 2005 the area has become a gateway for returnees, especially for Dinka Ngok and Twic people. Tens of thousands of returnees have resettled in Abyei, and about nine new villages have been re-established whilst several markets have either expanded or opened. However, due to the many years of conflict, Abyei area still suffers from the lack of access to basic social services such as drinking water, schools and health facilities making the resettlement process very challenging for the returning population.
In Abyei town, the community is polarized between the Ngok Dinka, who predominantly support the SPLM, and the Misseriya, who predominantly support the NCP. This polarization has contributed to a certain level of tensions, particularly between armed groups, both within the JIUs (the SAF and SPLA components), as well as the between the SPLA and PDF militia who declared their intention to join the SAF. Contrary to the spirit of the CPA, which stipulates withdrawal of all military forces except the JIU, these militias have recently been deployed inside Abyei town from their camps in Difra (north of Abyei Town). Such a step was a cause for concern to the Dinka community and has further heightened tension in the town.
73
Abyei Conflict Assessment
The Ngok Dinka leaders rejected the proposal of the presidency to appoint a temporary administration for Abyei for six months while continue their efforts in search of resolution of their differences over implementation of the ABC report, leading to a lack of 'legally' appointed local administration. In January 2007, disaffected Ngok Dinka civil society groups, including youths, traditional leaders and women groups, had occupied the locality, ousted the local administrators and took over the running of the administrative unit. As a result, the Misseriya feel that they are not represented on the Abyei Development Committee (ADC). Compounding this situation is the presence of large numbers of returnees in Abyei town and its surroundings who are living in squalid conditions with no or little services.
In Agok town, the presence of large number of SPLA 'mother' forces, including those deployed in May/June 06 from the eastern Sudan front, and SPLA police are perceived as a potential trigger for conflict. As in Abyei town, there are also large numbers of returnees lacking access to basic services.
The presence of armed groups is a cause of tensions in Meiram town including those allied with the SAF (remnants of the Salam (Peace) brigade militia of General Abdel-Bagi Ayee) and the large numbers of disaffected Mujahideen (Fursan - Knights) PDF militias, both of which are allied with the SAF. The presence of SPLA allied militia from the former Misseriya PDF, and a large numbers of Dinka communities further exacerbates these tensions. The town’s proximity to Darfur and to the oilfields makes it a front line area and recruiting ground for the Darfur National Redemption Front (NRF). The ABC report included Meiram as part of the Ngok Dinka border, although Misseriya claim that it has always been a Misseriya (Fiareen) centre. Ngok Dinka, on the other hand, claim Meiram has been part of Ngok land and the history of Meiram emerged as a town only in the 1960s after the construction of the railway line to Aweil.
Muglad town, the current seat of the government of Abyei Locality, is a main centre of Misseriya Humur, and the home of the Paramount Nazir (Amir) of the Misseriya, Mr. Mahdi Babu Nimir. There is a strong presence of various Misseriya Youth movements (e.g. Shahama21 ةماهش & Shamam22 ممش), who collectively advocate a radical agenda emphasizing the restoration of Western Kordofan State, oppose implementation of the ABC report, provide basic services and negotiate/demand compensation from Oil companies as well as for employment of locals.
Opportunities/Priorities
Historically there have been functional local dispute resolution mechanisms between the communities in the transition areas in general and in Abyei area in particular. Disputes were generally mediated by respected local leaders from neighboring communities who were not party to the ensuing conflict alongside community elders from the communities in conflict. The disputes mediated ranged from simple family feuds such as divorce and quarrels between neighbors to serious conflicts such as incidents involving death of one or more persons. During the colonial period, as well as after independence, the government organized annual tribal conferences to settle larger tribal conflicts, and the practice has continued. Historically, the Misseriya and Dinka held annual tribal meetings along the Kiir (Bahr el-Arab) river in which diya (blood compensation) was paid, and abducted persons returned. This tradition helps the Misseriya gain access to dry season pastures, and it helps local populations to get access to commodities and they become focal points for returnee abductees. However, they are neighborhood agreements negotiated more by traders than local traditional leaders.
Over the years, however, these traditional mechanisms have been steadily undermined as a consequence of modernization and politicization of the tradition leadership. The division of roles between the federal
21 Shahama (ةماهش) is an armed Misseriya movement first appeared in 2004 led by a leader of the Misseriya PDF and former commissioner of Rashad locality, Mr Musa Ali Hamdein. He was mysteriously killed in 2004 in Warawar in northern Bahr El-Ghazal. The remnant of the late Hamdien’s formed re-organised themselved in to Shahama 2 and negotiated a deal with NCP in July 2005. They are now dissatisfied with the lack of progress in the implementation of terms of their agreement. Shahama’s current spokesman is Muhammad Abd al-Rahman al-Rizeigi.
22 Shamam )مش is a youth organisation called Misseriya Peoples’ Youth Forum
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Abyei Conflict Assessment
75
and traditional native administration is blurred and as such has created confusion. The availability of different systems led to encouragement of one or the other of parties to a conflict to recourse to alternative institutions in what has been described as 'institutional shopping'. The shear increase in the frequency and severity of natural resource based conflict has also overwhelmed the limited capacity of the traditional leaders to deal with them. More importantly the traditional leaders has become part of the problem and perceived to be biased in their decisions due to politicization and ethnicization of conflict.
There is a growing recognition that the traditional administration used to be an effective mechanism for dispute resolution among and between neighboring communities in the past and can be made as effective again. The key reason behind the current inefficiency of the traditional administration is that it has become highly politicized and consequently lost the confidence of the community it purports to represent. In addition, the loss of certain powers (e.g. legal powers) and lack of capacity are important reasons behind the current ineffectiveness of traditional administration in conflict management and dispute resolution. Addressing these deficiencies should restore the credibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the tradition administration.
Table 6 - Abyei Conflict Threats
Structural Issues
Proximate Threat
Tool 1 - Threat to the CPA
Tool 2 - EPPIC Select Criteria
1. Institutional weakness,
International
ABC not implemented - lack of agreed administration.
85 60
2. Institutional weakness,
Insecurity, Identity
Dinka, Misseriya, Rizeigat (DMR) Tensions
84 90
3. Institutional weakness,
Interests, Injustice
Access to Land and Natural Resources.
87 85
4. Identity,
Interests
Ethnic Politics within Abyei
78 50
5. Institutional weakness,
Inequitable development
Politicisation of jobs, recovery and development.
71 55
6. Institutional weakness,
Identity
Returnees vs. Residents - tensions.
64 55
7. Insecurity
SPLA/SAF, JIU issues & tensions
77 60
Abyei Conflict Threats
1. Str
uctural Issue:INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS
Proximate Issue: ABC NOT IMPLEMENTED – LACK OF AGREED ADMINISTRATION
Linked to:
• Unresolved history of contestation over Abyei for last 100 plus years
• Importance of Abyei to whole CPA – sensitive issue and last one to be agreed at Naivasha
• Importance of Abyei to SPLM leadership - many Ngok Dinka in SPLM top leadership
• Abyei Protocol and rejection of ABC Report by President and NCP
• Ethnic tensions between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya and Rizeigat
• Influence of NCP over processes – delays and obstructions
• Presence of oil in Abyei
• High presence of troops in Abyei
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLM and NCP national leadership
• Armed Groups:
o SPLA and SAF,
o Remnants of El-Salam (Peace) brigade militia
o Mujahideen (Fursan - Knights)
o PDF militias allied with NCP
o PDF militias allied with SPLA
o SPLM Police
• Abyei Development Committee (ADC)
• Abyei Peace Committee (APC)
• Ngok Dinka Youth
• Misseriya Youth Movements:
o Shahama
o Shamam - Misseriya Peoples’ Youth Forum
• Ngok Dinka Traditional Leaders
• Misseriya Humur Traditional Leaders
• Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC)
• Individuals:
o Amir (paramount Chief) Kuol Deng
o Amir. Mahdi Babu Nimir, Paramount Nazir (Amir) of Misseriya
o Abdel-Bagi Ayee of Salam Peace Brigade militia
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Historical annual tribal meetings between Misseriya and Dinka along the Kiir (Bahr el-Arab) river when diya (blood compensation) was paid and abducted persons returned.
• On going intra-ethnic dialogue for peaceful coexistence at the grass root level
• Ongoing inter-ethnic Ngok – Misseriya community initiatives for peace and reconciliation
EPPIC Relevance:
The military and political aspects are outside of EPPIC mandate. Nonetheless, this threat goes to the heart of the north-south conflict and to the heart of the Presidency in the GONU. It affects all aspects of the roll out of the whole CPA and tensions will increase if ABC not implemented as Ngok think it should be or if it is implemented according to Misseriya expectations. It has the potential to be an intractable issue that will stalemate for some time and could be the cause of a return to war.
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Abyei Conflict Threats
2. Str
uctural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS – INSECURITY - IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: DINKA, MISSEIRIYA, RIZEIGAT (DMR) TENSIONS
Linked to:
• Historic relationships between pastoral tribes along the north/south border
• Obviously links to ABC issues and special protocol
• Ethnic tensions/differences – ‘Arab’ Misseriya and Rizeigat versus African Dinka.
• Legacy of war between pro-SPLA Dinka in the south and Misseriya and Rizeigat in the north who were used by the northern government as proxy militias during to raid Abyei and displace majority of Ngok population. Abyei was devastated and depopulated through these groups and the PDF, and the Ngok who fled retain a deep memory of suffering.
• Borders - contestation over the demarcation of the Abyei border. The ABC seemingly resolved this issue but it was rejected by NCP as well as the Misseriya and Rizeigat, who claim the border is further south than the ABC/Ngok do. NCP influence and support the claim of the Misseriya & Rizeigat in order to destabilize the area.
• Interests – underlying the border contestation is the presence of large reserves of oil in Abyei.
• Access to local resources – especially land, water and grazing, and therefore livelihoods, are an important issue especially for Misseriya and Rizeigat who need access to water and grazing near Lol and Kiir rivers in the Ngok areas.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Armed Groups:
o SPLA, SAF, Police
o Remnants of El-Salam brigade militia (Peace Brigade for Development and Reconstruction – PBDR)
o Mujahideen (Fursan - Knights)
o PDF militias allied with NCP
o PDF militias allied with SPLA
• The DMR High Conference Organizing Committee (HCOC) – includes Dinka, Misseriya and Rizeigat representatives
• Abyei Development Committee (ADC)
• Abyei Peace Committee (APC)
• Ngok Dinka Youth
• DMR Traditional Leaders
• Individuals:
o Emir Kuol Deng – Ngok paramount chief, Amir Mahdi Babu Nimir, Paramount Nazir (Amir) of Misseriya, Major-General Sultan Abdel-Bagi Ayii – Chairperson of the GOSS Cross border dialogue Commission and former c-in-c of the PBDR). Major-General, Al-Tom Al Nour Daldoum, Leader of National Peace Forces militia
• Misseriya Youth Movements: (Shahama, Shamam - Misseriya peoples’ Youth Forum)
• SPLM and NCP political leadership
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Traditional annual tribal meetings between Misseriya and Dinka along the Kiir (Bahr el-Arab) river.
• Previous DMR initiatives – supported by Pact, UNDP and other organisations
• Meetings with oil companies already initiated in some areas
EPPIC Relevance:
This is a serious issue of concern among both the politicians and the local community who wish it to be addressed as soon as possible. There is a potential role for traditional leadership and peace committees to maintain stability and manage conflict. Potential links to Corporate Community Engagement (CCE) around oil issues. Has some military and political elements above EPPIC that are needed in order to support local efforts. The CPA and particularly the Abyei protocol state that ‘the presidency shall start the reconciliation and peace building process for Abyei as soon as the CPA is signed”. However, highly political issues need delicate and sustained support. There is a good basis for supporting community initiatives for peace building and reconciliation.
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Abyei Conflict Threats
3. Structural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS & INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: ACCESS TO LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Linked to:
• The Arab Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka ethnic groups have long held competing claims for access to the cattle grazing pastures and resources.
• Fundamental issue in the DMR process as M & R need to access water and grazing.
• Issues of grazing rights versus ownership rights of land
• Awareness of Ngok customary rights to land is growing as is willingness to fight for those rights.
• Environmental degradation of traditional land is a growing issue as climate changes and becomes drier, while cattle numbers continue to increase.
• Prevention of extraction and exploitation by others from outside – particularly in oil producing areas.
• Returnees are coming back into Abyei and surrounding areas (i.e. Agok). Potential conflict around how to allocate and manage their needs and expectations, pressure on services and land, and issues around land reclamation.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Abyei Development Committee (ADC)
• Abyei Peace Committee (APC)
• Ngok Dinka Leaders
• Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC)
• Misseriya Humur’s Traditional leaders
• Amir Kuol Deng – paramount Chief of Ngok
• Amir Mahdi Babu Nimir, Paramount Nazir (Amir) of Misseriya
• SPLM and NCP
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• The Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka have shared resources and cattle grazing areas in Abyei since the 18th century
• Historical annual tribal meetings between Misseriya and Dinka along the Kiir (Bahr el-Arab) river.
•
• Meetings with oil companies already started in order to promote corporate community engagement
EPPIC Relevance:
This involves traditional leaders and communities who have been fighting for recognition of customary rights to land and resources and the reintegration process of returnees in and around Abyei. Support for equitable rights to access and use natural resource and revival of indigenous mechanisms for access and distribution of resources
4. Str
uctural Issue: IDENTITY & INTERESTS
Proximate Issue: ETHNIC POLITICS WITHIN ABYEI TOWN
Linked to:
• Misinterpretation of the CPA re definition of who are the citizens or residents of Abyei area. The protocol says “residents will be those living in the area with residency criteria determined by the Abyei Referendum Commission”.
• SPLA and police are inside Abyei town but not integrated into the ‘legal’ police force
• Abyei town management split down ethnic lines
• Traders still dependent on north and mainly Arab.
• Arabs in Abyei felt excluded as they are not represented in the Abyei Development Committee (ABC)
Stakeholders/Actors:
• Armed Groups: (SPLA, SAF, Police and militia)
• Abyei Development Committee (ADC)
• Abyei Peace Council/Committee (APC) in Abyei and Agok
• Youth and women
• Traditional Leaders
• SPLM and NCP leadership at local level
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Inter ethnic linkages between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya
• Joint Misseriya -Dinka peace committee training in Agok, 2005
• CPA- Abyei Protocol states ‘Abyei is a bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of Sudan’.
EPPIC Relevance:
78
Abyei Conflict Threats
5. Str
6. Str
Largely outside of EPPIC mandate but can be addressed at community level through dialogue on these issues, such as citizenship rights and obligations, multiple identities, etc.
uctural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS & INEQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT
Proximate Issue: POLITICISATION OF JOBS AND RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT
Linked to:
• Historic inequitable development between GoS and SPLM areas during war still not addressed although the CPA is in place. In particular, Agok area is less developed than Abyei/northern parts and under pressure to provide services to citizens.
• Civil authorities in the ‘former’ SPLM controlled areas (e.g. Agok) still works on voluntary basis.
• Limited capacity of Local Government to provide and/or manage basic services in Abyei – i.e. lack of financial capacity.
• Absence of ‘legal’ administration of Abyei – contestation over power and control, and employment.
• Returns and reintegration – Abyei a high returns area due to high displacement during war and high demand to return people home.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLM and NCP leadership at local level
• SRRC/HC
• Abyei Development Committee (ADC)
• Abyei Peace Committee (APC)
• Elders and traditional Leaders
• Youth, Women and IDPs/Returnees
• Civil Society and CBOs – such as ACAD, NDO and Angato
• INGOs, including UN agencies such UNMIS and UNDP
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Existing traditional mechanisms for managing disputes
• Formation of an hoc Abyei Development committee as a de facto administration for the area
EPPIC Relevance:
There is a key role for traditional leaders and local communities to hold leaders accountable to CPA and to good local governance. IDPs, particularly the youth, women and children are the most vulnerable. Traditional leadership may play significant role in facilitating community dialogue on issues such equitable development, fairness and vulnerability.
uctural Issue: INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS - IDENTITY
Proximate Issue: RETURNEES V RESIDENTS – TENSIONS
Linked to:
• Return of internally displaced people (IDPs) from Khartoum and other areas to Abyei. In particular, the Ngok unable to settle where they would want, or to what they consider their traditional areas.
• Increased numbers of vulnerable persons – especially women, children, youth
• Gaining access to land and livelihoods difficult
• Employment and resettlement - influx of large numbers of IDPs and others looking for work but delay in the formation of administration leads to constrained and limited opportunities.
• Disillusionment with governing authorities around service delivery and support for reintegration.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SRRC/HC
• Abyei Development Committee (ADC)
• Abyei Peace Committee (APC)
• Ngok Dinka Youth
• Ngok Dinka Leaders
• UNMIS RRR unit
• UNDP and other INGOs
• LNGOs – such as ACAD and NDO
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Historical annual tribal meetings between Misseriya and Dinka along the Kiir (Bahr el-Arab) river.
• Meetings with oil companies already started
EPPIC Relevance:
Some aspects of this threat are outside of the EPPIC Mandate. However, poverty affects ordinary citizens and can have a role in breeding conflict, especially when it feeds into ethnic tensions.
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Abyei Conflict Threats
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Traditional leaders have strong role to play in ensuring inclusion and fair access to resources, services and opportunities.
8. Structural Issue: INSECURITY
Proximate Issue: SPLA, SAF, JIUs ISSUES AND TENSIONS
Linked to:
• Implementation of security arrangements of CPA; SPLA/SAF are supposed to integrate into JIU. However, tension in JIUs as they are not properly integrated, there are dual command structures.
• Largely dysfunctional SPLA forces/police in and around Abyei are fully armed but unpaid or paid on ad hoc basis.
• Presence of SSUM/SSDF.
Stakeholders/Actors:
• SPLM and NCP political leadership
• Armed Groups:
o SPLA, SAF, Police
o Remnants of El-Salam brigade militia (Peace Brigade for Development and Reconstruction – PBDR))
o Mujahideen (Fursan - Knights)
o PDF militias allied with NCP,
o PDF militias allied with SPLA
• Abyei Development Committee (ADC)
• Abyei Peace Committee (APC)
• Ngok Dinka Youth
• Traditional Community Leaders
• Individuals:
o Emir Kuol Deng – Ngok paramount chief,
o Amir Mahdi Babu Nimir, Paramount Nazir (Amir) of Misseriya,
o Major-General Sultan Abdel-Bagi Ayii – Chairperson of the GOSS Cross border dialogue Commission and former c-in-c of the PBDR).
o Major-General, Al-Tom Al Nour Daldoum, Leader of National Peace Forces militia
• Misseriya Youth Movements: (Shahama, Shamam - Misseriya peoples’ Youth Forum)
Previous and Ongoing Initiatives:
• Joint JIUs military command
• UNMIS – Area Joint Military Committees (JMC) and Area Joint Military Teams (JMT)
EPPIC Relevance:
Military and political context outside of EPPIC mandate but local politicians and local community see JIUs and PDF as a threat.
Section IV:
EPPIC Analysis
of Conflict Threats
_______________________________________________________
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1. Understanding Structural Causes in Sudan
If the goal for Sudan is not just the absence of violent conflict but a just and sustainable peace it necessitates addressing the structural causes of violent conflict (from the local to the national level) in order to build a society that can provide basic human security to all its citizens and manage conflict constructively to prevent it from turning into violence. What the impacts of the war in Sudan demonstrate is that the intra-state crisis will endure as long as the conditions that threaten human security and engender violence prevail. Even though there is now the CPA, in place many of the structural conditions that threaten security and violence still persist in Sudan. The more proximate tactics used to foster instability have mutated and adapted to take into account the CPA and many negative practices are more nuanced and hidden (at least to the external observers) but they are still very much present. Bribery and buying support, political belligerence and plain hypocrisy have replaced proxy militias, antonov bombers and forced displacement – at least for the present.
The root causes of the war in Sudan are well documented23 and more importantly deeply engrained in all Southerners and those in the Transitional Areas and are to do with the planned and orchestrated history of oppression and marginalization by the small northern central elite over the rest of the country. These roots causes have not gone with the signing of the CPA. In fact it could be argued that the opposite is in fact the case as whilst the CPA is supposed to provide the means to address those fundamental systemic causes of marginalization and exclusion, inequity and injustice, racism and religious hegemony, the jury is still out as to whether it is doing actually doing that and for many the early signs have not been positive and, for some like many of the Nuba and Funj and others, it is clear that the fundamental reasons why they went to war have not been not addressed in the CPA.
What heightens tensions post the CPA is that ordinary people judge that there is no desire to properly address the structural issues behind the conflicts in Sudan. It is not only the failure to implement to the letter – but the blatant lack of willingness to implement according to the spirit of the CPA. It is this failure of political will that most signals to the people that this war may well not be over yet – that there is more to come if they are to secure what is rightfully theirs. The paradigmatic transformation of structures and systems, of behaviour and attitude as envisaged by Dr John Garang has still to become a reality in Sudan;
“The transformation which shall be engendered by this agreement shall be reflected first and foremost in democratic transformation to which the SPLM is fully committed. Surely by democraic we do not mean a return to the sham procedural democracy of the past, which was a camouflage for the perpetuation of vested interest. In that sham democracy civil rights were subject to the whims of rulers. The majority of Sudanese regions remained peripheral to the central power and was treated as an expendable quantum only to be manipulated through political trickery and double-dealing. The transformaion envisaged in the CPA puts an end to allthat sinceit epresents a political and socioeconomic paradigm shift which entails the recognitionof political diversity the entrenchmentof human rights in the constitution, the upholding of the independence of the judiciary, the commitment to the rule of law by the government and the governed, and the establishment of a truly independent and competent civil service at all levels of government. It also conceptualizes and seeks to realize a receation of the legislature in a manner that shall ensure rigorous checks and balances and guarantees powers to the government of southern Sudan and to the states powers which can neiher be withdrawn nor impaired by other centres of power.”
t
t
r
,
r
t
24
In spite of such a vision, sham procedural democracy, the perpetuation of vested interest, political trickery and double dealing still seem to be the order of the day. It is because these deep structural
23 See especially ‘The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Douglas H. Johnson, The International African Institute, in association with James Currey and others, 2003. This assessment is grateful to this book for much of the historical accounts given.
24 From the speech of the Chairman of the SPLM at the signing ceremony of the CPA in Nairobi in January 2005.
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causes of conflict still exist and still foment beneath the surface of the CPA that there is a concern that they might well coalesce and become vulnerable the present proximate causes or triggers which could manifest as violent conflict and even worse lead to a return to war. Because of the inter-relatedness of these causes no single one can be identified in isolation, and it is unlikely that any single cause will lead Sudan back to war (though there may be one or two notable exceptions – oil and the referendum being the most obvious – but even then others will underpin those key issues). It is understanding these complex dynamics of conflict in Sudan that is so essential for those seeking to act on them. Grasping how the different causal factors interact in this context, in this generation, and according to the different actors’ goals and how they choose to pursue them is the basis of all intervention.
Lessons drawn by other observers help to highlight the complexity of addressing local conflict and building peace in Sudan and its link with the national level. Some lessons identified by Bradbury et. al. (2005) include;25
• Violent conflict at the local level cannot be separated from the wider armed conflict.
• Local disputes reflect competition for representation at the centre.
• Local peace building is no substitute for a national peace agreement.
• Local agreements are limited in the extent they can address structural factors underlying the war.
• The sustainability of local peace processes depends on the success of national peace agreements. And the success of the latter will involve renewed attention to local disputes.
• Local peace processes need support from representative government at the national level.
• External support for local peace processes has been reinforced by current concerns about regional security and counter-terrorism.
• There is no clear, shared understanding between donors and supposed beneficiaries over what peace-building projects are intended to achieve.
• The interests of the institutions involved in supporting local peace processes need to be identified as well as those of the parties to the conflict.
• Making local peace with one group can be a precursor for making local war with another.
• There is a risk that support for peace processes may feed the conflicts they are meant to resolve.
• There is a contradiction between the rationale presented for local peace processes and the nature of the support provided by donors.
• Support for processes of dialogue and mediation are inadequate without support to implement agreements.
• International support for peace building is generating an expanding body of useful literature.
• Peace-building is evolving.
• Indigenous traditions of reconciliation and forgiveness are not well understood by outsiders.
• International organizations sponsoring peace building do not always speak the same moral and political language as the people they are assisting.
• International aid agencies should not seek to fill the vacuum of government.
• The notion of “civil society” remains undefined.
• Oil exploitation is a complicating factor on the road to peace.
25 Summary of Findings from Local Peace Processes in Sudan. A Baseline Study. Mark Bradbury, John Ryle, Michael Medley, Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge. Rift Valley Institutue, November 2005.
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All this needs to be understood, not only by EPPIC but by the majority of actors seeking to address threats to the CPA and support peace in Sudan. Consensus building begins with a commonly agreed analysis of the situation – of the complex reality on the ground and the conceptual basis for interpreting it. Building on that consensus leads to developing a holistic and strategic approach to addressing the factors that drive conflict and that can build peace. Such an approach necessitates incorporating all the potential causes and actors at all geographical levels (local, national, regional and international) and involves a series of coherent actions only part of which can be undertaken by the EPPIC Program. Identifying EPPIC’s specific contribution and its own strategic actions (if possible within a coherent ‘pathway of change’ strategy that identifies the actions of others as part of a response to conflict and peace) is however based on this shared analysis.
2. The historical perspective
If there are structural causes to any conflict then what are these in Southern Sudan and in the Transitional Areas? How might these causes be described or categorized for analysis and for addressing?
According to Douglas H. Johnson (2003), Sudan’s recurring civil wars are a product of the following historical factors:26
1. Patterns of governance which developed in the Sudanic states before the nineteenth century, establishing an exploitative relationship between the centralizing power of the state and its hinterlands or peripheries, mainly through the institutions of slavery and slave raiding, creating groups of peoples with a lastingly ambiguous status in relation to the state;
2. The introduction of a particular brand of militant Islam in the late nineteenth century which further sharpened the divide between persons with and without full legal rights within the state;
3. Inequalities in economic, educational and political development within the colonial state of the twentieth century, which often built upon earlier patterns;
4. Britain’s decision, based on political expediency, to grant independence in 1956 to the whole of the Sudan before disparities in development could be addressed, and without obtaining adequate guarantees for safeguarding the interests and representation of southern Sudanese;
5. A narrowly based nationalist movement among the northern elite in the Sudan which confronted the issue of Sudan’s diversity and unequal development by attempting to build a national identity based on the principles of Arab culture and the religion of Islam, leading to the re-emergence of nineteenth century ideas of centre-periphery relations.
6. Failure to obtain a national consensus in either the North or South in the 1970’s concerning national unity, regional development, and the balance of power between the central and regional governments.
7. The weakened state of the Sudan’s economy in the 1970’s, coinciding with a Sudanese awareness of the extent of their own natural resources, that hastened political instability in the 1980’s;
8. The Sudan’s involvement in the international politics of the Cold War, which exacerbated its own internal war, especially through the distribution of arms on an unprecedented scale;
9. The re-emergence of militant Islam as a major political and economic force in the 1990s, both nationally and internationally, and the qualifications this has placed on the rights of the non-Muslim citizens;
26 From ‘The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Douglas H. Johnson, The International African Institute, in association with James Currey and others, 2003.
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10. The interest of foreign governments and foreign investors in the Sudan’s natural and mineral resources, especially water and oil.
It is essential to recall these causes of conflict in Sudan because for many Sudanese they still persist and explain the true dynamic of what still goes on in Sudan despite the CPA. There is a long memory held by the people of Sudan associated with their deep experience of these causes which translates into a fundamental mistrust of the north as a whole and of the central government in particular.
3. Structural Causes and the CPA
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement - whilst inevitably being something of a compromise between two long standing warring parties – by its very nature seeks to address these structural causes. Whilst it is far from comprehensive the very use of that word to describe this peace agreement highlights the deep structural nature of what was being negotiated. Both sides – and those observing both internal and external – knew this was going to the heart of the matter re the structural problems in Sudan. Hence the protracted nature of the talks and the fact that there was little movement on key issues until the key (two) people who could agree on such fundamentals were negotiating face to face. Again this highlights the importance of individual personalities in addressing conflict and building peace – or agreeing to peace in this case. It signifies the human element, the personal and relational aspects of addressing these fundamental issues and its link to addressing structural causes.
The six protocols that make up the CPA make specific the way power and wealth sharing, as well as the specific issues in specific locations, will be addressed. These have been further enshrined in the Interim National Constitution and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. These documents thus give legal strength to the way things are supposed to be done – both internationally and nationally.
Given the specifics of the CPA there are clearly areas that, if not addressed as agreed, pose a threat to peace and security in Sudan. Some of these are major threats and some will in fact be potential breakers of the agreement. These main threats and specific potential accelerators or triggers associated with each are as follows;
(1) The Referendum – a potential breaker of the CPA
People denied the right to self-determination – either delay or abandonment
One Party or more manipulates the referendum process
The result of the referendum is not honored by Parties to CPA or others or International community
Abyei referendum result not honored
(2) The Elections
Elections don’t take place or not felt to be free and fair – high degree of corruption around election process – perceived or real - potential violence pre-voting, potential violence during voting
Results contested in some locations – potential violence post voting
NCP suffers major losses or is ousted in north
SPLM suffers major losses or is ousted in south
(3) Oil – a potential breaker of the CPA
Revenues withheld by NCP from GOSS and oil producing States
South denies access to oil areas to northern contracted companies
Militias used to secure/clear southern oil areas
NCP delays/denies referendum to keep oil reserves/revenues going north
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(4) Borders – linked to oil and Abyei this is another potential CPA breaker
North South borders not demarcated or contested – with the link to oil revenues
Abyei borders not agreed and contested - link to oil revenues
State Borders contested deliberately to foster division
Local borders - county and payam - become cause of contestation
(5) Three Areas
Historic grievances not addressed or redressed – land not compensated, marginalization continues
Land misappropriated by government to elites and/or – non Nuba etc
Oil revenues to States not received or misused
Popular consultation process manipulated or denied
Ethnic divisions fostered – Nuba/Baggara etc
Abyei issues not resolved satisfactorily
(6) SPLA/SAF tensions
Build up of armies and weapons over Interim Period
JIUs do not cooperate or integrate – and mistrust builds over time
Deployment of troops along the north south border and in oil areas
OAGs continue to be supported in south by SAF/NCP, SSDF becomes a ‘cuckoo in the nest’
SPLA not paid due to withholding of oil revenues
(7) NCP v SPLM Relations
Continued disagreement over implementation of CPA - unity not made attractive to south
Increasing disagreement over GONU policy on Darfur
SPLM link with SLM and other northern groups against NCP
NCP manipulates southern politics - sponsors anti SPLM feelings – especially re elections
CPA Commissions to monitor CPA ineffective or perceived as biased
Spirit of CPA not there between parties – mistrust prevetns things moving forward
(8) South-South Relations
Legacy of war persists – polarisation of tribes – Anyanya, memory of 1991, Dinka in Equatoria etc.
Personal relationships/rivalries between southern leaders not reconciled/resolved
Ethnic tensions between tribes fostered and used for political gain or instability
SPLM and Other Political Parties split over ideology – especially re unity and secession
Reaction over Dinka dominance in Government or unequal representation in governance
Corruption is increasingly an issue increasing tensions between various actors and constituencies.
Intergovernmental relations between the tiers of government – especially GOSS v States.
Whilst all these are major threats to the CPA, they are all linked to the historic structural causes of conflict in Sudan. These threats speak about the dangers still posed to fair representation in power and fair distribution of wealth. They highlight the dangers to genuine safety and security. They especially expose the fragmented and fractured relationships and the politically ethnicized identities that so pervade this country and have dogged its history.
Whilst the structural causes have mainly been implemented and fostered by various Khartoum regimes and in the last 18 years by the NCP/NIF and mainly experienced by the Southerner Sudanese there are fears that some of these traits are now also starting to appear in the south in the practices if not yet in the policies of the GOSS. After so many years of being oppressed and excluded from governance it may 86
not be surprising that what the south has suffered it is also starting to act out (though some would argue this was present in the SPLM also). The abused becoming the abuser is a common psychological reality. Unless there is healing and reconciliation but also some boundaries and checks and balances put in place the potential for conflict, not only between north and south but within the south, is a possibility.
4. Urban Issues and the CPA
Whilst the above threats are common across all of Southern Sudan, the EPPIC program has an urban focus, therefore it is important to understand how these causes and potential threats may play out in Juba, Wau and Malakal and the other urban centres of the south as well as in the Transitional Areas. It is important to understand there are specific urban dynamics that can affect conflict and peace. Urban areas can be either positive or negative spaces. They can be active social and political agents capable of moving a society forward to either disruptive unrest or ethnic accommodation for example.
Negatively urban centres are capable through their physical and political qualities of exerting independent effects on ethnic tension, conflict, and violence with specific features and institutions of urban life having the capacity to generate large-scale violence. Skewed power structures and unequal urban opportunities seem to have the most significant influence on conflict and peace. The absence of good urban management conjures the influx of malign agents into the urban vacuum and facilitates the breeding of unjust institutions which, in total, could be of far greater destructive potential than any temporary approach that addresses the distribution of basic livability factors such as housing, water, sewage.
At the same time cities also provide opportunities for conflict transformation and embody agency through ‘networks of exchange’. However in Sudan urban conflict transformation and peace building has to be put on solid ground to render sustainable results, and it has to address some key issues identified in the assessments including the vast income and power gap between the haves and the have-nots, particularly given post war expectations and the close urban spatial proximity.
Urban action has the potential to contribute to the achievement of peace in Southern Sudan. However, the transition from potential spaces of crisis into livable towns where citizens receive basic services and enjoy protection from violence while exercising basic political rights remains a great challenge – especially to the Government of Southern Sudan but also to the other levels of government sharing these urban spaces – as well to the citizens who live there. Changing existing power structures is arguably the most difficult task everyone faces, and such efforts are inherently prone to incite further conflict – which are already surfacing. The main task of urban governance will be to create the incentive structures to make this transformation possible, and to empower the constituents of local polity.
The urban issues facing Southern Sudan seem to be similar across all locations;
Ethnic tensions – different groups living in proximity with historic tensions and differences
Land grabbing – by elites and by government from traditional owners
Presence of military in urban areas – whether SPLA, SAF, OAGS or a mixture
Poverty/inequality – the mass of urban poor who are excluded from the ‘peace dividends’
Unfair representation – either minorities excluded or elites by passing local actors
Corruption – in and by government skewing trade, development and use of limited resources
Northern interference of Southernpolitics – perceived to be pervasive by most Southerners
Poor urban management – poor services, dirty and uninhabitable conditions breeding discontent
Given this reality some of the objectives for the urban areas must be;
Improved local leadership/governance – effective and fair
Aware and active communities – able to articulate and address their issues
Enabling environment for law and policy – conducive to good urban life
Good links between citizens and government - developing local, state, national relationships
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Peaceful co-existence between ethnic groups and communities – building common identities
Functional networks of exchange and joint action - building critical mass for change
Good information through effective use of media to highlight issues – getting messages out
Increased civic participation and trust in urban areas – safe space and good neighbourhoods
This assessment and analysis of conflict has identified the threats in the main urban centres of Southern Sudan. It recognizes the commonalities between them whilst allowing for the specifics of each urban location to have its own characteristics. Again these specific characteristics are a product of both local history and also local personality. Finding solutions to the local threats will be a mixture of addressing the common root issues whilst accommodating the realities of local dynamics and local relationships within the framework of local personalities.
This brief analysis of the assessment findings can be summarised as follows;
• Conflict in Southern Sudan has a high degree of historical complexity which widens the scope of the response required to address conflict and build peace in specific parts of Southern Sudan. So many issues are inter-related and linked and are in need of addressing together. The positive and negative domino effect needs understanding.
• Structural issues need to be addressed whilst dealing with their proximate manifestations and immediate trigger events.
• Threats to the CPA at the local level are linked to key threats at the national level; ABC, borders, oil, and especially the referendum and elections.
• Local people feel strongly over local issues and over local injustices and will fight for local restitution and recompense. Land and natural resources are key to local livelihoods and misappropriation, mismanagement and miscarriages of justice are potential triggers of local conflict.
• Conflict in Sudan has always played on identity and ethnic difference. Working on these perceptions at the local level can help address the societal propensity for conflict.
• Anticipating potential conflict means starting immediately to mitigate that potential. Experience says that elections in Africa are often violent. In such a tense post conflict situation the elections in Southern Sudan are very vulnerable to violence. Campaigning early with local actors to prevent violent voting would be a positive intervention. Collaborating with other actors on this will increase impact further.
• Peace building is more than addressing conflict and needs a more integrated set of interventions than mitigating conflict.
• Local peace actors need good local government. Peace is not built alone – it needs a series of actions undertaken by a collaboration of actors. Local authorities are key to that to provide a lead and direction and the enabling environment.
• Urban spaces bring their own challenges to conflict and peace building. Understanding the urban dynamics of each location would help with early warning and in addressing structural issues.
• Indigenous capacity exists but faces many constraints. Local people are often the most disempowered of stakeholders. Work needs to be done to understand how local power systems operate and to develop mechanisms that really increase grassroots empowerment. Again the most vulnerable have the least leverage for change. Building networks of vulnerable people may increase what limited power they have.
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Section V
Conclusion
___________________________________________________
Conflict is a very human issue; it is as much personally pathological as it is about large scale policies or practices of governments or groups. It is about and between people, it is about relationships and their fractures, it is about psyche and perception. Each conflict is unique because its actors are unique, its dynamics are specific because of those specific personalities involved. Response to such conflict requires understanding those personalities. Power, pride and personal interest dictate as much if not, in some cases, more than thought out policy and practice.
Key mechanisms need to be identified or developed, particularly those that bring local government authorities together with local traditional leaders and other members of the community able and willing to play a role. Those mechanisms that already exist need to be strengthened as do those that bring different community groups together to share ideas and analysis and information. Roles and responsibilities need clarifying, and people need to be given the tools not only to analyse their problems but more especially know how they can bring about genuine changes to their situation. This requires a realistic assessment of possibilities and a realistic assessment of constraints and controls on the limits of change. Knowing the causes of conflict is the relatively easy bit. It is in identifying ways to transform conflict that is the real challenge, particularly for those at the grassroots who are often the least empowered of all the actors and stakeholders in conflict.
Next steps
The next stage is to share these assessments back in the locations from where the information was gathered and to begin to map out what can be done and by whom. EPPIC is only able to do certain things but there are other actors who can take up some actions that will be crucial to the mitigating of conflict and to the better establishment of peace in the community. The role of the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) is crucial in this in these urban centres especially. Overall there is need to work out the pathway of change for each location that identifies both EPPIC and other actors’ roles.
The pathways will be covered in the strategy for EPPIC that is being developed out of this analysis and assessment. This will identify entry points for the threats and conflicts that EPPIC is able to address. It will also identify one or two key structural issues that can be addressed across all locations – possibly around identity/ethnic issues. It will also highlight peace building opportunities that exist in each location.
In each place the assessment teams met with people and groups who could play a role in building peace if trained and resourced to do so, and the tools developed have helped begin the process of identification of who EPPIC can work with more specifically. In most locations some potential partners have already been identified, but more work needs to be done to understand their present and potential capabilities including their commitment to the long haul work that needs to be done.
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Bibliography
Johnson, D. H. (2003). The root causes of Sudan's civil wars. Oxford: James Currey
Keen, D. (1994). The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
Macaskill, U. (1999). Humanitarian Assistance in the Sudan in 1998. Confliction Prevention Network
Matus, J. (2006). The three areas: a template for regional agreements: Accord Sudan
Matus, J. (2007). The Transitional Areas and the CPA – An Overiew. Unpublished paper
Perks, R. (2006). Final Report on Lessons-Learned of Pact’s Sudan Country Program suppor towards peace committees in Southern Sudan. Nairobi: Pact Sudan
Perspectives on Peace Building. (2006). Nigeria: Human Securities in Conflict and Emergencies Unit, ActionAid International
Soil and Oil: Dirty Business in Sudan. (2006) Coalition for International Justice
Sudan Peace Fund Final Report. (2006) Nairobi: Pact Sudan
UNMIS Media Monitoring Report. (2007). UNMIS
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Annex 1 - The EPPIC Program
EPPIC was designed in response to a USAID Request for Applications (RFA) in 2006 that sought to “target and mitigate conflict in the urban centers and their counties in southern Sudan, key locations in the Three Areas, as well as other key flashpoint locations as identified, by building viable indigenous conflict resolution capacities”. The overall purpose for this focus is to ‘target and mitigate threats to the CPA at the local level’. The Program therefore developed four specific project objectives:
• To analyze critical threats to the CPA at the local level during 2006– 2011
• To address threats to the CPA in urban centers and their counties, as well as the former opposition-held territories in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Abyei and other flashpoints as identified
• To enhance the capacity of Traditional Authorities, Peace Committees and other peace actors by building their skills to be effective in resolving conflict
• To build the capacity of the GoSS Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC).
Over the course of the initial months of the program EPPIC staff undertook the research and assessments in some of the key program locations as the foundation for the development of its overall strategy and for the EPPIC work plan for the first year of implementation. This has entailed on going discussions with USAID and through that process a deeper understanding of the context and how EPPIC can contribute to addressing it has emerged.
While the focus of the RFA was on enhancing local capacities to address threats to the CPA at the local level and especially as they might lead to violent conflict it was also recognized that there is need to look at the positive opportunities to build peace and to develop the skills of local actors to know what that means and how to do it. This might seem an obvious thing to do but building peace is of a different order to mitigating threat or conflict. Peace is much more than the absence of violent conflict and requires a different set of skills and demands a different set of interventions and indicators.
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Annex 2 - EPPIC INDICATORS ON THREATS TO THE CPA
KEY Indicators on Threats to the CPA
1pts
2pts
3pts
4pts
Score
Max Score
Indicator Category
1
What is the degree of link to a critical CPA threat at the national level? I. Referendum VI. SPLA/SAF tensions II. Elections VII. NCP/SPLM Relations
III. Oil VIII. South-South Relations
IV. Borders - including Abyei IX. Regime Change
V. The Three Areas
Low
Medium
High
Very High
4
all
2
How many people have been affected / are expected to be affected?
10
100
1000
10,000
4
social
3
How many groups are involved?
One Group
Two Groups
Many
All Groups
4
social
4
What is the degree of inter-communal conflict?
Intra-tribal
Inter-tribal
Multiple-tribal
All Tribes
4
socio-ethnic
5
How many issues are driving this conflict?
Single
Two
Few
Multiple
4
socio-political
6
What level of military involvement in driving the conflict / threat – SPLA v SAF?
None
Small
Major
Total
4
political
7
What level of involvement of OAGs?
none
slight
Major
total
4
political/security
8
What is the degree of military involvement in addressing this conflict /threat?
None
Small
Major
Total
4
political/security
9
What level of arms is involved in the conflict /threat?
no arms
few small arms
all armed
small & large arms
4
political/security
10
How many people have been killed?
1 to 2
3 to 10
10+
100+
4
political/security
11
What is the capacity of the conflict threat to escalate?
None
Small
Possible
Highly Probable
4
political
12
What proximity to the centre is this conflict threat?
Peripheral
Distant
Close
In center
4
political
13
At what level is the highest politician addressing the conflict /threat?
Local
State
Sub-National
National
4
political
14
At what level are politicians/intellectuals involved in driving the conflict /threat?
Local
State
Sub-National
National
4
political
15
What level of organization is behind the conflict /threat?
Sponta-neous
Small
Some
Well Organized
4
political
16
What level of authority is addressing the conflict /threat?
county
state
Sub-National
National
4
Political
17
What level of capacity does the authority have to address the conflict /threat?
Good
Average
Poor
None
4
political
18
What is the scale of the conflict threat - Urban
OR - Rural
Ward Payam
Quarter State
large section State
Whole Inter-state
4
socio-political
19
How old is the grievance driving this conflict /threat?
<6months>20 years
4
socio-political
20
What is the possibility for a peaceful negotiation/intervention?
Highly Probable
Possible
Unlikely
None
4
social & political
21
What is the degree of consensus between communities and authorities?
together
Mostly together
Split
Opposed
4
Social
22
What is the level of tension resulting from the conflict /threat?
none
low
medium
high
4
Social
23
To what degree are the Youth affected by this conflict threat?
Low
Medium
High
Very High
4
Social
24
How many people are expected to have been directly or indirectly affected?
10s
100s
1,000s
10,000s
4
socio-economic
25
What is the potential for a large population movement (IDP or returnee)?
None
Small
Possible
Highly Probable
4
socio-economic
Total Score
100
93
Annex 3 - EPPIC SELECTION CRITERIA OF IDENTIFIED CONFLICT THREAT
Not Likely
Likely
Very Likely
Selection Criteria
0 pt
5 pts
10 pts
1
Threat to CPA Does the local conflict threat address or potentially contribute to addressing critical threats to the CPA?
2
Local Intervention Is risk & conflict escalation likely to be mitigated through local intervention?
3
EPPIC objectives Does the conflict fit within the context of EPPIC program objectives?
4
Potential for EPPIC intervention Can the conflict issue be directly or indirectly addressed by an NGO or local targeted EPPIC partners (peace committee/council, traditional leaders, etc)?
5
Potential Local Partner(s) Can an appropriate local partner(s) be identified to address this conflict?
6
Stakeholder involvement Is the majority of key stakeholders likely to be involved in finding a solution to the conflict threat?
7
Perceptions on local consensus-building Is there a genuine belief among key stakeholders that an NGO-led consensus building activity can successfully avert violent conflict?
8
South Sudan Peace Commission Does the SSPC see this as a genuine conflict threat?
9
EPPIC local presence Is the conflict threat located in a pre-established EPPIC location?
10
EPPIC program capacity Can EPPIC afford to address this initiative in terms of cost and competing priorities?
Total Score
/100
Note on criteria 5: 'appropriate' is defined as representative of the communities they claim to represent; have a history of peace building expertise; are seen as credible partners by Pact, USAID and the conflict/peace stakeholders.
Optional Comments
94
Annex 4 - EPPIC Partner Selection Scoring
Name of Organization
Director/Chairperson
Registered (yes or no)?
Other key members
Brief background on origins & history, particularly experience related to peace-building at the local level:
Low
Medium
High
Indicators
1 pt
3 pts
5pts
1
Capacity of organisation -- Admin/financial management -- Logistics -- Asset Management -- Staff Management
2
Capacity to implement -- Analytical ability -- Articulation of project proposal/issues -- Activity oversight & delivery -- Facilitation of dialogues or conferences -- Reporting and follow up ability
3
Legitimacy & Credibility in relations to the local community & with local authorities
4
Legitimacy & Credibility in relations to represented community (i.e., legitimate representatives)
5
Membership Representation of EPPIC targeted communities: women, youth & IDPs
6
Proven Peace Builders Expertise & Interest
7
Commitment to mediate conflict at the local level
8
Degree of Initiative Willingness to act without direct financial support
9
Networking Ability & commitment to link and include relevant external actors
10
Potential Commitment to expanding skills & techniques
Total Score
/ 50
SSPC consulted?
YES / NO
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About Me
- Steve Foreman
- Former professional soldier (British Army), former professional licensed safari guide (Africa), published freelance writer, professional security manager, currently security consultant (East Africa region)
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